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ABSTRACT 
In the nearly four decades since Professor Joe Sax published an 
article in the Michigan Law Review, there has been a flood of 
academic writing and court decisions on the public trust doctrine.  The 
vast majority of these articles and judicial opinions give a brief 
synopsis of the doctrine’s Roman, English and early American roots.  
In a nutshell, the generally accepted history is that from Justinian’s 
Institutes through Magna Carta and Bracton, Hale and Blackstone 
reporting on English law, and Chancellor Kent acknowledging the 
reception of English and Roman law in America, the public has deeply 
rooted rights in access to and use of resources important to the public 
welfare.  Arnold v. Mundy, Martin v. Waddell and Illinois Central 
Railroad v. Illinois are cited repeatedly as precedent for present day 
recognition of a doctrine that will limit the authority of the state to 
alienate resources while imposing constraints on governmental and 
private use of those resources.  As propounded by Professor Sax and 
the many adherents to his argument, an expansive public trust doctrine 
will restore the wisdom of antiquity while serving as a powerful tool 
for the protection and preservation of natural resources and the 
environment. 
The only problem with these ambitions for the public trust 
doctrine is that they rely on a mythological history of the doctrine.  
There was nothing resembling the modern idea of public trust in 
Roman law and the claimed restraint on alienation of state owned 
waters and lands is belied by a history of pervasive private ownership 
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in both Rome and England.  Magna Carta had little or nothing to do 
with such public rights, nor is there significant support in Bracton, 
Hale, or Blackstone for the imagined doctrine.  The one concept of 
English law on which the modern public trust doctrine relies – the 
prima facie rule pursuant to which title to submerged lands is 
presumed to be in the Crown absent a showing to the contrary – was a 
sixteenth century fabrication that did not take hold in England until 
late in the nineteenth century, well after American law had developed 
on its own.  Ironically, the invented prima facie rule served to feather 
the nest of the Crown, not to protect the rights of the public.  American 
law would serve the same government self-dealing many centuries later 
in Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi, though in the name of the public 
good. 
American public trust law, even today, is founded on a New 
Jersey decision that misunderstood the Roman and English history 
and contradicted the contemporary law and practice of that state.  That 
decision was overruled less than three decades later and only eight 
years after the United States Supreme Court had embraced its public 
trust theories in a title dispute to which it had no relevance.  A half 
century later, the Supreme Court revived the public trust concept, 
along with the mistaken history, in a case that has been badly 
misconstrued both legally and sociologically.  Professors Kearney and 
Merrill have set the record straight on the economic and political 
history, but the legal significance of Illinois Central continues to be 
misunderstood, notwithstanding the Court’s clear explanation of 
Illinois Central’s narrow holding only three decades later in Appleby 
v. City of New York. 
Relying on both original and secondary sources, this paper sets 
the historical record straight.  While the courts will do what they 
choose, those with expansive ideas about the public trust doctrine 
should be discomfited by the conclusions reached.  Presumably they 
and their academic enablers make persistent reference to the history of 
Roman and English law because they understand that precedent is 
important in a rule of law system.  If their claims for precedent are 
incorrect, as demonstrated in this paper, they must look to other 
justifications for a doctrine that threatens the property rights of 
millions of individuals while recognizing in the courts expansive 
powers to invalidate the democratic choices of the elected 
representatives of the people. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
At the dawn of the modern environmental movement, on the 
heels of the first Earth Day and before the enactment of most of 
today’s environmental regulations, Professor Joe Sax published an 
article that anticipated the challenges environmentalists would face in 
the legislative process and the successes they would achieve in the 
courts.1  The little known public trust doctrine, wrote Sax, could be a 
powerful tool for “effective judicial intervention” on behalf of 
environmental protection and natural resource conservation.2  Sax’s 
article spawned a still raging flood of academic commentary on the 
public trust doctrine and encouraged environmentalists across the 
country to petition for judicial intervention in the name of the public 
trust.  Sax later recognized the limited application of the doctrine 
historically,3 but he was optimistic about how the general concept of 
public rights might be expanded to impact all manner of natural 
resource and environmental management issues.4 
 1. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 473 (1970). 
 2. See id. at 474 (“Of all the concepts known to American law, only the public trust 
doctrine seems to have the breadth and substantive content which might make it useful as a tool 
of general application.”). 
 3. He later wrote an article suggesting how some of these historic limitations might be 
circumvented.  See infra note 21. 
 4. Sax, supra note 1, at 473. 
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Ambitions for an expanded public trust doctrine are numerous.  
Many writers have followed up on Professor Sax’s article with 
concrete proposals for application of the public trust doctrine to 
natural resource conservation and environmental protection.  A few 
examples are illustrative.  With the financial support of the federal 
government and under contract to the state of Connecticut, David 
Slade and several coauthors wrote an entire book on how the public 
trust doctrine might be applied to the management of the “lands, 
waters and living resources” of coastal states.5  Gary Meyers has 
argued that the public trust doctrine can be the vehicle for a more 
holistic approach to the management of wildlife and wildlife habitat.6  
Robert Fishman, noting that the public trust doctrine “has long held 
attraction for advocates of federal public land conservation,” suggests 
the legislative “mandate to make affirmative contributions toward the 
[National Wildlife Refuge] System mission provides a statutory basis 
for application of the public trust doctrine.”7  Samantha Bohrman 
argues that coalbed methane development “exacerbates an inequity 
between gas giants and farmers, ranchers, and common citizens[,] . . . 
[leaves] counties struggling to fund and maintain programs and 
infrastructure they can no longer afford[,] . . . [and] compromises the 
environment,  . . . [all of which] present[] a classic violation of the 
public trust doctrine.”8  Kristen Carpenter suggests that the public 
trust doctrine “may support the right of citizens (including American 
Indian citizens) to use public lands for religious and cultural 
purposes.”9  Alison Rieser makes the case for ecological preservation 
as a public property right under the public trust doctrine.10  A 
bibliography of papers suggesting innovative uses of the public trust 
doctrine in natural resources and environmental law would go on for 
many pages, and it would be even longer if it included proposals for 
applying the doctrine in other areas of the law.  For example, noting 
 5. DAVID C. SLADE ET AL., PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK: THE 
APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO THE MANAGEMENT OF LANDS, WATERS 
AND LIVING RESOURCES OF THE COASTAL STATES (1990). 
 6. Gary D. Meyers, Variation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine to Include 
Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENVTL. L. 723, 723 (1989). 
 7. Robert L. Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge System and the Hallmarks of 
Modern Organic Legislation, 29 ECOLOGY L. Q. 457, 581 (2002). 
 8. Samantha Bohrman, Groundwater Conservation and Coalbed Methane Development in 
the Powder River Basin, 24 LAW & INEQ. 181, 200-01 (2006). 
 9. Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting a 
Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1119-20 (2005). 
 10. Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging 
Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 432-33 (1991). 
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that “[t]he public-trust doctrine has proved useful in the past to 
correct government misallocations,” Patrick Ryan suggests that “it 
can also do so with the regulation of the electromagnetic spectrum.”11  
Keith Aoki suggests that the public trust doctrine provides a useful 
analogy for asserting public rights in intellectual property.12  The 
possibilities, it seems, are only limited by the imagination. 
While some commentators have been proposing concrete 
applications of the public trust doctrine, they and others have been 
considering the theoretical justifications for judicial intervention in 
the name of public, as opposed to individual, rights.  In a rule of law 
system committed to democratic government, this is not a simple 
problem since judicial intervention will often be in contravention of 
the actions of elected legislatures and executives.  In his 1970 article, 
Sax asserted, counter-intuitively, that the public trust doctrine is 
rooted in the requirements of democracy,13 a theory later elaborated 
on by Michael Blumm.14  Charles Wilkinson and Richard Epstein 
have made very different arguments for the doctrine having roots in 
the United States Constitution.15  William Araiza suggests that the 
doctrine has roots in state constitutional provisions to the extent that 
they guarantee appropriate consideration of environmental values in 
government decision making.16  Based on perceived convergences in 
ecology and economic theories, Alison Rieser suggests that the public 
trust doctrine might have its roots in the police powers of the states.17  
Carol Rose has looked beyond public trust law to public prescription 
and custom to find a unifying theme rooted in the idea of “inherently 
 11. Patrick S. Ryan, Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine and Principles of Natural 
Resource Management to Electromagnetic Spectrum, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
285, 335 (2004). 
 12. Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-So-
Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 11, 39-40 (1998). 
 13. Sax, supra note 1, at 491-556. 
 14. Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law: A 
Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573 (1989). 
 15. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the 
Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 458-59 (1989); Richard A. 
Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 426-28 (1987). 
 16. William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process Based 
Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive Environmental 
Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385, 450-51 (1997). 
 17. Rieser, supra note 10, at 395. 
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public property” held and managed by the “unorganized public.”18  In 
a paper written many years ago, I examined several possible 
theoretical foundations for the public trust doctrine and concluded 
that it is best understood as an aspect of property law.19 
Despite thirty-seven years of litigation and a flood of academic 
speculation on how Sax’s public trust vision might emerge as the 
beacon for judicial intervention in conservation and environmental 
protection, there has not been widespread application of the doctrine 
beyond the waters and submerged lands to which it originally 
applied.20  As early as 1980, Professor Sax himself recognized the 
problem.  It seemed the reach of the public trust doctrine was limited 
by its “historic shackles.”21  Many courts, it turns out, have been less 
inclined to active intervention in resource management than 
Professor Sax and his many followers have hoped.  But the drumbeat 
continues in the academy and among environmental groups, and a 
few courts have taken up the invitation to “liberate” the doctrine by 
applying it to non-navigable waters for an expanded array of uses and 
to resources having little or nothing to do with navigable waters.22 
Most courts responding favorably to Professor Sax’s urging that 
the historic shackles of the doctrine be removed have done so in one 
of two ways, both of which keep the doctrine tied to water.  One 
 18. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 721 (1986). 
 19. See generally James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a 
Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527 (1989). 
 20. However, the doctrine has been employed expansively by some states within the 
context of water and submerged lands.  The most publicized case is National Audubon Society v. 
Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 passim (Cal. 1983).  Other state cases dramatically expanded the 
reach of the doctrine.  See Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 167-71 
(Mont. 1984); Matthews v. Bay Head Imp. Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 passim (N.J. 1984); Just v. 
Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768-69 (Wis. 1972) (expanding the doctrine to include 
shorelands). 
 21. Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 185 (1980). 
 22. For example, the Illinois case of Paepcke v. Public Building Co., 263 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. 
1970), has been cited often as an example of the application of the public trust doctrine to park 
lands unrelated to any navigable waters.  While the court does speak of public parks as subject 
to a public trust, it upholds a challenged change of use on the basis of a clear legislative 
authorization of the change.  Paepcke, 263 N.E.2d at 21.  As recently as 2003, the Illinois court 
reaffirmed the holding in Friends of Parks v. Chicago Park Dist., 786 N.E.2d 161, 170 (Ill. 2003).  
In In re Steuart Transportation Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980), a federal district court 
stated that “[u]nder the public trust doctrine, the State of Virginia and the United States have 
the right and the duty to protect and preserve the public’s interest in natural wildlife resources. 
Such right does not derive from ownership of the resources but from a duty owing to the 
people.” 
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approach has been to expand public trust uses beyond navigation, 
commerce, fishing and bathing.  In the most celebrated modern public 
trust case of National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,23 the 
California Supreme Court held that the public trust doctrine protects 
ecological and recreational uses as well as navigation, commerce and 
fishing.  The other approach has been to extend the geographic reach 
of the doctrine by applying it to waters that are neither tidal nor 
navigable in fact.  The National Audubon case extended the doctrine 
in this way,24 as did the Montana Supreme Court decision in Montana 
Coalition of Stream Access v. Curran.25  The geographic scope also has 
been expanded to uplands in some states.  For example, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court has held that the public trust doctrine 
guarantees a public right of beach access across private, non-tidal 
uplands.26 
Few cases or commentaries on the public trust doctrine fail to 
mention the Roman roots of the doctrine.  Specifically, they have 
reference to Justinian and quote this language: “Things common to 
mankind by the law of nature, are the air, running water, the sea, and, 
consequently the shores of the sea.”27  Upon these few words from 
antiquity, environmental advocates, and at least a few American 
courts, have sought to build the foundation of what they hope will 
become a grand edifice of public rights in natural resources and 
environmental protection.  But Justinian is not the hero in this 
struggle against the forces of development and environmental 
destruction – he was merely summarizing the laws of his time for the 
benefit of young law students.28  The hero is Professor Joe Sax whose 
1970 article called for “effective judicial intervention” in natural 
resource management through resort to the public trust doctrine.29 
Much ink has been spilled over the past four decades, both in 
academic articles and judicial decisions, on the public trust doctrine 
and its historic foundations.  This is as it should be in a rule of law, 
 23. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 719. 
 24. Id. (including tributaries of navigable waters in the geographic reach of the public trust 
doctrine). 
 25. Curran, 682 P.2d at 171 (holding that the doctrine applied to all waters in the state 
capable of recreational use). 
 26. Matthews v. Bay Head Imp. Ass’n, 471 A.2d 335, 368.  The New Jersey court 
reaffirmed the Matthews holding in Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, 879 
A.2d 112, 113 (2005), but said that the private beach club could impose a reasonable fee. 
 27. JUSTINIAN, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 2.1.1 (Thomas Cooper trans. & ed., 1841). 
 28. See id. 
 29. Sax, supra note 1, at 474. 
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precedent-based legal system.  What can one more study of the 
subject add to what we already know?  A fair amount, it turns out, 
because what we think we know about the history of the public trust 
doctrine is often a distortion and sometimes just plain wrong.  Even a 
cursory review of the literature and case law reveals a lot of wishful 
thinking and not very much sound historical research.  In a sense, the 
widespread misrepresentation of the history of the public trust 
doctrine is apt because the lawmakers themselves often have been 
party to the distortions.  Bracton, often cited for the notion that the 
English common law had embraced the Roman law as described by 
Justinian, either misunderstood or misrepresented the law of Rome,30 
and, most probably, was himself stating an aspiration for the common 
law rather than reporting on the actual laws of his time.31  Hale 
endorsed a rule of presumptive Crown ownership of submerged, tidal 
lands that had been fabricated from whole cloth by a title hunter in 
service to himself and the Crown.32  Chancellor Kent, with reference 
to English law, announced an American law of title to submerged 
lands that reflected neither the law nor the fact of English practice.33  
And so it is with most modern advocates of the expansive public trust 
doctrine proposed by Professor Sax almost four decades ago.  They 
are making it up as they go, but in the tradition of some of the 
common law’s greatest lawyers. 
The history of the public trust doctrine remains important for 
several reasons.  First, where a generation of scholars and several 
generations of judges have misunderstood or misrepresented the 
history of a legal doctrine, the record should be corrected for its own 
 30. Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 
SEA GRANT L. J. 13, 37 (1976) (“Bracton omits, for example, the passage from the Institutes 
which said that the property of the seashore was in no one, probably because he was well aware 
that some of the foreshore was held by private individuals.”). 
 31. Id. at 36 (“[W]here Bracton relies on Roman law, and specifically where he lays down 
the rule that the sea and seashore were common to all and asserts that the general public had 
the right to use river banks for towing and mooring and the foreshore for cottages and the 
drying of nets, he is most probably describing a rule of law he thought desirable, relying on the 
codified wisdom of the Roman law as a model for the common law, and not stating a rule that 
actually obtained in England at the time.”). 
 32. MATTHEW HALE, A TREATISE DE JURE MARIS ET BRACHIORUM EJUSDEM (1670), 
reprinted in STUART A. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING 
THERETO 370, 373 (1888). 
 33. English law was set forth in The Royal Fishery of the River Banne, (1611) 80 Eng. Rep. 
540 (see discussion infra note 160).  In Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. 307 (N.Y. 1908), Chancellor 
Kent misinterpreted the rule of River Banne in stating the rule of title to submerged lands.  Kent 
repeated this error in his Commentaries.  See Merritt Starr, Navigable Waters of the United 
States – State and National Control, 35 HARV. L. REV. 154, 166 (1921). 
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sake.  Second, the fact that both academics and judges have 
consistently felt obliged to demonstrate that the laws of today and 
tomorrow have historic pedigree indicates their understanding that 
precedent remains important in our legal system.  To the extent they 
are prepared to press ahead with legal interpretations not supported 
by precedent, particularly where those interpretations come in the 
form of judicial intervention in legislative and administrative law 
making and enforcement, they are implicitly, though seldom 
explicitly, urging (or undertaking, in the case of judges) a law and 
policy making role for judges.  They should be expected to articulate 
their theory of judging and not be permitted to hide behind false 
claims of adherence to precedent.  Finally, there is a wisdom of 
experience reflected in the laws of Rome, England, and early 
America that can inform today’s resource allocation and 
environmental protection challenges, but only if we understand what 
those laws actually were. 
What follows is straightforward.  The first section recounts the 
myth that is the generally accepted version of public trust history.  
The second section examines relevant Roman law precedent.  English 
common law origins of the doctrine are examined in the third section.  
The fourth part of the paper is a review of nineteenth and early 
twentieth century public trust law in the United States, including 
Supreme Court case law to the present.  Because American law has 
generally linked the public trust doctrine to state ownership of 
resources, the fifth section discusses the law of state ownership, first 
with respect to submerged lands and then with respect to wildlife.  
The sixth and concluding section argues that expansions of the public 
trust doctrine cannot be rooted in history, and therefore must be 
founded upon a sound theory of judicial intervention in the decisions 
of democratic government, if a suitable such theory can be devised. 
II.  THE MYTHOLOGICAL  
HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
In a nutshell, the generally accepted storyline goes like this.  
Roman law, as communicated to us across the centuries by Justinian, 
recognized and protected public rights in especially important natural 
resources.34  These public rights constituted the jus publicum.35  We 
suspect that the Romans inherited the idea from earlier civilizations 
 34. JUSTINIAN, supra note 27. 
 35. Id. 
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(of the Golden Age during which resources belonged to no one and 
everyone was well provided for, but that is a different story),36 but we 
place the provenance of this public trust at least as early as the 
Romans because Justinian recorded – to paraphrase – that air, 
flowing water, the sea and the shores of the sea are by natural law 
common to all.37  Here is Professor Sax’s summary of this part of the 
story: 
Long ago there developed in the law of the Roman Empire a legal 
theory known as the “doctrine of the public trust.”  It was founded 
upon the very sensible idea that certain common properties, such as 
rivers, the seashore, and the air, were held by the government in 
trusteeship for the free and unimpeded use of the general public.38 
Sax goes on to suggest that “[o]ur contemporary concerns about ‘the 
environment’ bear a very close conceptual relationship to this 
venerable legal doctrine.”39  In fact there is no evidence whatsoever 
that the Roman concept of jus publicum has even a distant 
relationship to contemporary concerns for the environment, nor is 
there any indication that Roman law had anything resembling the 
modern notion of trust, but I digress. 
Commentators and the occasional judge pick up the story about 
seven centuries later with the English judge Henry of Bracton who 
reported in his De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae that the jus 
publicum of Roman law was also the law of England.40  Sometimes 
Magna Carta is part of the story, notwithstanding the inconvenient 
fact that it “is primarily a protest by the landed barons against 
infringement on their property rights,”41 rather than a declaration of 
the rights of the general public.  However, it bolsters the public trust 
concept to assert that “[t]he main purpose of the Magna Charta was 
to restrict the king’s power by pronouncing that the sovereign was 
subject to the citizens,” making it “a defining moment in public rights 
to the coastline.”42 
Our story continues across the Atlantic.  “British settlers brought 
the concept of the public trust to America when they claimed 
 36. See Deveney, supra note 30, at 26. 
 37. See Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 167-71 (Mont. 1984). 
 38. JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 163-64 (1971). 
 39. Id. at 164. 
 40. See, e.g., Deveney, supra note 30, at 36. 
 41. Id. at 39. 
 42. James M. Kehoe, The Next Wave in Public Beach Access: Removal of States as Trustees 
of Public Trust Properties, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1921 (1995). 
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ownership by the right of discovery.”43  Actually, it was the English 
Crown that claimed by right of discovery.44  Most settlers claimed 
ownership pursuant to grants from the Crown,45 grants one might 
expect to be important to subsequent resource allocation disputes.  
Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale’s treatise De Jure Maris et 
Brachiorum Ejusdem46 is most often cited as the authority relied upon 
by American courts, although “[t]here is no suggestion whatsoever of 
a public trust in Lord Hale’s writings . . . .”47  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court decision in Arnold v. Mundy is generally cited as the 
first case to apply the doctrine on American soil.48  But it is always 
best to have a United States Supreme Court opinion to rely upon, 
even when we are talking about state law, so the story of the history 
of the public trust doctrine concludes with Illinois Central Railroad 
Co. v. Illinois.49  However, what public trust advocates generally 
ignore is that Illinois Central actually was a contract clause case, and 
the Court was ambivalent as to whether the contract was invalid 
because the state violated the trust or because the revocation of the 
grant was not an impairment of contract in light of the trust.50 
Upon the foundation of this widely accepted history of the public 
trust doctrine, advocates for resource conservation and 
environmental protection have sought to erect the grand edifice of 
judicial intervention proposed by Professor Sax in his 1970 article.  
Supporters of the Sax project have had some successes, but many 
courts have declined invitations to expand the doctrine, and at least a 
few fellow-travelers have expressed concerns about the wisdom and 
viability of the public trust doctrine as the silver bullet of 
environmental protection.51 
 43. Id. at 1924. 
 44. Deveney, supra note 30, at 41. 
 45. Id. 
 46. HALE, supra note 32. 
 47. Deveney, supra note 30, at 48. 
 48. 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821). 
 49. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 460 (1892). 
 50. Id. at 462-63. 
 51. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in 
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 715 (1986) 
(stating that the public trust doctrine is a step backwards); Richard Delgado, Our Better 
Natures: A Revisionist View of Joseph Sax’s Public Trust Theory of Environmental Protection 
and Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of Law Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1209, 1226 (1991) 
(stating that Sax’s theory “forestalled more serious consideration of humanity’s relationship 
with the natural world”); Rose, supra note 18, at 781 (stating that “[i]n the absence of the 
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Of course there is another century of public trust doctrine 
history, but most of that is the story of what has happened since 
Professor Sax wrote his seminal 1970 article.  I will comment on that 
history later in this paper, but my central purpose is to explain the 
errors and deficiencies in the generally accepted story recounted 
above.  I recognize that I may be tilting at windmills in trying to set 
the story straight, but in that case I will not be the first.52  As we have 
learned in so many contexts, including many cases of false forecasts of 
environmental hazard, truth often struggles in the face of repetitious 
assertions of myth. 
III.  ROMAN LAW AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
An enthusiastic Yale law student, writing at the same time as 
Sax, urged “proponents of the public trust . . . [to] hold the original 
Roman law up as a useful model of doctrinal purity to which we 
should return.”53  “If Roman citizens had these rights,” asks the 
student rhetorically, “why shouldn’t we?”54  Indeed, why shouldn’t 
we?  As we shall see, it turns out Roman citizens had no such rights.55  
Of course, that is no reason we should not have them, but it is a 
reason we should not base our claim on the precedent of Roman law, 
as public trust advocates have done consistently over four decades. 
What we know about Roman law is relatively little compared to 
what we know about our own law or even the law of medieval 
England.  We are limited to a relatively few sources that have 
survived, many of which are seen through the gloss of much later 
translations and edits.  More significantly, we are limited by our own 
frame of reference.  The challenge of understanding historic laws in 
their own time is great, even within our own legal system over a mere 
century or two.  The challenge is twofold: first, words do not have 
constant meaning over time, even assuming nothing has been lost in 
translation from one language to another; and second, our moral 
judgments can easily influence our understanding and assessment of 
socializing activities that take place on ‘inherently public property,’ the public is a shapeless 
mob”). 
 52. I have relied heavily on the work of two individuals, Patrick Deveney, supra note 30, 
and Glenn MacGrady, infra note 58, whose historical research and analyses have been generally 
ignored.  Before them, Stuart Moore’s comprehensive treatise, supra note 32, was similarly 
ignored. 
 53. Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 
YALE L. J. 762, 764 (1970). 
 54. Id. at 787 n.113. 
 55. See infra pp. 14-23. 
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past laws.  This latter challenge of what some have called 
“presentism”56 can lead us to misunderstand or misrepresent the 
motivations of historic lawmakers either because our own morality 
condemns what we take to be the intended results of historic laws or 
because, out of its historic context, the law’s purpose appears 
consistent with that to which we aspire – as in the case of the public 
trust doctrine. 
A charitable view of the widespread reliance by environmental 
advocates on a mistaken understanding of Roman law would hold 
that they, like me, have neither the time nor language skills to do a 
thorough study of the Roman law as it related to the sea, seashore, 
and navigable waters of the Roman Empire.  My solution has been to 
do what research I can without fluency in Latin and to rely heavily on 
two superb articles: Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An 
Historical Analysis by Patrick Deveney57 and The Navigability 
Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical Development, 
Current Importance, and Some Doctrines that Don’t Hold Water by 
Glenn MacGrady.58  What is puzzling, and might be cause for less 
charity, is how seldom these articles have been cited in the vast public 
trust literature,59 most of which begins with a brief reference to the 
Roman law.  One suspects that Deveney and MacGrady have been 
ignored not because their work is questioned, but because their 
conclusions are inconvenient for the judicial intervention project 
 56. Variously defined as the application of current standards to historical figures and 
events.  See Lynn Hunt, Against Presentism, AM. HIST. ASS’N PERSP., May 2002, at 7-9, available 
at http://www.historians.org/Perspectives/issues/2002/0205/0205pre1.cfm. 
 57. Deveney, supra note 30. 
 58. Glenn J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: 
Historical Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines that Don’t Hold Water, 3 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 511 (1975). 
 59. Since 1990, there have been over 1700 articles that make reference to the public trust 
doctrine.  Of these, over 420 mention Roman history.  Deveney’s article, supra note 30, is cited 
in only thirty-six and MacGrady’s, supra note 58, in only thirty-one.  Among the few articles 
citing both Deveney and MacGrady (seventeen of the 420) is Carol Rose’s The Comedy of the 
Commons, supra note 18.  Rose acknowledges that the historical foundations of the public trust 
doctrine are shaky at best.  She looks largely to nineteenth century American case law in an 
effort to explain the persistence of the idea of public rights (in the context of public trust, 
prescription and custom) in the face of a generally pervasive acceptance of private property as 
the better way to allocate scarce resources.  For a discussion of Rose’s conclusion, see infra text 
accompanying note 186.  Deveney and MacGrady were not the first to be ignored.  As 
MacGrady notes, Stuart Moore, author of A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE, supra note 32, at 
552, wrote at length on the Roman and English laws of submerged lands yet “remains relatively 
unknown.” 
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launched by Professor Sax.60  Indeed, I have found no work that 
challenges either author’s conclusions about Roman or English law.61 
The gemstone of modern public trust law, widely quoted in the 
literature and case law, is Justinian’s declaration that “[t]hings 
common to mankind by the law of nature, are the air, running water, 
the sea, and, consequently, the shores of the sea; no man therefore is 
prohibited from approaching any part of the seashore . . . .”62  The 
first clue that something might not be as it seems in this oft quoted 
language is the ellipses appearing at the end of the quotation, at least 
when properly quoted.  What follows immediately in the same 
sentence after “seashore” is “whilst he abstains from damaging farms, 
monuments, [and buildings], which are not in common as the sea is.”63  
But is not the point that Roman law protected the sea and seashore 
from private use to assure free access for all the public?  What are 
these farms, monuments and buildings that the public must not harm 
doing on the seashore?  Here is what Deveney has to say on the 
subject: 
[T]here was . . . a sentiment, primarily Stoic and philosophical, that 
unless and until a private person or the state required exclusive 
control of the resource, the sea and shore should be open for the 
use of all.  In light of the vast coastal area of the Roman Mare 
Nostrum, the generally low population density outside the cities, 
and the even lower percentage of the population with sufficient 
means to utilize coastal lands, such an attitude was not impractical.  
However, to concentrate on this aspect of Roman law to the 
exclusion of its complements – state grants of exclusive rights and 
 60. Neither Deveney nor MacGrady takes an “anti-environmentalist” stance, indeed one 
suspects that either could be supportive of many of the objectives of public trust advocates.  But 
one can only guess about their policy preferences because their focus is on the role of the law 
and the courts in resolving the “conflict between bona fide competing interests” in coastal areas.  
“This conflict,” says Deveney, “cannot be avoided by the use of such historical talismans as the 
public trust or by simple appeal to supposed moral imperatives and uncritical sentiment rooted 
in myth.”  Deveney, supra note 30, at 81. 
 61. To their credit, Michael Blumm and Lucus Ritchie acknowledge that “recent 
scholarship has questioned Justice Kirkpatrick’s interpretation of English precedent” in Arnold 
v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821), citing Anna R.C. Caspersen, The Public Trust Doctrine and the 
Impossibility of “Takings” by Wildlife, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 367 (1996), and MacGrady, 
but not Deveney.  Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: 
The American Rule of Capture, 35 ENVTL. L. 673 (2005).  The more common reaction to the 
contrarian history of MacGrady and Deveney has been in the vein of what Professor Eric 
Freyfogle wrote in commenting on Blumm’s and Ritchie’s draft article: “My bottom line is that 
the public trust doctrine did build upon a solid body of English legal materials; the only thing 
new was the phrasing of the idea.” Id. at 694 n.137. 
 62. JUSTINIAN, supra note 27. 
 63. Id. 
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individual acquisition of ownership by occupation – is to 
misunderstand the Roman law and to ignore the economic realities 
of the time.64 
That the Roman law did not really guarantee an inalienable 
public right to use and access the sea and seashore does not mean that 
the public had no rights at all.  Roman law provided for several forms 
of injunctive and restitutionary relief (interdicta), including popular 
injunctions that granted standing to all citizens to protect the public’s 
rights.65  One popular injunction allowed citizens to challenge 
obstructions to navigation or docking and to shoreline footpaths, with 
restoration of the status quo ante as the remedy (though only 
damages could be sought for obstructions to navigation and fishing on 
the sea).66  Another cause enforced a prohibition on changing stream 
flows by blocking or diverting waters, whether or not it affected 
navigation.67  Individual citizens could seek an injunction against 
interferences with navigation or with anyone bringing cattle to drink 
at the shore.68  Anyone actually injured by the building of a pier or 
breakwater was entitled to injunctive relief and presumably 
damages.69  But, says Deveney, “[t]he actual effect of these 
injunctions was negligible . . . .  They were granted ex parte and 
without investigation into the actual situation; consequently, the 
interdicts were phrased hypothetically and amounted to no more than 
a mere statement of the rule the praetor recogni
Legal remedies aside, references to Roman law have suggested a 
strong philosophical commitment to the notion of common or public 
rights.  Justinian wrote “[r]ivers and ports are public; hence the right 
of fishing in a port, or in rivers are in common.”71  While 
acknowledging that Justinian may not have been stating the law as it 
was in fact, commentators Smith and Sweeney recently have written 
that “[u]nder a remarkable philosophy of natural resource 
 64. Deveney, supra note 30, at 21-22.  MacGrady notes that the Digests explicitly recognize 
the private right to appropriate shore lands by building on them.  “If one builds in the sea or on 
the seashore, although not on his own land, yet nevertheless he by the jus gentium makes it his.” 
MacGrady, supra note 58, at 533 (citation omitted). 
 65. See MacGrady, supra note 58, at 521, for a discussion of the enforcement of rights on 
public rivers by interdict and for a discussion of the difference in Roman law between private 
and public rivers. 
 66. Deveney, supra note 30, at 24. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 24. 
 70. Id. 
 71. JUSTINIAN, supra note 27, at 2.1.2. 
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preservation, the Romans implemented a concept of ‘common 
property’ and extended public protection to the air, rivers, sea, and 
seashores, which were unsuited to private ownership and dedicated to 
the use of the general public.”72  They go on to suggest that “this 
public trust concept resonated throughout medieval Europe . . . .”73  
But what did the Romans really mean by “common to all,” and is it 
really plausible that a continent of warring kings and barons 
embraced a philosophy of sharing? 
Deveney concludes that the concept of “things common to all” 
originated with the third century jurist Marcian who adopted the idea 
of a Golden Age from the classical poets and philosophers.74  In this 
Golden Age of antiquity, writes Deveney, “until greed gave birth to 
private property, all things were held in common and the earth 
naturally produced its fruits for the benefit of all.”75  But then there 
was trouble.  There arose “the age of hard iron . . . .  [T]he land which 
had previously been common to all, like the sunlight and the breezes, 
was now divided up far and wide by boundaries, set by cautious 
surveyors.”76  Marcian’s list of things common to all included air, 
flowing water, the sea and the seashore.77  Dry land was not included, 
suggests Deveney, probably “because it had long been ‘divided up far 
and wide by boundaries, set by cautious surveyors.’”78  And it was 
already divided up because of the economic realities of third century 
Rome.  This myth of a Golden Age of antiquity, in which there was 
no private property and all shared equally the bounty of the earth, is 
very similar to the modern day myths about the relationship between 
aboriginal Americans and the earth and water they depended upon 
for survival.79  In both cases, “things common to all” were so in part 
because of the physical nature of the particular resources and the 
limits of technology, but mostly because supply was abundant and 
demand slight.  “In actuality,” says Deveney, “the sea and the seashore 
were ‘common to all’ only insofar as they were not yet appropriated to 
 72. George P. Smith II & Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and Natural 
Law: Emanations within a Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307, 310 (2006). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Deveney, supra note 30, at 26. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 27 (quoting THE METAMORPHOSES OF OVID 31-32 (Mary M. Innes, trans., 
1966)). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. James L. Huffman, An Exploratory Essay on Native Americans and Environmentalism, 
63 U. COLO. L. REV. 901, 901 (1992). 
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the use of anyone or allocated by the state.”80  “It was their character as 
‘things common to all’ that made the sea and seashore capable of 
individual appropriation.”81  The law of private acquisition was set 
forth clearly in the Digest: 
If I drive piles into the sea . . . and if I build an island in the sea, it 
becomes mine at once, because what is the property of no one 
becomes that of the occupier.82 
What a person builds on the seashore becomes his, because beaches 
are not public in the same way as those things which are in the 
patrimony of the people, but as those things which were at first 
produced by nature and which have not yet come into ownership of 
anyone; their condition is not unlike that of fish and wild beasts, 
which, as soon as they are taken, become without doubt the 
property of those into whose hands they have fallen.83 
That “things common to all” are those things free for the taking 
and conversion to private property turns on its head the modern 
reliance on Roman law as the foundation for the public trust doctrine.  
Worse yet for the modern public trust doctrine, which most often is 
offered as a limit on the states’ ability to dispose of state owned lands 
and waters, is “that there were no restraints whatever imposed by law 
on the power of the sovereign to convey public land, including the sea 
and seashore.  All such restraints were in fact made impossible by the 
basic premise of Roman Law: ‘That which pleases the Emperor has 
the force of law.’”84  While most advocates of the public trust doctrine 
will have few sympathies for the Roman emperors, they may have 
sympathies for democratic government, which causes a theoretical 
problem for the modern public trust doctrine to which I will return.85 
Another problem for those who rely on Roman law as precedent 
for the modern public trust doctrine is that Roman law made no 
distinction, until very late in the Empire, between the public and the 
personal status of the ruler.86  Without this distinction, the concept of 
the jus publicum (as distinguished from jus privatum), upon which the 
public trust doctrine depends, makes no sense.  Unless all properties 
 80. Deveney, supra note 30, at 29 (emphasis in original). 
 81. Id. at 30. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Deveney, supra note 30, at 32-33.  Of course this is the same principle that gave the 
English Parliament unlimited authority to dispose of any and all public lands of Britain.  See 
infra text following note 122. 
 85. See infra text accompanying notes 308-09. 
 86. Deveney, supra note 30, at 17. 
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held by the ruler are in the nature of jus publicum, which was clearly 
not the case in the Roman Empire, there must be some basis for 
distinguishing those resources the ruler can alienate or in which he 
can grant private rights of use from those he cannot.  It is one thing to 
hold that “things held in common” are open for all to use “unless and 
until a private person or the state required exclusive control of the 
resource,”87 as Roman law did.  It is quite a different thing to hold 
that the state cannot alienate or grant exclusive rights of use to 
common resources because the sovereign’s title is held subject to a 
restraint in the nature of an easement held by the public independent 
from the sovereign, as modern public trust advocates would have it.88  
As a theoretical matter, the latter rule is plausible where the 
sovereign is independent of the people, although it was not the case in 
Rome.  But where the sovereign is the people, as in the United States, 
advocates of the latter approach have some theoretical scrambling to 
do.  As we will see later in this paper, the distinction between the 
public and personal status of the king came late to the English 
common law as well, but that is a problem for reliance on common 
law precedent to which we will turn imminently.89 
Contrary to the ubiquitous assertion that the public trust 
doctrine originated with the Romans, the reality is: 
Roman law was innocent of the idea of trusts, had no idea at all of a 
“public” (in the sense we use the term) as the beneficiary of such a 
trust, allowed no legal remedies whatever against state allotment of 
land, exploited by private monopolies everything (including the sea 
and the seashore) that was worth exploiting, and had a general idea 
of public rights that is quite alien to our own.90 
Thus, Roman law seems to offer little to those seeking the comfort or 
reassurance of well pedigreed legal precedence.  The reality of life in 
the Roman Empire was that “all of the marine and coastal area 
resources that it was possible for the technology of the Romans to 
exploit were either in private ownership or were leased to 
monopolies . . . .”91  The Stoics and other philosophers of classical 
Greece provided both Romans and modern Americans with lovely 
visions of a plentiful earth without boundaries.  But this Golden Age 
 87. Id. at 21. 
 88. See, e.g., Blumm, supra note 14, at 580. 
 89. See infra Part IV. 
 90. Deveney, supra note 30, at 17. 
 91. Id. at 33.  MacGrady agrees with this conclusion: “Roman law evidently tolerated 
appropriations of the seashore in the nature of private ownership.”  MacGrady, supra note 58, 
at 533. 
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existed only in legend and myth.  “The [Roman] rule that ‘the sea and 
seashore are by nature common to all’ reflected a philosophic 
commitment to the freedom of elemental things for all men, even 
though its legal effect was to make the sea and shore available for 
private appropriation.”92 
IV.  COMMON LAW AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
Roman law with respect to navigable waters was formally 
introduced to the common law by Bracton who included parts of 
Justinian’s commentary on the sea and seashore in his thirteenth 
century work.93  Although Bracton purported to be restating the law 
of England at the time he wrote, “he is most probably describing a 
rule of law he thought desirable, relying on the codified wisdom of 
the Roman law as a model for the common law, and not stating a rule 
that actually obtained in England at the time.”94  Thus, modern public 
trust advocates have not only the precedent of Roman law as they 
wish to understand it, but the precedent of Bracton’s summation of 
English law as he wished to understand it.  But before Bracton wrote, 
there was Magna Carta which contained two chapters of possible 
relevance. 
Chapter 16 of Magna Carta states: “No riverbanks shall be 
placed in defense from henceforth except such as were so placed in 
the time of King Henry, our grandfather, by the same places and the 
same bounds as they were wont to be in his time.”95  This provision 
was a reaction to the kings having placed “as well fresh as salt rivers 
in defense for [the kings’ recreation]; that is, to bar fishing and fowling 
in a river till the King had taken his pleasure or advantage of the writ 
de defensione ripariae.”96  Although this limitation on the Crown 
would eventually resemble the kind of public right imagined for the 
modern public trust doctrine, at the time it appears that the writ de 
 92. Deveney, supra note 30, at 34. 
 93. BRACTON, 2 DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 39-40 (1256), available at 
http://hlsl5.law.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/brac-hilite.cgi?Unframed+English+2+40+public. 
 94. Deveney, supra note 30, at 36.  MacGrady suggests that Bracton was not distorting 
Roman law, rather that he was borrowing from the language of the Institutes to the extent that 
it conformed to his understanding of English law at the time.  MacGrady, supra note 58, at 556. 
 95. MAGNA CARTA CHAPT. 16, art. 20 (Eng. 1225).  The quoted language is from the 1225 
version of Magna Carta.  It was derived from Chapter 47 of the 1215 version that provided: “All 
forests that have been made such in our time shall forthwith be disafforsted; and a similar 
course shall be followed with regard to river banks that have been placed ‘in defense’ by us in 
our time.” 
 96. HALE, supra note 32. 
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defensione ripariae was objected to because it required the riparian 
owner to repair, at his own expense, roads and bridges in preparation 
for the king’s fishing expeditions.97  Eventually Chapter 16 would be 
understood as a prohibition on the king’s granting of exclusive 
fisheries, but not until the nineteenth century.98  As late as 1768 the 
courts still acknowledged the king’s authority to grant exclusive 
fisheries,99 although the burden of proof was on the party claiming the 
exclusive grant.100  Thus, the Roman rule that the coastal area 
resources were open for common use until occupied or granted by the 
ruler remained the law of England for several centuries after Magna 
Carta with the not unimportant later modification that the right was 
prima facie in the Crown, placing the burden on anyone claiming an 
exclusive right.  But this prima facie rule did not become fully 
accepted until late in the nineteenth century101 and the law with 
respect to fisheries was not the same as the law with respect to 
submerged lands.102 
Chapter 23 of Magna Carta provides that: “All weirs for the 
future shall be utterly put down on the Thames and Medway and 
throughout all England, except on the seashore.”103  “This simple 
provision of the Magna Charta would not even bear mentioning,” 
says MacGrady, “were it not for the fact that some writers and jurists 
have expanded it ‘almost unrecognizably’ over the years.”104  
Although the provision was relied upon by later writers and courts to 
support a prohibition on obstructions to navigation, its immediate 
purpose was to prevent the king from blocking fish passage upstream 
to the exclusive fisheries of the barons who, after all, were the other 
party of interest in the negotiation of Magna Carta.105  Chapter 23 
 97. S. MOORE & H. MOORE, THE HISTORY AND LAW OF FISHERIES 6-18 (1903). 
 98. See generally Gann v. Free Fishers, (1865) 11 Eng. Rep 1305 (H.L.), Malcomson v. 
O’Dea, (1863) 11 Eng. Rep. 1155, 1155-56 (H.L.). 
 99. Carter v. Murcot, (1768) 98 Eng. Rep. 2162. 
 100. Lord Fitzwalter’s Case, (1762) 86 Eng. Rep. 766 (K.B.). 
 101. Deveney, supra note 30, at 48. 
 102. See Royal Fishery of the River Banne, (1611) 80 Eng. Rep. 540 (applying the law with 
respect to fisheries). 
 103. MAGNA CARTA, CHAPT. 23 (Eng. 1225).  The quoted language is from the 1225 
version of Magna Carta.  It was derived from Chapter 33 of the 1215 version that provided: “All 
kydells for the future shall be removed altogether from Thames and Medway, and throughout 
all England, except upon the seashore.”  MAGNA CARTA, CHAPT. 33 (ENG. 1215). 
 104. MacGrady, supra note 58, at 554 (quoting from The Public Trust in Tidal Areas, supra 
note 53, at 767). 
 105. See Deveney, supra note 30, at 39. 
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“had nothing to do with the question of title to land under waters.”106  
In fact the provision was relied upon by Lord Hale to demonstrate 
that private ownership of such lands was possible: 
The exception of weares upon the sea-coast[s] . . . makes it appear 
that there might be such private interests not only in point of 
liberty, but in point of propriety, on the sea-coast and below the 
low-water mark; . . . .  But in all of these statutes, though they 
prohibit the thing, yet they do admit, that there may be such an 
interest lodged in a subject, not only in navigable rivers, but even in 
the ports of the sea itself contiguous to the shore, though below the 
low-water mark, whereby a subject may not only have a liberty, but 
also a right of property of soil.107 
Thus, Magna Carta Chapters 16 and 23 are very thin reeds upon 
which to rest an expansive public trust doctrine.  The modern 
doctrine as applied to navigable waters relies heavily upon the state’s 
having title to the submerged lands.  But at the time of Magna Carta, 
and for many centuries later, there was no concept in England of 
lands owned by the king (who, according to modern public trust 
theory, was the predecessor in title to the states) as trustee for the 
general public: 
Then again, no line is drawn, at least no marked line, between those 
proprietary rights which the king has as king and those which he 
has in his private capacity.  The nation, the state, is not personified; 
there are no lands which belong to the nation or to the state.  The 
king’s lands are the king’s lands; the king’s treasure is the king’s 
treasure: there is no more to be said.108 
Magna Carta reflects clearly that the king had special standing in 
relation to the barons, but “if the medieval king’s property differed in 
any way from that of his barons, it was only to the extent that he held 
more of it.”109 
Every legal system that recognizes private property requires an 
explanation for how any particular claimant came into title to 
particular land or resources.  The Roman theory, at least with respect 
to submerged lands and those subject to the ebb and flow of the tides, 
was that the land was held in common which, as we have seen, means 
that owners came into title by appropriation or occupation.110  
Modern advocates have interpreted the Roman res communes to 
 106. Id. at 40. 
 107. HALE, supra note 32, at 389. 
 108. F. POLLOCK & F. W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 518 (2d ed. 1952). 
 109. Deveney, supra note 30, at 38. 
 110. See supra pp. 19-23. 
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suggest resources belonging to the public in the sense we might 
understand it today, but in reality there was little to distinguish res 
communes from res nullius in Roman law.111  That is, no one owned 
the land until someone occupied it.112  This theory was consistent with 
the myth of the Golden Age, and was the theory in English law at 
least until the seventeenth century when John Selden posited the 
mare clausum (the closed sea) as the property of the English 
Crown.113  While the king did not object to this break with antiquity, 
Selden, and Blackstone after him, turned to the Bible to justify this 
claim of private title o
In the beginning of the world, we are informed by holy writ, the all-
bountiful creator gave to men “dominion over all the earth; and 
over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every 
living thing that moveth on the earth.”  This is the only true and 
solid foundation of man’s dominion over external things, whatever 
metaphysical notions may have been started by fanciful writers 
upon this subject.114 
The Bible justified private ownership, including by the king, but in 
English theory the act by which the king acquired title was the 
Norman Conquest.115  This meant that all property held by anyone 
other than the king, including title to submerged and riparian lands, 
came by grant from the king.116  Of course this was mostly theory, 
without evidence of actual grants, that served to explain and justify 
the status quo, but the king did in fact make many grants so that “[b]y 
the reign of King John almost all of the foreshore and the rivers of the 
kingdom either were still held by the Crown as private property or 
had been granted in fee to individual holders.”117  Of particular 
importance to modern public trust theory that seeks precedent in 
Magna Carta and English law is that the foreshore and rivers to which 
 111. “[A]ll [of the Roman sources] except Celsus use language in the nature of res 
communes and res nullius – terms which . . . represent a distinction without a real difference.”  
MacGrady, supra note 58, at 533. 
 112. This concept of land held in common forms the basis for the famous “tragedy of the 
commons” commentary inspired by Garrett Hardin.  Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the 
Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).  It might be argued that Hardin’s starting point was common 
ownership as opposed to non-ownership, but it comes to the same thing since the private uses 
that lead to the tragedy of the commons are, for practical purposes, the equivalent of private 
title, albeit nonexclusive private title. 
 113. JOHN SELDEN, MARE CLAUSUM: THE RIGHT AND DOMINION OF THE SEA 127-35 
(1663). 
 114. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *2, *2-*3. 
 115. Deveney, supra note 30, at 38-39. 
 116. Id. at 39. 
 117. Id. 
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the Crown still had title could be and often were granted to other 
private owners.118  “There was no concept of a public trust in the early 
common law – that is, of the idea that the title of certain lands was 
held inalienably by the Crown for the common use.”119 
Nonetheless, Magna Carta has been relied upon repeatedly in 
modern times for claims of broad public rights, notwithstanding its 
origins in the struggle between the king and his barons.  “[T]hrough 
the process of creative judicial misunderstanding in favor of the 
public’s rights,”120 and with some help from Blackstone,121 the English 
courts did eventually embrace the rule that the Crown could not grant 
exclusive fisheries in tidal waters.122  But this late recognition of public 
rights in English law was more symbolic than real since many 
exclusive fisheries had been granted in the past and the prohibition 
had nothing to do with ownership of submerged and riparian or tidal 
lands.  That past grants of private right were to be respected was 
evident from Magna Carta which in Chapter 16 expressly excepted 
defenses (exclusive Crown fisheries) established in the time of King 
Henry and in Chapter 23 prohibited all weirs “for the future.”  That 
future conveyances and grants of land still could be made by the king 
was inherent in his private property rights, so long as the lands were 
his in his personal capacity, or in the sovereignty of the king and 
Parliament, to the extent the property was held in the king’s public 
role. 
What changed to the benefit of public rights, at least in the long 
run, was the prima facie rule for ownership of submerged and tidal 
lands, pursuant to which the lands were presumed to remain with the 
 118. “Bracton clearly states what the Romans left in doubt: the soil of the shore can be 
privately owned, at least by building on it.”  Significant evidence of this, according to 
MacGrady, is Bracton’s statement that “the soil cedes to the building.”  MacGrady, supra note 
58, at 556. 
 119. Deveney, supra note 30, at 38.  MacGrady concludes that there was still no concept of a 
public trust in English law by the time of the American Revolution.  “At the time the public 
trust doctrine was supposedly vesting the Crown title to submerged beds and the foreshore in 
the newly sovereign American states, there was virtually no legal support for such a doctrine in 
English common law.”  MacGrady, supra note 58, at 590. 
 120. Deveney, supra note 30, at 39. 
 121. “A free fishery, or exclusive right of fishing in a public river, is also a royal franchise; 
and is considered as such in all countries where the feudal polity has prevailed: though the 
making such grants, and by that means appropriating what seems to be unnatural to restrain, the 
use of running water, was prohibited for the future by King John’s great charter, and the rivers 
that were fenced in his time were directed to be laid open . . . .”  BLACKSTONE, supra note 114, 
at *39. 
 122. Carter v. Murcot, (1768) 98 Eng. Rep. 2162. 
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king unless expressly granted.  The new rule was first stated in the 
case of Attorney-General v. Philpott,123 but that case was decided by a 
corrupt court doing the king’s bidding and was not cited as authority 
by an English court for another 164 years,124 after which at least 
another century passed without a single English jury deciding in favor 
of the Crown “against evidence of user on the part of the subject.”125  
The Philpott decision was a factor leading to the beheading of Charles 
I for, among other things, “taking away of men’s rights under color of 
the King’s title to land between high and low-water mark.”126  Note 
that the objection was not to the king’s taking public rights, but to 
taking the private rights of those claiming title to the lands in 
question.  Indeed, the Crown’s objective in pressing the prima facie 
rule was not to protect the lands for the public, but rather “to 
expropriate lands long in private hands in order to resell them to 
replenish their coffers.”127  Although the prima facie theory was 
invented from whole cloth in the sixteenth century to facilitate the 
Crown’s taking of long vested private rights and did not become the 
fully accepted law of England for three centuries, we will see that its 
pedigree would gain luster at the hands of American commentators 
and judges.  But even then, “under the prima facie theory the power 
of the Crown to make grants of the foreshore and land under water 
was never in question.  None of the parties involved [in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries] was interested in expanding the interests 
of the general public in the coastal area.”128  Notwithstanding its 
sordid past, however, the prima facie rule did serve the eventual 
 123. The case is unreported and may never have been acted upon.  It appears in MOORE, 
supra note 32, at 896-907. 
 124. Attorney General v. Richards, (1795) 145 Eng. Rep. 980, 981 (Ex.). 
 125. MOORE, supra note 32, at 616. 
 126. Article 26 of the Grand Remonstrance presented to Charles I on December 1, 1641, in 
MOORE, id. at 310. 
 127. Deveney, supra note 30, at 42. MacGrady provides a vivid account of the title hunting 
and title hunters who relied on the prima facie rule to identify submerged properties on which 
private title would be difficult to prove.  With adequate payments to the Crown, these lands 
would then be expressly granted to the title hunters.  Among the title hunters was a certain 
Thomas Digges who is credited with inventing the prima facie rule in his 1568 treatise Proofs of 
the Queen’s Interest in Lands Left by the Sea and the Salt Shores Thereof.  MacGrady, supra note 
58, at 559-63.  See also James Rasband, The Disregarded Common Law Parentage of the Equal 
Footing and Public Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1997).  As noted 
below, infra text accompanying note 405, there is an interesting similarity between the Crown’s 
motives in pressing for the prima facie rule and the motives of the state of Mississippi in Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 472-76 (1988), the United States Supreme Court’s 
most recent public trust decision. 
 128. Deveney, supra note 30, at 43. 
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claims of public right under the public trust theory.  With resources of 
such value as submerged and tidal lands, it was not to be presumed 
that title passed with the conveyance of the uplands.  But, of course, 
the prima facie rule did not preclude express grants of such lands. 
Writing not long after Magna Carta, Bracton played an 
important role by introducing Justinian’s Institutes to the mix of 
sources that might be relied upon.129  He did not, however, introduce 
all of Justinian.  He left out the statement that “the ownership of the 
beaches is in no one,”130 perhaps because the phrase seemed 
inconsistent with the existence of farms and buildings that were not to 
be injured by public use of the seashore and because he recognized 
that many beaches in England were in fact private.  But if this 
explains Bracton’s elimination of Justinian’s statement that the 
seashore belongs to no one, it would seem to reflect a 
misunderstanding of the significance of that phrase.  It did not mean 
that the seashore could not be owned, rather it meant that it belonged 
to no one until occupied or put to private use.  Modern public trust 
advocates who have relied on Justinian’s language in asserting that jus 
publicum is an inalienable public right in state ownership of beaches 
and submerged lands have misunderstood the language in the same 
way, whether or not misunderstanding explains Bracton’s omission.  
Bracton did acknowledge, indirectly, that the beaches belonged to no 
one by taking pains to explain, contrary to the usual rule that a 
building belongs to the owner of the underlying land, that on the 
seashore the land belongs to the owner of the overlying building.131 
The most influential source on the English law of the sea among 
nineteenth century American courts and commentators was Lord 
Chief Justice Matthew Hale’s treatise De Jure Maris.132  Although he 
endorsed the prima facie theory, he acknowledged that title to 
submerged and tidal land could be and most often was privately 
owned and that it could be acquired by usage, custom, prescription, or 
conveyance from the Crown.133  “There was no question in Hale’s 
mind that the king could convey title to land below the sea, several 
 129. Id. at 36-37. 
 130. BRACTON, supra note 93. 
 131. See id. at 40. 
 132. HALE, supra note 32.  The treatise of Sir Matthew Hale, De Jure Maris, has been so 
often recognized in this country, and in England, that it has become the text book, from which, 
when properly understood, there seems to be no appeal either by sovereign or subject, upon any 
question relating to their respective rights, either in the sea, arms of the sea, or private streams 
of water.  Ex parte Jennings, 6 Cow. 518 n.(a) (N.Y. 1826). 
 133. HALE, supra note 32, at 370-72. 
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fisheries, and even property in a delimited part of the sea itself or in 
navigable rivers.”134 
Lord Hale identified three categories of coastal property.  The 
jus privatum is held by individuals or by the Crown, and, as we have 
seen, the king’s private interests were not different from the holdings 
of other individuals except in amount.135  The jus regium he described 
as the royal right which was the equivalent of what we would call the 
police power today.136  Finally, the jus publicum are the rights of the 
general public.137  Hale described these public rights as follows: 
[T]he people have a publick interest, a jus publicum, of passage and 
repassage with their goods by water, and must not be obstructed by 
nuisances or impeached by exactions. . . . [F]or the jus privatum of 
the owner or proprietor is charged with and subject to that jus 
publicum which belongs to the king’s subjects; as the soil of an 
highway is, which though in point of property it may be a private 
man’s freehold, yet it is charged with a publick interest of the 
people, which may not be prejudiced or damnified.138 
Taken together these three categories of coastal property fit neatly 
together, although not precisely as modern public trust advocates 
would like.  There is private (including crown or state) ownership of 
coastal land; there is a public right of navigation over and past those 
lands, meaning that obstructions to navigation (nuisances) are 
forbidden; and there is the power in the king or state to enjoin or 
remove such obstructions.  However, there is no public right to fish in 
navigable waters, though the public may be granted the liberty to do 
so.139  Additionally, there is no constraint on private ownership of 
submerged or tidal lands or on the power of the king to convey those 
lands,140 though private owners are prohibited from creating nuisances 
that obstruct navigation.  In sum, “[t]here is no suggestion whatsoever 
 134. Deveney, supra note 30, at 45. 
 135. HALE, supra note 32, at 372-74. 
 136. See id. at 373 (“[W]e are bound to provide for the safety and preservation of our 
realm . . . .”) (internal quotation omitted). 
 137. See id. at 374. 
 138. Id. at 404-05. 
 139. Id. at 377 (“But though the king is the owner of this great wast [the sea], and as a 
consequent of his propriety hath the primary right of fishing in the sea and the creeks and arms 
thereof; yet the common people of England have regularly a liberty of fishing in the sea or 
creeks or arms thereof, as a publick common of piscary, and may not without injury to their 
right be restrained of it, unless such places or creeks or navigable rivers, where either the king 
or some particular subject hath gained a propriety exclusive of that common liberty.”). 
 140. Deveney, supra note 30, at 49 (“Neither the changes following the beheading of 
Charles I nor the revolution of 1688 reduced in any way the power of the sovereign to alienate 
the coastal area resources of the kingdom.”). 
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of a public trust in Lord Hale’s writings, and he recognizes no 
limitations on the power of the Crown to convey title to the coastal 
area.”141 
V.  EARLY AMERICAN PUBLIC TRUST LAW 
The American Revolution created some interesting theoretical 
problems for those required to design the new governments and 
create legal systems that could carry on where the English 
government and law left off.  The law part was relatively easy, 
particularly since the American revolutionaries, for the most part, 
only sought to guarantee for themselves the rights of Englishmen.142  
The common law would be received as the law of the individual states 
subject to whatever modifications would be made subsequently.143  
But a more challenging theoretical issue was the explanation and 
justification for the transition from a sovereign king to a sovereign 
democratic republic.  The legitimacy of the Revolution rested in the 
self evident truth that “Governments are instituted among Men, 
deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, . . . .”144  
The Revolution was an assertion that the king’s government, at least 
in America, was not just, yet the sovereign powers the newly 
independent states would exercise would be exactly those the king 
had exercised.  Like the individual rights asserted in the Declaration 
of Independence, the powers of government were self evident.  So, 
the states simply succeeded to the powers of the Crown (and 
Parliament), at least until some of those powers were delegated to a 
national government.145 
By this same theory, the states succeeded to the ownership of 
lands previously held by the king.  Of course the king in England had 
no deed or other document evidencing the Crown’s title, but no one 
challenged the legal fiction that the king owned everything in the 
beginning and continued to own that which had not been granted by 
 141. Id. at 48.  Of the eventual acceptance of the prima facie rule and Hale’s considerable 
influence on that lengthy process, MacGrady, supra note 58, at 567, writes: “The adoption of the 
prima facie rule is thus an example of lawmaking by personal reputation and treatise writing.”  
He goes on to say the “American law concerning foreshore ownership was shaped by a similar 
lawmaking process,” and so too, as we shall see, has been modern American public trust law. 
 142. See F. MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLOORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 9-55 (1985). 
 143. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 127-30 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 
2002). 
 144. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 145. See, e.g., Browne v. Kennedy, 5 H. & J. 195, 195 (Md. 1821). 
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the king or otherwise privately acquired.  The principle of universal 
title in the Crown, combined with the king’s power to grant title and 
the concepts of customary use and prescription, made it possible “to 
assign a particular proprietor to every thing capable of ownership, 
leaving as little as may be in common, to be the source of contention 
and strife.”146  While the modern public trust doctrine stands in 
opposition, Justice Earle of the Maryland Court of Appeals thought 
this common law rule was “a principle based on soundest policy.”147  
For the new American states that succeeded to the king’s ownership, 
this legal fiction was critical to their economic and political success.  
State title to unoccupied and unused lands (waste lands they were 
often called) made it possible for the states to embrace the English 
common law of property and to establish formal systems for the 
disposal of these lands.148  Without state title and formal systems for 
conveyance to private owners, there surely would have been much 
“contention and strife.”149 
But in America, the lands owned by the Crown were vastly 
greater in volume and a much larger portion of the whole than in 
England.150  In the case of a few states with large western land claims, 
lands would be ceded to the national government in the interest of 
gaining agreement to unite as one nation and in anticipation of the 
formation of future states,151 but most of these now state lands 
(including those ceded to the national government) were expected to 
become private property in due course.152  Neither state governments 
nor the federal government were expected to be large landowners 
over the long haul.153  This was, after all, a revolution against a king 
 146. Id. at 208 (Earle, J., dissenting). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See id. 
 149. Id.  In the oft cited case of Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 45 (N.J. 1821), Chief Justice 
Kirkpatrick reported that notwithstanding the claimed exclusive right at issue in the case, “the 
people had always disputed that right, had entered upon it, and taken oysters from it, when they 
pleased, and if opposed by Coddington [predecessor in title to plaintiff], that the strongest 
usually prevailed.” 
 150. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 478-79 (1988) (noting that “the 
different topography of America – in particular, our ‘thousands of miles of public navigable 
water[s] . . . in which there is no tide’” distinguished the extent of the public trust doctrine in 
America from England (quoting Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443, 457 (1852)). 
 151. See FORREST MCDONALD, E PLURIBUS UNUM: THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 1776-1790, 11 (1965). 
 152. See James Huffman, The Inevitability of Private Rights in Public Lands, 65 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 241, 245 (1994). 
 153. Id. at 247-48. 
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who, among other offenses, had significant land holdings from which 
most ordinary citizens were excluded.154  From after the Revolution 
until well past the middle of the nineteenth century, “government did 
not choose to manage its land as a capital asset, but to get rid of it in 
an orderly, fruitful way.”155 
These presumptions about government land ownership would 
change over time.  Nearly a century after the adoption of the 
Constitution, significant federal lands began to be reserved from 
private acquisition with the expectation that they would remain in 
federal ownership indefinitely.156  As new states were created, other 
federal lands were granted for the support of schools and other public 
services,157 with the initial expectation that most of these lands sooner 
or later would be sold to private purchasers.158  None of this was very 
controversial, and although the original states with large western land 
claims would rather have retained those lands, had they succeeded in 
retaining their western lands, the expectation still would have been 
that the lands would be conveyed into private ownership.159 
In sorting out these land ownership issues, the founding 
generation paid little attention to submerged and tidal lands, not 
because they were in fact invisible, but because the law on the subject 
was thought to be well settled.  Citing the case of The Royal Fishery 
of the River Banne,160 Chancellor Kent stated that “by the rules and 
authorities of the common law, every river where the sea does not 
ebb and flow, was an inland river not navigable, and belonged to the 
owners of the adjoining soil.”161  Pursuant to the prima facie rule, all 
other submerged lands (those under navigable waters – understood to 
include all waters affected by the tide) were presumed to be owned by 
the state unless a private claimant could demonstrate otherwise.162  It 
was and is widely accepted among American courts that this alleged 
English equation of navigability with tidal waters was gradually 
 154. See id. at 248. 
 155. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 203 (1973). 
 156. Huffman, supra note 152, at 250. 
 157. Id. at 249. 
 158. Id. at 247. 
 159. See id. at 246-47. 
 160. (1611) 80 Eng. Rep. 540. This case was widely cited in American cases on ownership of 
submerged lands, but on its facts it was concerned with ownership of the fishery and not with 
title to submerged lands.  The same is true of the oft cited Carter v. Murcot, (1768) 98 Eng. Rep. 
2162. 
 161. Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. 307 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
 162. Ex parte Jennings, 6 Cow. 518 (N.Y. 1826). 
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abandoned by many state courts in recognition of the topography of 
the North American continent with its great inland waterways.163  But 
there is good evidence that Chancellor Kent and the most influential 
treatise writer on the subject, Joseph Angell, got the English law 
wrong on this point.164  If indeed navigable in fact, non-tidal waters 
were considered navigable under English law, as MacGrady 
contends,165 it is just one more historical error contributing to the 
eventual linkage in American law of the public trust doctrine to state 
ownership of submerged lands. 
It is also reasonable to assume that the founding generation was 
less concerned about ownership of submerged lands than we might be 
today because ownership of those lands generally was not a factor in 
what was then the most important use of those waters – navigation.  
Chancellor Kent stated the matter succinctly: 
In Sir Mathew Hale’s excellent treatise . . . he lays down the law 
generally that fresh rivers, of what kind soever, do, of common 
right, belong to the owners of the adjacent soil, but he admits that 
fresh rivers, as well as those which ebb and flow, may be under the 
servitude of the public interest, and may be of common or public 
use for the carriage of boats, &c., and in that sense may be regarded 
as common highways by water. . . . They are called public rivers, not 
in reference to the property of the river, but to the public use.166 
American law would gradually lose sight of this point and would 
create a tie between public ownership of submerged lands and public 
rights in the use of overlying waters.  However, Lord Hale’s tripartite 
division of rights in the coastal area in no way linked the jus publicum 
to the king (or the state) having title to the submerged or riparian 
lands.  As Hale defined it, the jus publicum is a public right in the 
nature of an easement whether the land is owned by the king, by a 
private party, or by no one.167  The prima facie theory endorsed by 
 163. See, e.g., Diana Shooting Club v. Hasting, 145 N.W. 816, 819 (Wis. 1914) (“In England, 
however, only waters on which the tide ebbed and flowed were held navigable. Such limitation 
upon navigable waters has never obtained in the United States.  Navigability in fact for products 
of the forest, field, or commerce for regularly recurrent annual periods has, in our state, been 
held sufficient to constitute a stream navigable.”). 
 164. See infra at pp. 38-41. 
 165. MacGrady, supra note 58, at 567 (“Whether the current American doctrine is 
ultimately a good one or a bad one is not the issue here.  The point is that Angell and Kent, and 
the multitude of courts that have announced the American rule, have relied on an erroneous 
historical view of English fact and English law.”). 
 166. Palmer, 3 Cai. at 317. 
 167. See HALE, supra note 32, at 336. 
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Hale was an evidentiary presumption, not a rule of title.168  But as the 
following discussion of the American public trust doctrine will 
evidence, American law came to understand the prima facie rule as a 
rule of title with the result that the jus publicum, which had been the 
basis for the evidentiary presumption under English law,169 became 
dependent on state ownership of the submerged land.  That link is 
one of the “shackles” to which Professor Sax made reference.170  By 
linking the jus publicum to state ownership, it would be difficult to 
extend the public rights theory to perceived public interests in the 
management and use of privately owned resources.  However, 
expansive public trust theories as applied to water resources did 
benefit from this misunderstanding of Hale’s prima facie theory in the 
following way.  Under English law, the jus publicum extended to all 
navigable waters independent of ownership.  Under American law, 
because the jus publicum was an attribute of state ownership, the 
states were presumed to own the beds and banks of all navigable 
streams.  Thus, although the states as sovereigns were theoretically 
successors in title to the king, they got more than the king actually 
had when it came to submerged lands. 
The original states also succeeded to title in uplands held by the 
Crown and new states generally were granted some lands by the 
United States Government.171  No one suggested, until recently, that 
these and other uplands might be affected by the public trust 
doctrine.  But a concern for public access to privately held resources 
was not limited to navigable waters and submerged lands.  Just as the 
jus publicum had application to navigable waters in service of 
commerce,172 so were there claims of public rights in roadways over 
which commerce traveled. Roads were sometimes dedicated at the 
time lands were granted and sometimes later, either by willing 
 168. MacGrady, supra note 58, at 550. 
 169. Deveney, supra note 30, at 43 (discussing the prima facie theory in England’s roots in 
the “recognition that the foreshore was a distinct and valuable type of property not to be passed 
by implication”). 
 170. SAX, supra note 38, at 186 (With the historical shackles loosened or removed, “the 
public trust doctrine is not just a set of rules about tidelands, a restraint on alienation by the 
government, or an historical inquiry into the circumstances of long-forgotten grants. . . . [T]he 
public trust doctrine should be employed to help us reach the real issues – expectations and 
destabilization – whether the expectations are those of private property ownership, of a diffuse 
public benefit from ecosystem protection or of a community’s water supply.”). 
 171. See, e.g., Deveney, supra note 30, at 58. 
 172. Id. at 46. 
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property owners or by eminent domain.173  But roads were also 
established by common use and, via one of the many fictions by which 
the common law courts kept their house in order, some of these roads 
were found to have been granted through custom or prescription.174  
Under English law, and in some cases American law, other public 
easements on private property were similarly acquired for grazing,175 
public squares,176 annual festivals,177 horse racing178 and other sporting 
events.179 
Although most commentators on the public trust doctrine have 
paid scant attention to these dryland public uses and their underlying 
legal doctrines, Professor Carol Rose has done us the favor of 
considering how public trust, prescription and custom might be 
interrelated in nineteenth century American law.180  Rose suggests 
that all three doctrines protect the interests of what she calls the 
“unorganized public” as distinct from the organized public that is 
represented by the state and other governmental entities.181  The 
unorganized public, says Rose, is vested with “inherently public 
property” that is “collectively ‘owned’ and ‘managed’ by society at 
large, with claims independent of and indeed superior to the claims of 
any purported governmental manager” of property vested in the 
state.182  The fact that “the prescriptive doctrines generated no real 
tests for the character of the use that could establish public 
acquisition of a road . . . suggests the extraordinary strength of the 
view that roads should be public property.”183  “[D]espite frailties in 
its original authority,” says Rose, “[i]t is equally striking that ‘public 
trust’ doctrines in waterways, like the doctrines easing public 
 173. BLACKSTONE, supra note 114, at *35 n.19. 
 174. Id. at *265 (“A prescription cannot be for a thing which cannot be raised by grant.  For 
the law allows prescription only in supply of the loss of a grant, and therefore every prescription 
presupposes a grant to have existed.”). 
 175. See e.g.,. Kerwhaker v. Cleveland, Columbus & Cincinnati R.R. Co., 3 Ohio St. 172, 185 
(1854) (“it was the common custom of the country to allow domestic animals to run at large 
upon the uninclosed grounds of the neighborhood”). 
 176. See e.g., Le Clercq v. Trustees of Town of Gallipolis, 7 Ohio 218, 220 (1835) (“The 
original survey of the town left the ground for this purpose, in conformity to our habits-in 
greater conformity to the habits and customs of the people composing the colony.”). 
 177. Hall v. Nottingham, (1876) 33 L.T.R. 697 (Exch. Div.). 
 178. Mounsey v. Ismay, (1863) 158 Eng. Rep. 1077 (Q.B.). 
 179. Abbot v. Weekly, (1665) 83 Eng. Rep. 357 (K.B.). 
 180. Rose, supra note 18, at 714. 
 181. Id. at 721. 
 182. Id. at 720-21. 
 183. Id. at 727. 
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acquisition of roadways, flourished alongside the popularization of 
classical economic theory – a theory that generally rejected the notion 
that the general public could own and manage property.”184  The 
persistence of the idea of “inherently public property” in the face of 
otherwise widespread agreement, at least until the late nineteenth 
century, that public property should be privatized wherever possible, 
leads Rose to ask what led some nineteenth century American courts 
to conclude that some resource uses are inherently public.185 
One explanation might be that some resources simply cannot be 
privatized due to their physical nature.  Presumably such resources 
also could not be owned by the state in a proprietary sense for the 
same reasons.  But Rose rejects this simple explanation, noting that 
many public rights rooted in public trust, prescription, and custom 
could easily be converted to exclusive proprietary interests and 
suggesting a different form of control:186 
[C]ustom suggests that there may be a middle ground between 
regimes in which the resource is so plentiful or so difficult to 
privatize that it is not worth the effort, and regimes in which 
conflicting uses are managed by formal ownership.  This middle 
ground is the regime of the managed commons, where usage as a 
commons is not tragic but rather capable of self-management by 
orderly and civilized people.187 
The challenge Rose faces is to explain what distinguishes these 
“inherently public” resource uses from those that are either private or 
public in the formal sense.  She acknowledges the usual argument 
made in justification of eminent domain that rent seeking by holdouts 
can result in diminished net social welfare where foregone public 
benefits far outweigh any increased benefits to the holdout.188  “But 
even if the holdout danger was necessary for a presumption of 
‘publicness,’” says Rose, “that danger cannot have been sufficient. . . . 
 184. Id. at 730. 
 185. Id.  The idea of “inherently public property” could be understood to mean that some 
resources are by their nature public.  This is the sense in which many nineteenth and twentieth 
century American courts have understood the public trust.  But Rose seems to take the view 
that what is inherently public may change with circumstances, and Farnham on page 171 of his 
1904 treatise THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, relying on the generally ignored 
Stuart Moore (see supra note 32, at 172), demonstrates that whatever consensus exists today on 
the inherently public nature of tidal lands was not shared by the pre-nineteenth century English: 
“There was no public sentiment or rule of law to prevent [the King’s] . . . granting land covered 
by the water.” 
 186. Rose, supra note 18, at 781. 
 187. Id. at 749. 
 188. Id. at 760-61. 
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Unlike eminent domain, public prescription and public trust doctrines 
require no payment to the owner; . . . .  How, then, can we know 
whether such property will be more valuable in public hands?”189 
Finding traditional holdout explanations for public trust, public 
prescription, and custom incomplete, Rose turns to another idea of 
classical economics – “returns to scale or ‘interactiveness’ of use.”190  
Noting that American law has generally reflected the view that more 
commerce is better, not just in terms of economic prosperity but also 
in terms of building strong communities, Rose suggests that public 
trust, public prescription, and custom are connected by an 
understanding of the importance of the unorganized public to 
community.191  In economic terms, she contends, there are significant 
rents realized by this unorganized public through commerce and 
other community activities dependent on public access to particular 
resources, and when the public is excluded, these rents are 
foregone.192  Thus, public trust, public prescription, and custom can 
preserve the unorganized public’s entitlement to these rents: 
The public right to “its” rent could assume several guises.  An 
organized public could use eminent domain powers, paying for the 
underlying land at fair market value but appropriating to itself any 
additional rent created by the nonexclusiveness and expandability 
of the public use.  The “unorganized” public, on the other hand, fell 
back on doctrines of inherently public property – public trust and 
public prescription.  These doctrines allocated to the public only an 
easement for access; but the easement again rendered to the public 
its rent.  Thus eminent domain and inherently public property were 
only variant assertions of the same public entitlement to the rents 
that publicness had created.193 
While Rose’s argument elegantly bridges categories of common 
law taxonomy and offers a more than plausible economic rationale to 
support that bridge, it is doubtful that many courts were thinking in 
the terms she suggests.  Of course we can never know what judges 
were really thinking, but based on what they wrote in their opinions, 
it appears few had in mind the unorganized public’s entitlement to 
the rents created by community interaction.  Rose acknowledges that 
many nineteenth century American courts rejected the claim that the 
unorganized public has rights that constrain the democratically 
 189. Id. at 761. 
 190. Id. at 769. 
 191. Id. at 776. 
 192. See id. at 776-80. 
 193. Id. at 771. 
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elected legislature,194 but she turns to Blackstone and American 
courts relying on Blackstone for the idea that custom exists in parallel 
with laws enacted by Parliament or local legislatures.
Blackstone does speak extensively of custom, but largely as a 
source of the common law rather than as a limitation on Parliament 
or the common law courts.  Blackstone’s examples of customary law 
relate almost entirely to private interests and to governmental 
processes and powers, not to notions of public right to which both 
Parliament and the courts must defer.196  For Blackstone, custom was 
a legitimating source for laws to be formalized mostly by courts and 
to some extent by Parliament, not an independent category of laws 
that could bind the courts and Parliament.  Indeed, Blackstone states 
explicitly that “no custom can prevail against an express act of 
Parliament; since the statute itself is a proof of a time when such a 
custom did not exist.”197 
Rose’s suggestion that a concept of “inherently public” property 
underlies the public trust doctrine, even if the English origins of that 
doctrine are not quite what advocates have claimed, is not well 
supported by the history of the prima facie rule on which the modern 
trust doctrine relies.198  As demonstrated above, the Crown’s claim of 
title to submerged lands had nothing to do with protecting the 
public’s interest in navigating and fishing the overlying waters.199  
 194. See id. at 736. 
 195. See id.  at 740-42. 
 196. As examples of general custom Blackstone cites “the course in which lands descend by 
inheritance; the manner and form of acquiring and transferring property; the solemnities and 
obligation of contracts; the rules of expounding wills, deeds, and acts of parliament; the 
respective remedies of civil injuries, the several species of temporal offences, with the manner 
and degree of punishment; and an infinite number of minuter particulars, which diffuse 
themselves as extensively as the ordinary distribution of common justice requires.”  WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *68.  As examples of local custom Blackstone cites “in 
Kent . . . that not the eldest son only of the father shall succeed to his inheritance . . .: and that, 
though the ancestor be attainted and hanged, yet the heir shall succeed to his estate, without any 
escheat to the lord , . . . [and] in divers antient boroughs . . . that the youngest son shall inherit 
the estate, in preference to his elder brothers, . . . [and] in other boroughs that a widow shall be 
intitled, for her dower, to all her husband’s lands, . . . [and] lastly, are many particular customs 
within the city of London, with regard to trade, apprentices, widows, orphans, and a variety of 
other matters.”  Id. at *74-*75. 
 197. Id. at *76-*77. 
 198. Rasband, supra note 127, at 18. On the other hand, the prima facie theory may make 
more sense as an evidentiary presumption, if not a rule of title, in the United States.  “The 
presumption of prima facie ownership by the state was more appropriate in the new American 
situation because rather than presuming ownership in the crown for purposes of augmenting the 
royal purse, the prima facie theory in America presumed ownership on behalf of the people.” 
 199. Supra text accompanying notes 120-28. 
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Among the grievances leading to the execution of King Charles I in 
1649 was the Crown’s taking, pursuant to the prima facie theory, 
lands that had been held in private hands for generations.200  It took 
three centuries for English law finally to embrace the Crown’s claim, 
though always made in the name of the public interest – hardly what 
one would call “inherently public” property. 
Rose offers as “an example closer to home, . . . the western 
United States . . . settlers [who] treated land, water, and other 
resources as a commons, and managed them through their own 
customs.”201  But like the customs upon which much English law was 
founded (and in Rose’s own words), these “customs were formalized 
into law” with “the arrival of increasing numbers of claimants with 
conflicting claims.”202  This fairly quick formalization occurred, one 
suspects, because America had become very much a nation of written 
laws (in judicial opinions as well as constitutions, statutes, and 
ordinances) and because resource management by custom proved 
effective only on a small scale. 
Rose argues that “indefiniteness of the number and identity of 
users” is essential to these rights of the unorganized public,203 but 
much of the case law on public prescription relies on analogy to the 
law of private prescription which is centrally concerned with 
protecting the settled expectations of particular individuals.204  In 
answering her own query as to “[w]hy allow unorganized individuals 
to bind their governments to ‘accept’ roadways?” Rose suggests that 
“[t]he chief idea seems to have been to protect injured parties’ 
expectations.”205  It is certainly true that public rights acquired by 
prescription, or existing pursuant to public trust or custom, may be 
asserted by individuals unknown in advance of any legal action, but 
the context for judicial consideration of any claim will involve 
identifiable individuals whose expectations will be very much like 
 200. See Rasband, supra note 127, at 12-13 n.35. 
 201. Rose, supra note 18, at 744. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 764-66. 
 204. See, e.g., Schwerdtle v. Placer County, 41 P. 448, 449 (Cal. 1895) (noting that “[t]he rule 
thus being that the adverse user conclusively establishes the presumption of dedication to the 
public—as in the case of the individual the prescriptive right establishes the presumption of a 
grant.”); EMORY WASHBURN, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF EASEMENTS AND 
SERVITUDES 199 (4th ed. 1885) (“The use of a way by the public for twenty years gives a 
prescriptive right of a public as well as a similar user does of a private way.”). 
 205. Rose, supra note 18, at 734. 
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those of individuals claiming a private prescriptive right.206  Certainly 
there were nineteenth century American courts that employed the 
language of public rights, and perhaps a few of them even thought 
about the gains from community and interconnectedness such public 
rights would yield, but the adversarial approach of Anglo-American 
law allows judicial consideration of such lofty matters only in the 
context of particularized claims.  One must have a self-interest to get 
a court’s attention, and to prevail one must have something in the 
nature of a private right, even if that right is held in common with 
others.207  Indeed, that is precisely the context of Arnold v. Mundy 
and every public trust case that follow
A. Arnold v. Mundy 
Arnold v. Mundy208  is generally cited as the foundational case of 
public trust law in the United States.209  The case involved just one of 
many disputes over the right to take oysters in the tidal mud flats of 
the Rariton River at Perth Amboy in New Jersey.210  The plaintiff 
claimed that defendant had trespassed on his private oyster bed and 
taken away his oysters.211  Plaintiff’s claim of exclusive right in the 
oyster bed was founded upon a survey conducted pursuant to New 
Jersey law, his having planted and tended oysters in the bed, and a 
chain of title dating back to the 24 proprietors of East New Jersey 
who acquired title from the Duke of York who, in turn, acquired title 
in 1664 and 1674 from his brother Charles II, the King of England.212  
The defendant claimed that plaintiff’s title extended only to the high 
water mark and that he had taken oysters pursuant to a right held in 
 206. An important distinction between prescription and custom in English law, said 
Blackstone, was “that custom is properly a local usage, and not annexed to any person.”  
BLACKSTONE, supra note 114, at *263 (emphasis in original).  But those who could claim a right 
of use in private property pursuant to custom were nonetheless a definite and limited number of 
individuals at any point in time.  Even claims pursuant to constitutional rights held by all 
citizens must demonstrate personal interests, although sometimes those personal interests can 
be very attenuated.  See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 
Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973). 
 207. Students Challenging, 412 U.S. at 686-687. 
 208. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821). 
 209. See, e.g., Blumm, supra note 14, at 580. 
 210. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 1-3. 
 211. Id. at 1. 
 212. Id. at 4 (noting that the history of land conveyances from the Crown through the 
twenty-four proprietors to individual grants is recounted as determined by the jury in the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 370-80 (1842)). 
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common with his fellow citizens to harvest oysters from the navigable 
waters of the state of New Jersey.213 
Writing for the New Jersey Supreme Court was Chief Justice 
Kirkpatrick, who also had ruled on the case at trial.214  “[T]he great 
question in the cause,” said Kirkpatrick, is “[a]s to the right of the 
proprietors to convey.”215  Here he was referring to the 24 proprietors 
of East New Jersey who had been granted title in common to a 
significant part of New Jersey by the Duke of York, for the purpose 
of overseeing and encouraging the development of that portion of the 
colony.216  After confessing that he had not had sufficient time to 
consider the issue fully,217 Kirkpatrick concluded that the plaintiff did 
not have a private right in the oyster beds because the proprietors did 
not hold an alienable interest in those beds that they could have 
conveyed to plaintiff’s predecessors in title.218  Because all of the 
grants in the plaintiff’s claimed chain of title appeared on their face to 
convey the oyster beds,219 Kirkpatrick had to find that the original 
grant by Charles II to the Duke of York was invalid to the extent it 
purported to convey a proprietary interest in tidal lands.220 
Kirkpatrick found that the grant to the Duke of York was not of 
a private estate, but rather of all the powers of government and the 
crown, save the reserved power to hear appeals.221  Pursuant to those 
granted powers, the Duke could convey properties to individuals, but 
 213. Id. at 2. 
 214. See id. at 76 (“Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion, as I was at the trial . . . .”). 
 215. Id. at 69-70. 
 216. See id. at 60 (discussing the history of how East New Jersey came to be owned by 
twenty-four proprietors). See also id. at 28. 
 217. Id. at 70 (Noting that “though we have taken time since last term to look into it, yet I 
must confess, for myself, that I have not done so in so full and satisfactory a manner as could 
have been wished; and my apology must be, that during a very great part of the vacation, I have 
been necessarily abroad, attending to other official duties, and during the time I had assigned to 
myself for this purpose, I have been so much indisposed as not to be able very satisfactorily to 
attend to business of any kind.”). 
 218. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 78. 
 219. The grant by Charles II to the Duke of York conveyed “all the lands, islands, soils, 
rivers, harbors, mines, minerals, quarries, woods, marshes, waters, lakes, fishings, hawkings, 
huntings and fowlings, and all other royalties, profits, commodities and hereditaments to said 
islands, lands and premises . . . .”  Quoted in Martin, 41 U.S. at 370.  The grant by the Duke of 
York to the twenty-four proprietors of East New Jersey conveyed “every part and parcel 
thereof, together with all islands, bays, rivers, waters, forts, mines, minerals, quarries, royalties, 
franchises whatsoever . . . .”  Id. at 377. 
 220. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 78. 
 221. Id. at 70-71. 
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only under the same circumstances as could the king.222  The king’s 
powers in this regard were limited, and therefore, so were the Duke’s 
powers.223  “Every thing susceptible of property is considered as 
belonging to the nation that possesses the country, and as forming the 
entire mass of its wealth,” said Kirkpatrick, “but the nation does not 
possess all those things in the same manner.”224  He goes on to 
identify three kinds of property: private property that has been 
granted to individuals; public property (the crown or public domain) 
which has not been, but can be, granted to individuals; and common 
property which is for all to share.225  He cites Blackstone and Vattel in 
stating that common property includes “the air, the running water, 
the sea, the fish, and the wild beasts.”226  Because these are all 
resources “in which a sort of transient usufructuary possession, only, 
can be had,” and because they cannot “well. . .be vested in all the 
people,” this common property is therefore in the sovereign power 
“to be held, protected, and regulated for the common use and 
benefit.”227  Kirkpatrick cites Hale and Bracton, as well as several 
English cases, in support of this description of common property.228  
Following on Hale, he states that “[i]n navigable rivers, the fishery is 
common, it is prima facie in the king, but is public and for the 
common use.”229  Consistent with the widespread American 
misunderstanding of the English prima facie rule, Kirkpatrick takes it 
to be a rule of title rather than an evidentiary presumption.  
Understood as an evidentiary presumption placing the burden of 
proof on a claimant, the prima facie rule would necessarily imply that 
alienation is possible, and that would contradict Kirkpatrick’s holding
e case. 
Kirkpatrick illustrates the difference between the public domain 
and common property by suggesting that a citizen cannot go into the 
king’s forests and harvest trees even though it is public property.230  
The king’s forests, like all of the crown’s domain, exist for the 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 71. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 71-72. 
 229. Id. at 72. 
 230. Id. at 72-73. 
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purposes.231  Common property, on the other hand, is for the use of 
everyone.232  The king may not “appropriate it to himself, or to the 
fiscal purposes of the nation, the enjoyment of it is a natural right 
which cannot be infringed or taken away, unless by arbitrary power; 
and that, in theory at least, could not exist in a free government, such 
as England has always claimed to be.”233 
Having taken the absolutist position that the common property 
rights in navigable waters below the high water mark are inalienable 
by the king or any of his assignees, Kirkpatrick must explain the 
reality of many private claims to submerged lands in tidal waters, 
particularly in England.  His explanation is two fold.  First, grants 
dating from Henry II or earlier are legally valid, although for 
Kirkpatrick not morally legitimate.234  Exclusive fishing rights claimed 
as royal franchises pursuant to the royal prerogative were 
“considered by the people to be a usurpation of their ancient 
common rights.”235  This violation of public rights was “broken down 
and prohibited in [the] future,” by Magna Carta which was “nothing 
more than a restoration of the ancient common law.”236  The fact that 
counsel for the plaintiff provided evidence that “[could not] be 
controverted” that “not only navigable rivers, but also arms of the 
sea, ports, harbours, and certain portions of the main sea itself upon 
the coasts, and all the fisheries appertaining to them [are] in the 
hands of individuals,”237 was, for Kirkpatrick, only evidence of the 
continuing usurpation of the public’s rights,238 whether the claim of 
private right was based on royal grant or prescription.  In looking to 
Magna Carta as the legal recognition of these public rights under 
English law, he relied upon Blackstone.239  However, the law was not 
so clear cut for Blackstone who felt compelled to explain the 
inconsistencies in the case law: “But the considering such right as 
originally a flower of the prerogative, till restrained by magna carta, 
and derived by royal grant (previous to the reign of Richard I.) to 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 71. 
 233. Id. at 72-73. 
 234. Id. at 73. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. (claiming that “[s]o far as it depends upon royal grant [claims of private title to 
fisheries or submerged lands] . . . it seems pretty clear that it has always been considered as an 
encroachment upon the common rights of the people”). 
 239. Id. at 74. 
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such as now claim it by prescription, may remove some difficulties in 
respect to this matter, with which our books are embarrassed.”240  Of 
Hale, who wrote three and a half centuries after Magna Carta that 
“[t]he king may grant fishing within a creek of the sea . . . [and] may 
also grant that very interest itself, viz. a navigable river that is an arm 
of the sea, [with] the water and soil thereof,”241 Kirkpatrick insisted 
that “he must be understood as speaking of the common law before it 
was confined and restrained by Magna Carta.”242  But, suggested 
Kirkpatrick, if Hale were understood to suggest that the king retained 
the power to alienate tidal lands, waters and fisheries, it should be 
remembered that he, like Davies, the reporter of the River Banne 
case, were “disciples of Seldon, and converts to his doctrine of mare 
clausum,”243 a doctrine reflective of the positive law but not favorable 
to the public rights theory. 
Justice Kirkpatrick summed up his position in language a 
modern advocate of public rights could scarce improve upon: 
Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion, as I was at the trial, 
that by the law of nature, which is the only true foundation of all 
the social rights; that by the civil law, which formerly governed 
almost the whole civilized world, and which is still the foundation of 
the polity of almost every nation in Europe; that by the common 
law of England, of which our ancestors boasted, and to which it 
were well if we ourselves paid a more sacred regard; I say I am of 
opinion, that by all these, the navigable rivers in which the tide ebbs 
and flows, the ports, the bays, the coasts of the sea, including both 
the water and the land under the water, for the purpose of passing 
and repassing, navigation, fishing, fowling, sustenance, and all the 
other uses of the water and its products (a few things excepted) are 
common to all the citizens, and that each has a right to use them 
according to his necessities, subject only to the laws which regulate 
that use . . . .244 
There is little wonder the case has stood, with Illinois Central, as 
a beacon of modern public trust theory.  The rhetoric is grand and 
sweeping.  But Kirkpatrick did play fast and loose with English 
 240. BLACKSTONE,  supra note 114, at *40. 
 241. HALE, supra note 32, at 384. 
 242. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 75; Rasband, supra note 127, at 24 (concluding “Kirkpatrick’s 
conclusion that after Magna Carta the crown lacked all power to grant land under navigable 
water was inaccurate.  The inaccuracy, however, did serve the useful purpose of clearing New 
Jersey’s title to the foreshore.”). 
 243. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 74. 
 244. Id. at 76-77. 
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precedent and history.245  In support of his understanding of the prima 
facie rule he cites both the River Banne case and Carter v. Murcot, but 
neither case supports his view that the rule simply establishes title in 
the crown as a sort of guardian (Kirkpatrick never uses the word 
trust) for inalienable public rights.  As the English Court said, five 
years after Arnold v. Mundy, in Duke of Somerset v. Fogwell, the 
River Banne case stood for the principle that because “general words 
in a grant by the King would not pass such a special royalty, which 
belonged to the Crown by prerogative. . . . [T]he grant of the King 
passes nothing by implication.”246  This understanding of the prima 
facie rule had been earlier recognized by Lord Mansfield in Carter 
where he stated: “[I]n navigable rivers, . . . the fishery is common: it is 
primâ facie in the King, and is public.  If anyone claims it exclusively, 
he must shew a right.  If he can shew a right by prescription, he may 
then exercise an exclusive right.”247  In Arnold, Justice Rossell even 
cites Carter as holding that “one might prescribe for a several fishery, 
parcel of a manor, where the sea flows and reflows, but he must prove 
a right by prescription . . . .”248  Rossell also quotes Hale on the same 
point: 
In case of private rivers, the lords having the soil is good evidence 
to prove he hath the right of fishing, and it puts the proof on them 
who claim liberam piscariam.  But in case of a river that flows and 
reflows prima facie it is common to all.  If any claim it to himself, 
the proof lieth on his side; and it is a good justification to say, the 
locus in quo is a branch of the sea, and that the subjects of the king 
are entitled to a free fishery.249 
Yet both Kirkpatrick and Rossell conclude that the king was without 
power to grant private rights to tidal lands or to an oystery or fishery 
in navigable waters. 
It is more than a little ironic that when Kirkpatrick and Rossell 
were writing their opinions, the New Jersey Legislature had already 
recognized that individuals could establish exclusive rights in certain 
oyster beds in state owned waters.  An Act of June 9, 1820, 
 245. Deveney, supra note 30, at 56 (“Arnold v. Mundy is an impressive display of judicial 
dexterity; [but] as history it is nonsense.”); see also Rasband, supra note 127, at 24-25 
(“Kirkpatrick’s conclusion that after Magna Carta the crown lacked all power to grant land 
under navigable water was inaccurate . . . [and] Arnold was an exceptional departure from the 
prima facie theory recognized by other early courts and state legislatures . . . .”). 
 246. Duke of Somerset v. Fogwell, (1829) 108 Eng. Rep. 325, 329. 
 247. Carter v. Murcot, (1768) 98 Eng. Rep. 127, 129. 
 248. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 88 (Rossel, J.) (summarizing Carter, 98 Eng. Rep. 127). 
 249. Id. 
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authorized individuals owning lands adjacent to waters “wherein 
oysters do or will grow” (meaning tidal waters) to plant and have the 
exclusive right of harvesting oysters.250  Consistent with the English 
understanding of the jus publicum, the Act excepted waters leading to 
“any public landing” and prohibited obstruction to free navigation.251  
Anyone violating these exclusive rights was subject to a fifty dollar 
penalty, half of which was to be paid to the person whose exclusive 
right was infringed.252  And the Act indicated that such exclusive, 
appropriative rights in oyster beds had been lawful at least since 
November 7, 1817.253  It is clear that the defendant in Arnold did not 
claim such an exclusive right, although he could make application for 
such a right under New Jersey law, and, additionally, he was the 
beneficiary of an exclusive right held by the community of 
Woodbridge in which he resided.254  Indeed it is not clear whether the 
defendant was claiming a right shared with all citizens of New Jersey 
or a right exclusive to the residents of Woodbridge.  In any event, it is 
clear that the idea of exclusive rights in tidal lands and fisheries was 
widely accepted in the state of New Jersey in the early nineteenth 
century, notwithstanding the rhetoric of Chief Justice Kirkpatrick’s 
opinion. 
Finally, Kirkpatrick made the all important connection between 
the powers and responsibilities of the English crown and those of its 
successor sovereign, the people of the state of New Jersey.  The 
people have “the legal estate and the usufruct [and] may make such 
disposition of them, and such regulation concerning them as they may 
think fit . . . [thru] the legislative body, who are the representatives of 
the people for this purpose.”255  The legislature may provide for all 
manner of public improvements for navigation and commerce, 
including fishing and oystering, “at the public expense, or they may 
 250. Act of June 9, 1820, 1820 N.J. Laws 162 § 9 (providing for the preservation of clams and 
oysters). 
 251. See Deveney, supra note 30, at 54. 
 252. 1820 N.J. Laws 162 § 10. 
 253. A subsequent statute made it clear that owners of coastal lands in Newark Bay could 
license the right to exclusive oyster beds to third parties and that such exclusive claims were to 
be staked out in a particular manner.  Act of Dec. 8, 1823, 1823 N.J. Laws 55 § 1 (supplementing 
the Act for the preservation of clams and oysters). 
 254. See BONNIE J. MCCAY, OYSTER WARS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 46-49 (1998).  As we 
will see, the defendant in Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 378-79 (1842), did make such a claim 
pursuant to legislation adopted three years after the Arnold decision.  See infra discussion 
accompanying note 258. 
 255. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 13 (N.J. 1821). 
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authorize others to do it by their own labour, and at their own 
expense, giving them reasonable tolls, rents, profits, or exclusive and 
temporary enjoyments.”256  But these considerable powers are 
nothing more than what is called the jus regium, the right of 
regulating, improving, and securing for the common benefit of 
every individual citizen.  The sovereign power itself, therefore, 
cannot, consistently with the principles of the law of nature and the 
constitution of a well ordered society, make a direct and absolute 
grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their 
common right.  It would be a grievance which never could be long 
borne by a free people.257 
Beyond asserting that the people of New Jersey succeeded to the 
crown’s sovereign powers and limitations, neither justice addressed 
the difficult question of how the powers of a democratic sovereign 
might be different from those of a king.  That question would be 
addressed in a subsequent United States Supreme Court decision, 
Martin v. Waddell, but only in dissent.  The majority opinion in 
Martin would embrace Arnold v. Mundy without reservation. 
B. Martin v. Waddell 
Martin v. Waddell 258 is very similar to Arnold on its facts, with 
one major difference.  In Martin the plaintiff claimed an exclusive 
right under the same royal grants as did the plaintiff in Arnold, but 
the defendant also claimed an exclusive right under license from the 
state of New Jersey pursuant to an 1824 statute authorizing the state 
to grant exclusive rights in oyster beds in return for rents to the 
state.259  In writing for the majority of the United States Supreme 
Court, Chief Justice Taney took no notice of this fundamental 
difference between the two cases.  A dissenting Justice Thompson did 
take note of the nature of the defendant’s claim, stating: “[I]f the king 
held such lands as trustee for the common benefit of all his subjects, 
and inalienable as private property, I am unable to discover on what 
ground the state of New Jersey can hold the land discharged of such 
trust, and can assume to dispose of it to the private and exclusive use 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 78. 
 258. Martin, 41 U.S. at 367. 
 259. See Rose, supra note 18, at 727-30, 737 (discussing the Court’s consideration of the 
state’s interest and the defendant’s interest under the statute); Act of November 25, 1824, 1824 
N.J. Laws 28 §§ 3-6 (encouraging and regulating the planting of oysters in the township of Perth 
Amboy). 
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of individuals.”260  Justice Thompson’s conclusion was that Charles II 
must, therefore, have had the power to alienate a proprietary interest 
in the oyster beds in question, a conclusion with considerable support 
in the law, although not one that necessarily follows from the power 
of alienation existing in the New Jersey Legislature.261  A decade later 
in the case of Den v. Jersey Co. Chief Justice Taney relied on his 
Martin opinion in upholding a claim to reclaimed tidal lands based 
upon a grant from the New Jersey Legislature as against another 
private claim based on a grant from the proprietors of East New 
Jersey.262  There was no mention of common or public rights, although 
the case was indistinguishable from Martin v. Waddell.263  The fact 
that Taney relied on Martin to uphold a private claim of entitlement 
in Den on very similar facts makes it puzzling why Martin has 
persisted as authority for a modern public trust doctrine understood 
to constrain the state’s power to alienate submerged lands.  In both 
Martin and Den, Taney confirmed private title to submerged lands 
granted by the state. 
While acknowledging that in England the crown was the 
appropriate organ of government to hold and dispose of the public 
domain, Chief Justice Taney introduced the trust concept to the 
Supreme Court’s navigable waters jurisprudence in his statement that 
“[t]he country mentioned in the letters-patent was held by the king in 
his public and regal character, as the representative of the nation, and 
in trust for them.”264  But Taney was not speaking only of navigable 
waters and their submerged lands. His assertion was that all of the 
lands granted in the letters-patent by Charles II to the Duke of York, 
lands he describes as public domain, were held in trust for the 
nation.265  So his use of the term trust is very different from its modern 
usage in the context of what Hale defined as common property.  
Taney’s application of the term to all of the lands that would become 
the state of New Jersey means he could only have been speaking of 
the trust which all free peoples must have in their governments, not of 
a trust in the sense the term is used in modern public trust doctrine. 
 260. Martin, 41 U.S. at 432. 
 261. See infra text accompanying notes 307-315. 
 262. Den v. Ass’n of the Jersey Co., 56 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1853). 
 263. Martin, 41 U.S. at 432 (discussing legislation that created a licensing scheme under 
which the defendant acquired an exclusive right to plant and harvest oysters in tidal waters).  
See also Den, 56 U.S. at 431-32 (noting that the legislature had chartered the defendant 
corporation for the purpose of granting it tidal lands to be reclaimed by filling). 
 264. Martin, 41 U.S. at 409. 
 265. Id. at 367. 
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With respect to the particular oyster beds claimed by the plaintiff 
in the case, Taney cites Blundell v. Catterall266 and Duke of Somerset 
v. Fogwell267 in asserting that “the question must be regarded as 
settled in England, against the right of the king, since Magna Carta, to 
make such a grant.”268  Neither case really supports Taney’s 
conclusion about En
In Blundell, the defendant sought to defend against an action in 
trespass by asserting a public right to bathe in the sea and to have 
access for that purpose across the foreshore.269  It is a puzzle why 
Chief Justice Taney cited the case as supportive of the conclusion that 
the king has no right to convey private interests in navigable waters 
and tidal lands.  None of the four opinions in the case question that 
the plaintiff had exclusive rights to the shore and to the associated 
fishery.  Nor did the defendant challenge those private rights, 
claiming only the right to bathe on the shore and to have access to the 
shore across the plaintiff’s property.  Whether or not the plaintiff’s 
property interest had been granted before or after Magna Carta was 
not an issue, even for the one dissenting judge, Justice Best, who was 
prepared to embrace a common law right to bathe even if the only 
justification was public policy.270  Best did fairly state the concept of 
common property as defined by Hale in stating that the seashore 
“was holden by the King, like the sea and the highways, for all his 
subjects.  The soil could only be transferred, subject to this public 
trust; and general usage shews that the public right has been excepted 
out of the grant of the soil.”271  This may have been the source of 
Chief Justice Taney’s use of the public trust terminology, but as 
Justice Bayley stated in response to Justice Best, while there is no 
doubt a jus publicum, “the question in this case is, what the jus 
publicum is.”272  Neither Bayley nor his other two colleagues could 
find any support for the jus publicum including the right to bathe 
claimed by the defendant.  What is important about Blundell for 
modern public trust analysis is Justice Bayley’s recognition that the 
 266. Blundell v. Catterall, (1821) 106 Eng. Rep. 1190, 1197, 1199-1200, 1203, 1205 (K.B.). 
 267. Duke of Somerset v. Fogwell, (1829) 108 Eng. Rep. 325, 328-29. 
 268. Martin, 41 U.S at 410. 
 269. Blundell, 106 Eng. Rep. at 1190-91. 
 270. Id. at 1197 (Best, J.) (“But unless I felt myself bound by an authority as strong and 
clear as an Act of Parliament, I would hold on principles of public policy, I might say public 
necessity, that the interruption of free access to the sea is a public nuisance.”). 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 1204 (Bayley, J.). 
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scope of the jus publicum was not defined by Hale in his oft cited 
treatise,273 and Justice Best’s willing expansion of the common law 
definition on the basis of his assessment of good public policy.274  
Taney, following the lead of the New Jersey court in Arnold, 
apparently was willing to embrace the Best approach. 
Although there is much language in the reporter’s preface to the 
court’s opinion in Fogwell that might be read to support Taney’s 
conclusion, the court did not seriously question the king’s power to 
grant a private fishery.  At issue was the proper form for the instant 
action.275  In resolving that technical question, the Court cited the 
River Banne case in support of the prima facie rule on crown grants 
pursuant to deciding whether or not the soil was a part of the grant,276 
but otherwise the Court assumed the grant upon which the plaintiff 
based his claim was valid.277  The reporter stated that “[t]he learned 
[trial] Judge was of opinion, that there was evidence for the jury to 
presume that there had been before the reign of Henry the Third, a 
grant of the exclusive right of fishing in the river Dart,”278 and stated 
in the headnote to the case that the ruling in the case applied 
“[w]here a subject is owner of a several fishery in a navigable river, 
where the tide flows and reflows, granted to him (as must be 
presumed) before Magna Charta.”279  Given that it is also reported 
that the grant to the Duke of Somerset issued from Elizabeth I more 
than three centuries after Magna Carta,280 one might conclude that 
indeed it “must be presumed” that the grant was before Magna Carta. 
Having addressed the question of English law, Taney then went 
on to say that it was of little relevance “because it has ceased to be a 
matter of much interest in the United States.”281 
For when the revolution took place, the people of each state 
became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the 
absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the soils under 
them, for their own common use, subject only to the rights since 
surrendered by the constitution to the general government.  A 
grant made by their authority must, therefore, manifestly be tried 
 273. Id. at 1204-05. 
 274. See id. at 1196-97 (Best, J.). 
 275. Duke of Somerset v. Fogwell, (1826) 5 B. & C. 875, 878 (reporter headnotes). 
 276. Id. at 885 (Bayley, J.). 
 277. Id. at 886. 
 278. Id. at 877 (reporter headnotes). 
 279. Id. at 875. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842). 
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and determined by different principles from those which apply to 
grants of the British crown, when the title is held by a single 
individual, in trust for the whole nation.282 
But even as late as 1842, the English law would not be so easily 
dismissed.  Both the plaintiff and the defendant asserted rights based 
in English law.  The plaintiff’s claim of title led back to a grant from 
the king of England,283 and Taney acknowledged the prima facie rule 
that Hale had described nearly three centuries earlier.  “The 
dominion and property in navigable waters, and in the lands under 
them, being held by the king as a public trust, . . . [any] grant to an 
individual . . . is so much taken from the common fund . . . . [Such 
grants] are, therefore, construed strictly; and it will not be presumed, 
that he intended to part from any portion of the public domain, unless 
clear and especial words are used to denote it.”284  The defendant’s 
claim was founded in the jus publicum, a concept with deep roots in 
English jurisprudence.285 
To determine the validity of the jus publicum claim, Taney asked 
“[w]hether the [king’s] dominion and propriety in the navigable 
waters, and in the soils under them, passed, as a part of the 
prerogative rights annexed to the political powers conferred on the 
duke?”286  And if so, “[w]hether, in his hands, they were intended to 
be a trust for the common use of the new community about to be 
established; or private property to be parceled out and sold to 
individuals, for his own benefit?”287  The latter question is not, said 
Taney, to be answered as if we are interpreting a mere deed or other 
document of conveyance, rather “it was an instrument upon which 
was to be founded the institutions of a great political community; and 
in that light it should be regarded and construed.”288  As the questions 
were posed by Taney, there could be only one answer.  No one 
doubted that public rights in navigable waters existed as the jus 
publicum.  If what the Duke of York received from Charles II was 
either a proprietary interest in those waters and submerged lands or a 
responsibility to preserve the public’s right of use, the public right 
would prevail and no grants of exclusive rights could be permitted.  
 282. Id. at 410-11. 
 283. Id. at 367. 
 284. Id. at 411. 
 285. See id. at 425-26. 
 286. Id. at 411. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 412. 
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For Taney, either the Duke received a proprietary interest or he held 
the waters and lands “as one of the royalties incident to the powers of 
government.”289  But those alternatives did not reflect the laws of 
England at the time.  Justice Taney could claim not to be interested in 
the laws of England, but the reality was (and remains) in a rule of law 
system bridging the sovereignty of two nations that the laws of the 
earlier sovereign continue to matter.  Hence the persistent return to 
English law in modern discussions of the public trust doctrine in 
American jurisdictions. 
Justice Thompson, in dissent, ably explains how Taney 
misunderstood or distorted the laws of England and of New Jersey, as 
evidenced by the dependence of the state on private enterprise 
pursued on submerged lands that had been granted by the Duke and 
his successors in title.  “A majority of the court seem to have adopted 
the doctrine of Arnold v. Mundy,”290 says Thompson, which was based 
on the “broad proposition, that the title to land under the water did 
not, and could not, pass to the Duke of York, as private property. . . . 
It is worthy of observation,” he suggests, “that the course of New 
Jersey in relation to this claim is hardly consistent with her 
pretensions.”291  Amidst those pretensions, he points out, is the very 
law upon which the defendant rests his claim.  “The enacting clause 
[of that legislation] authorizes the setting apart the oystery to 
exclusive private use, when, by the proviso, no obstruction is to be 
made to the fisheries.”292 
Where Taney got the law of navigable waters and fisheries 
wrong, the New Jersey Legislature got it right in that simple enacting 
clause.  It is not a choice between public and private rights.  Rather 
private rights can and do exist, subject to the jus publicum, and when 
grants of submerged lands and fisheries are made by the king or his 
assignee they must be explicit and will not be implied.  Thompson 
makes reference to Hale in stating that the “king of England hath a 
double right in the sea, viz., a right of jurisdiction, which he ordinarily 
exercises by his admiral, and a right of propriety or ownership.”293  By 
the letters of patent of 1664 and 1674 the Duke of York received both 
and there was no necessity, as Taney suggested, to convert the “jura 
 289. Id. at 413. 
 290. Id. at 419. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at 420-21. 
 293. Id. at 422. 
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regalia . . . into private property.”294  “The true rule on the subject,” 
said Thompson, “is that primâ facie a fishery in a navigable river is 
common, and he who sets up an exclusive right, must show title, 
either by grant or prescription.”295  Thompson further suggested that 
it was not clear from the majority opinion what was different about 
drylands.296  If the Duke of York received only the jura regalia from 
Charles II, how was it possible for most of the drylands in the state to 
have come into private ownership?  Of course Taney did not think 
that the Duke lacked sufficient proprietary interest to convey the 
dryland, but his argument that wetlands could not be privately owned 
because of their special public values made it difficult to explain why 
drylands, many of which had equal or greater public value, could be 
granted and privately owned. 
C. Arnold Overruled 
Although Taney’s majority opinion in Martin v. Waddell relied 
heavily on the New Jersey court’s opinion in Arnold v. Mundy, the 
New Jersey court overturned its decision only eight years after Martin 
in Gough v. Bell.297  Not surprisingly, Gough is seldom cited in the 
public trust literature.  Of 128 articles published since 1982 that cite 
Arnold, only 11 cite Gough and two of those misstate the holding in 
the case.298  But notwithstanding the extensive modern reliance on 
Arnold, the fact of the matter is that it was not good law in New 
Jersey after 1850.299  Indeed every indication in the three decades 
 294. Id. at 413. 
 295. Id. at 424. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Gough v. Bell, 22 N.J.L. 441 (N.J. 1850). 
 298. Erin Ryan, Comment, Public Trust and Distrust: The Theoretical Implications of the 
Public Trust Doctrine for Natural Resource Management, 31 ENVL. L. 477, 482 n.31 (2001) 
(stating that Gough holds “that state sovereignty precludes New Jersey proprietors from 
granting lands below high-water . . . .”).  See also Donna A. Golem, Note, The Public Trust 
Doctrine Unprecedentedly Gains New Ground in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 22 LOY. 
L. A. L. REV. 1319, 1353 (1989) (stating that Gough “applied the public trust doctrine to 
tidelands at the shore of navigable waters”). 
 299. It may be suggested that the holding in Arnold was restored in 1972 in the case of 
Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 52 (1972), in which the New Jersey 
court quoted extensively from Chief Justice Kirkpatrick’s opinion.  But Neptune City did not 
involve the alienability of tidal lands and in any event the Court agreed in dicta that such lands 
could be alienated if “promoting the interests of the public” or if there is no “‘substantial 
impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.’”  Id. at 54 (quoting Illinois 
Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892)). 
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separating the two opinions was that it was never good law.  In 
overruling Arnold, Chief Justice Green noted: 
The view, moreover, expressed by the Chief Justice, in Arnold v. 
Mundy, is incompatible with very numerous acts passed by the 
legislature of this state.  The acts which authorize the erection of 
dams or bridges across navigable streams, which are found upon 
the statute book from a very early period, the laws authorizing the 
erection of piers and docks, and the laws authorizing the exclusive 
appropriation of oyster beds to private use, are all grants or 
appropriations of the waters of the state destructive to some extent 
of common rights.300 
Quoting his predecessor’s holding in Arnold that “‘[t]he 
sovereign power itself cannot . . . make a direct and absolute grant of 
the waters of the state,’”301 Chief Justice Green stated: 
If, by this proposition, it is meant only to assert that a grant of all 
the waters of the state, to the utter destruction of the rights of 
navigation and fishery, would be an insufferable grievance, it is 
undoubtedly true. . . . But if it be intended to deny the power of the 
legislature, by grant, to limit common rights or to appropriate lands 
covered by water to individual enjoyment, to the exclusion of the 
public common rights of navigation or fishery, the position is too 
broadly stated.  The contrary doctrine is supported by numerous 
authorities.302 
Among the authorities cited by Green were Chief Justice Shaw of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court, who held in Charlestown v. Middlesex 
“that a navigable stream may cease to be such, by the appropriation 
of the soil, under legislative authority, to other purposes . . . ,”303 and 
Chief Justice John Marshall, who stated in Willson v. Black Bird 
Creek Marsh Co. that “unless it comes in conflict with the 
Constitution or a law of the United States [which he found it did 
not],” the placing of a dam in a navigable waterway “is an affair 
between the government of Delaware and its citizens . . . .”304  
Marshall concluded his very short opinion in Willson with a footnote 
that included the entirety of Justice Baldwin’s opinion on behalf of 
the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Atkinson 
v. Philadelphia and Trenton Railroad Co. in which Baldwin stated 
that “[t]his common right [of public access to a navigable waterway] is 
as much under the protection of the law, as a right of property in a 
 300. Gough, 22 N.J.L. at 456. 
 301. Id. at 458-59 (quoting Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 53 (N.J. 1821)). 
 302. Id. at 459. 
 303. 44 Mass. 202, 203 (1841). 
 304. 27 U.S. 245, 251 (1829). 
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citizen, . . . but it is a right derived from legislation, which may be 
abridged or modified . . . as may be thought most conducive to the 
public welfare, by authorizing the erection of bridges or dams, which 
may subject the navigation to partial interruption, or wholly destroy 
it.”305  It should be noted that Chief Justice Green’s statement of the 
law on state alienation of submerged lands is very similar to Justice 
Field’s explanation of the law in Illinois Central,306 notwithstanding 
the heavy modern reliance on Illinois Central for a near total limit on 
alienation. 
The Gough court might have overruled Arnold simply because 
its prohibition on state alienation of submerged lands did not comport 
with the reality everywhere in New Jersey and in every other state in 
the Union.  But the opinion warrants more attention than it has 
received because of its recognition that even if there existed a 
common law prohibition on alienation by the king (although the facts 
did not support the existence of that rule either), it did not follow that 
there would be a similar prohibition on the people and legislatures of 
the new American states.307  The court stated that “[w]hatever doubts 
may exist in regard to the power of the king to dispose of common 
rights, there exists none in regard to the power of parliament.  
Parliament not only may, but does exercise the power of aliening the 
public domain, of disposing of common rights, and of converting arms 
of the sea, where the tide ebbs and flows, into arable land, to the utter 
destruction of the common rights of navigation and fishing.”308  The 
court elaborated on its understanding of the legislative power: 
This power is attributed to the omnipotence of parliament, and it is 
said that no such omnipotence is vested in the legislature.  The 
legislature, it is true, is not omnipotent in the sense in which 
parliament is so.  It is restrained by constitutional provisions.  Its 
powers are abridged by fundamental laws.  But it would seem clear, 
upon principle, that in every political existence, in every organized 
government, whatever may be its form, there must be vested 
somewhere ultimate dominion, the absolute power of disposing of 
the property of every citizen.  In this consists eminent domain, 
which is an inseparable attribute of sovereignty . . . .  If the 
legislature may dispose of the property of each individual citizen 
for the public good, it would seem to be no greater exercise of 
power to dispose of public property or the common rights of all the 
people for the same end.  The objection to an alienation of the 
 305. 2 F. Cas. 105, 107-08 (1834). 
 306. See infra text accompanying notes 338-350. 
 307. See Gough v. Bell, 22 N.J.L. 441, 457 (N.J. 1850). 
 308. Id. 
01__HUFFMAN.DOC 10/8/2008  10:26 AM 
Fall 2007] HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 53 
 
public domain by the king is that he is but a trustee for the 
community.  But the legislature are not mere trustees of common 
rights for the people.  These rights are vested in the people 
themselves; the legislature, in disposing of them, act as their 
representatives, in their name and in their stead.  The act of the 
legislature is the act of the people, not that of a mere trustee 
holding the legal title for the public good.309 
The same point was made by the Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals in James River & Kanawha Power Co. v. Old Dominion Iron 
& Steel Corp.310  At issue was title to lands underlying a navigable 
river, the James.  Title was claimed pursuant to grants made by the 
state to predecessors in title.311  The Virginia court had many years 
earlier stated in Home v. Richards that the bed of a navigable river 
could not be granted.312  The reality in Home was that the prevailing 
party was permitted to construct a dam across a portion of the 
Rappahannock River, whether or not he had title to the bed, which 
depended upon whether or not the river was navigable.313  Thus, the 
court’s declaration that the bed of a navigable river could not be 
granted did not mean that individuals might not possess usufructuary 
rights in the water and bed as an attribute of ownership of riparian 
land or under license from the state.  Notwithstanding this caveat 
relative to the Home decision, there was an important difference 
between that case and James River.  In Home the grant in question 
had been made by the crown.314  In James River the grants were made 
by the Virginia Legislature.315  The James River court held that the 
state could grant private title to lands beneath a navigable waterway 
and stated: 
Undoubtedly there are certain public uses of navigable waters 
which the state does hold in trust for all the public, and of which the 
state cannot deprive them, such as the right of navigation, but, 
subject to these public rights, there is no reason why the beds of 
navigable streams may not be granted, unless restrained by the 
Constitution. The Legislature is the representative of the people in 
such matters, and may exercise full power over the property of the 
 309. Id. 
 310. James River & Kanawha Power Co. v. Old Dominion Iron & Steel Corp., 138 Va. 461, 
469-70 (1924). 
 311. Id. at 471. 
 312. Home v. Richards, 8 Va. 441, 466 (1798). 
 313. Id. at 446-47. 
 314. See id. at 441-45. 
 315. James River, 138 Va. at 471. 
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state, except so far as that right has been ceded to the federal 
government, or is restrained by the state Constitution.316 
D. Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois 
Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois317 is the “lodestar”318 of 
modern public trust doctrine for much the same reason that Justinian 
provides the Roman law foundation and Bracton and Hale the 
English common law foundation.  The case has been badly 
misunderstood and its holding distorted.  We know that the case has 
been misunderstood thanks to the meticulous historical work done by 
Professors Kearney and Merrill.319  We know that its holding has been 
distorted by reading Justice Field’s opinion carefully.  More than a 
century later, the misunderstandings and distortions matter little to 
modern public trust law, but there are nonetheless lessons to be 
learned from getting the facts and the law straight. 
The usual story goes like this.320  Like many other railroads in the 
United States, the Illinois Central was granted a right-of-way by the 
United States government along with significant land grants to 
subsidize the costs of construction.321  The State of Illinois issued a 
charter to the railroad permitting it to operate within the state.322  The 
City of Chicago came to agreement with the railroad, not without 
controversy, that the tracks would run along the lakeshore.323  
Subsequently, so the story goes, the Illinois Central stole the entire 
lakeshore and harbor of the city by getting friends in the Illinois 
Legislature to grant the company 1000 acres of submerged lands 
along the city’s existing harbor and lakeshore.324  Only a few years 
 316. Id. at 469. 
 317. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
 318. Sax, supra note 1, at 489. 
 319. See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American 
Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004). 
 320. Kearney & Merrill suggest that this “standard narrative” had its roots in Professor 
Sax’s telling of the story in his 1970 article.  Id. at 808.  They also suggest that the standard 
narrative has been embraced both by proponents and opponents of the modern doctrine.  Sax’s 
account of the facts underlying Illinois Central has remained influential among commentators, 
especially those who place more faith in collective than in market-based solutions to problems 
of environmental degradation. But to a remarkable degree, an identical narrative also underlies 
the accounts of the public trust doctrine advanced by scholars sympathetic to private property 
and market ordering and hence generally skeptical about the doctrine.  Id. 
 321. Id. at 818. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. at 836-37, 847. 
 324. Id. at 800-01, 838-39. 
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later, the Legislature recognized the error of its ways and revoked the 
land grant.325  The Illinois Central challenged the revocation as a 
violation of their federal constitutional rights under the contracts and 
14th Amendment due process clauses.326  When the case finally 
reached the United States Supreme Court, Justice Field recognized 
the scandal of the Illinois Legislature’s giveaway to big business of the 
public’s rights and held that the Legislature was not competent to 
grant the lands to Illinois Central because the public trust doctrine 
prohibited alienation.327  Absent Justice Field’s recognition of the 
ancient public trust doctrine, the growth and development of a great 
American city would have been subject to the whims and desires of a 
powerful, private monopoly.328 
As Kearney and Merrill demonstrate in their history of the case, 
“the reality is more complex than the standard story even begins to 
intimate.”329  They tell a story not of big business against the public 
interest, but rather of nearly four decades of political battles among 
the City of Chicago, the State of Illinois, the United States 
Government and the Illinois Central and other private interests.  At 
the end of the day everyone got some of what they wanted, and no 
one had perfectly clean hands.  Kearney and Merrill conclude that the 
Illinois Central may well have employed corrupt means to influence 
the Legislature,330 but they also contend that legislators could have 
reasonably believed that the grant was in the best interest of the City 
and State.331  A wide array of political and economic interests were 
competing for control of the Chicago waterfront, and it is safe to say 
that none of them had in mind the preservation of the natural beauty 
of the lakeshore, except for a few wealthy residents concerned with 
preserving their unobstructed views.332  Indeed, had any of the 
competing interests thought that the outcome would stymie the 
development and growth of Chicago,333 including the development of 
the submerged lands for commercial advantage, they would have 
 325. Id. at 801. 
 326. Id. at 801, 916-17. 
 327. See id. at 924-25. 
 328. Id. at 806, 881. 
 329. Id. at 930-31. 
 330. Id. at 927. 
 331. Id. at 927-28. 
 332. Id. at 925. 
 333. Justice Field did suggest that pursuant to the land grant Illinois Central had the power 
“to delay indefinitely the improvement of the harbor,” but no one had realistic fears that the 
company would do so.  Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 451 (1892). 
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worked out a solution without the aid of the Supreme Court.334  Nor 
did Justice Field have preservation of the lakefront in mind.335 
Kearney and Merrill conclude the following about their story of 
Illinois Central and its ramifications for the public trust doctrine: 
None of this is to suggest that the public trust doctrine is necessarily 
a bad idea or a good one.  But it does suggest that the doctrine 
should be assessed using arguments more probing than a retelling 
of the standard narrative of the Illinois Central case.  That story is a 
fable, and can justify the doctrine only if we already believe in it for 
reasons independent of the lesson the case supposedly teaches.336 
Many modern advocates of the expanded public trust doctrine are 
such believers because they see the doctrine as their best hope to stop 
development in its tracks.  For them, the fable of big business versus 
the common rights of ordinary people is a far better foundation for 
the doctrine than is the reality of power politics that Kearney and 
Merrill recount. 
The fable of Illinois Central’s history is matched with something 
of a fable about what the case actually held.  Most modern 
applications of the public trust doctrine involve proposals for 
development on isolated public and private parcels said to be affected 
with a public trust.337  In such cases, Illinois Central is offered as 
precedent for the principle that public property affected with a public 
trust cannot be alienated.  But that is not what the Supreme Court 
held in Illinois Central.  No less than five times in the opinion, Justice 
Field expressly states that submerged and coastal lands affected with 
a public trust can be alienated.338  Indeed, he notes that it is often in 
 334. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 319, at 925 (“A widespread consensus existed in the 
second half of the nineteenth century about the need for a new depot and a new outer harbor. 
The main point of controversy was over what form the development would take and who would 
control it, not whether there should be any development of the lakefront at all.”). 
 335. Id. (“His public trust doctrine was designed to preserve access to the lake for 
commercial vessels at competitive prices, not to preserve Lake Park or the shoreline from 
further economic development. Moreover, Justice Field was not alone in these preferences 
among the federal judges who ruled on aspects of the controversy. When the dust finally settled, 
all of Illinois Central’s massive landfills and improvements had been ratified by the federal 
courts as being consistent with the nebulous trust identified in Illinois Central. Thus, the public 
trust doctrine, as invoked in the Illinois Central litigation, was scarcely an anti-development 
doctrine.”). 
 336. Id. at 931. 
 337. See, e.g., Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988). 
 338. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 435 (1892) (“It is the settled law of this country that the 
ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters, within the limits 
of the several states, belong to the respective states . . . with the consequent right to use or 
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the public interest for the state to do so.339  What the Illinois Central 
majority of four justices did hold was: 
[T]he same doctrine as to the dominion and sovereignty over and 
ownership of lands under the navigable waters of the Great Lakes 
applies which obtains at the common law as to the dominion and 
sovereignty over and ownership of lands under tide waters in the 
borders of the sea, and that the lands are held by the same right in 
the one case as in the other, and subject to the same trusts and 
limitations.340 
Field later explains that these lands are “held in trust for the people 
of the state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on 
commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from 
the obstruction or interference of private parties.”341  So the import of 
Illinois Central when it was decided was that the state had 
considerable discretion in meeting its trust responsibilities with 
respect to navigable waters and submerged lands.  It could alienate 
lands for purposes related to the promotion of navigation and 
commerce.342  It could alienate land for any private purpose so long as 
it did not interfere with the public interests in navigation, commerce, 
and fishing.343  However, the alienation of most of the then present 
and future harbor of the City of Chicago could not be done consistent 
dispose of any portion thereof, when that can be done without substantial impairment of the 
interest of the public in the waters . . . .” Id. at 435; “It is grants of parcels of lands under 
navigable waters that may afford foundation for wharves, piers, docks, and other structures in 
aid of commerce, and grants of parcels which, being occupied, do not substantially impair the 
public interest in the land and waters remaining, that are chiefly considered and sustained in the 
adjudged cases as a valid exercise of legislative power consistently with the trust to the public 
upon which such lands are held by the state.” Id. at 452; “The control of the state for the 
purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the 
interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the 
public interest in the lands and waters remaining.” Id. at 453; “The state can no more abdicate 
its trust over property . . . like navigable waters and soils under them, . . . except in the instance 
of parcels mentioned for the improvement of the navigation and use of the waters, or when 
parcels can be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains, than it can 
abdicate its police powers . . . .”  Id.; “The trust with which they are held . . . cannot be alienated, 
except in those instances mentioned of parcels used in the improvement of the interest held, or 
when parcels can be disposed of without detriment to the public interest in the lands and waters 
remaining.” Id. at 455-56. 
 339. Id. at 452 (“The interest of the people in the navigation of the waters and in commerce 
over them may be improved in many instances by the erection of wharves, docks, and piers 
therein, for which purpose the state may grant parcels of the submerged lands; and, so long as 
their disposition is made for such purpose, no valid objections can be made to the grants.”). 
 340. Id. at 437. 
 341. Id. at 452. 
 342. See id. 
 343. See id. at 435. 
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with these trust responsibilities.  The permitted alienations, wrote 
Justice Field, reflect “a very different doctrine from the one which 
would sanction the abdication of the general control of the state over 
lands under the navigable waters of an entire harbor or bay, or of a 
sea or lake.”344  This narrow limitation on the state’s power to alienate 
submerged lands is precisely the same limitation articulated a half 
century earlier by New Jersey Chief Justice Green in Gough v. Bell.345 
In reaching his decision, Justice Field relied upon Hale’s 
explanation of English law and the English court’s application of that 
law in Blundell v. Catterall as recounted in the New York case of 
People v. New York & Staten Island Ferry Co.346  The New York court 
stated, correctly, that “[t]he king, by virtue of his proprietary interest, 
could grant the soil so that it should become private property, but his 
grant was subject to the paramount right of public use of navigable 
waters, which he could neither destroy nor abridge.”347  He also cited 
Martin v. Waddell, noting that Chief Justice Taney there relied 
heavily on Arnold v. Mundy as a case “in which the decision was 
made ‘with great deliberation and research,’”348 notwithstanding that 
Chief Justice Kirkpatrick had apologized for failing to devote 
adequate consideration to the case.349  From Arnold Justice Field 
drew the conclusion that “‘[t]he sovereign power, itself . . . cannot 
consistently with the principles of the law of nature and the 
constitution of a well-ordered society, make a direct and absolute 
grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their 
common right.’”350 
In quoting this statement, Field opened the door to a confusion 
that has persisted to the present day, although Justice Shiras’s dissent 
made clear that the grant to the Illinois Central did not in any way 
affect the sovereign powers of the state.351  The sovereign power of 
 344. Id. at 452-53. 
 345. 22 N.J.L. 441, 456-57 (N.J. 1850). 
 346. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 458 (relying on the discussion of Hale in People v. N. Y. 
& Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 76 (N.Y. 1877)). 
 347. Id. (quoting N. Y. & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. at 76). 
 348. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 456. 
 349. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 9 (N.J. 1821). 
 350. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 456. 
 351. Id. at 474. (“[I]t is not pretended, in this view of the case, that the state can part, or has 
parted, by contract, with her sovereign powers.  The railroad company takes and holds these 
lands subject at all times to the same sovereign powers in the state as obtain in the case of other 
owners of property.”)  This fundamental distinction between the state’s proprietary interests 
and its sovereign powers was well understood by nineteenth century American courts.  In the 
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the state, what Hale called the jus regium and we call the police 
power, is not the same thing as the public trust, or jus publicum in 
Hale’s terms.  The former are the powers inherent in all governments, 
subject to any self-imposed, usually constitutional, constraints.352  The 
latter are rights held in common by all citizens in the nature of an 
easement upon the jus privatum whether held by the state or by 
individuals.353  Field had earlier hinted at this confusion when he 
wrote that “[t]he state can no more abdicate its trust over property . . . 
than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of 
government and the preservation of the peace.”354  Although he was 
correct that, under English law, neither could be abdicated,355 the 
statement seemed to suggest that the state’s responsibilities with 
respect to the jus publicum were of the same nature as its 
responsibilities under the jus regium.  The confusion was further 
amplified by the implication from Arnold that alienation of state 
property in submerged lands (jus privatum with title in the state) was 
itself a breach of the state’s trust responsibilities under the jus 
publicum.356  But the jus publicum, properly understood, existed as an 
easement in properties in navigable waters and submerged lands 
whether held by the state or by private individuals.357  By the time of 
Illinois Central, this misunderstanding of the jus publicum had already 
become ingrained due to the conclusion that control of navigable 
waters arose from ownership of the underlying lands.  Title to the 
submerged lands under Lake Michigan, wrote Field, “necessarily 
carries with it control over the waters above them, whenever the 
lands are subjected to use.”358  But the original understanding of the 
jus publicum denied the truth of this assertion by holding that without 
1877 case of People v. New York and Staten Island Ferry Co. the New York Court of Appeals 
stated that “[t]he grantee [of submerged tidal lands] acquires the title to the soil and the State 
cannot annul the grant, and the grantee, by virtue of his proprietary interest, can exclude any 
other person from the permanent occupation of the land granted . . . .  But the State does not . . . 
divest itself of the right to regulate the use of the granted premises in the interest of the public 
and for the protection of commerce and navigation.” 68 N.Y. 71, 79 (N.Y. 1877). 
 352. See Karl P. Baker & Dwight H. Merriam, The Law and Planning of Public Open 
Spaces: Boston’s Big Dig and Beyond: Indelible Public Interests in Property: The Public Trust 
and the Public Forum, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 275, 279 (2005). 
 353. Id. 
 354. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453. 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. at 456. 
 357. HALE, supra note 32, at 336. 
 358. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452. 
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in the use (and therefore control to that extent) of the overlying 
waters.359 
Nowhere in Field’s opinion is there a suggestion that the law 
might be different in the democratic states of the United States than it 
was in the English monarchy.  The assumption seemed to be that the 
democratic legislature of Illinois was subject to the same constraints 
on alienation of state property as was the king of England.  This made 
sense, it was thought, because “‘prior to the Revolution, the shore 
and lands under water of the navigable streams and waters of the 
province of New Jersey belonged to the king of Great Britain as part 
of the jura regalia of the crown, and devolved to the state by right of 
conquest.’”360  Given this understanding of the nature of the state’s 
interest in navigable waters and submerged lands, it is probably not 
surprising that Illinois Central represented a preference for the 
judiciary, rather than the legislature, having the last say on the 
alienation of lands affected with the public trust.  “What happened in 
Illinois Central, according to the standard narrative, tells us that 
elected officials cannot be trusted with the power to dispose of certain 
kinds of resources.  If we are to protect the public interest in these 
resources effectively, we must resort to some kind of judicially 
enforced inalienability rule.”361  Justice Field confirmed this distrust of 
the legislature in stating that even if the legislature was competent to 
make the grant of submerged lands, it was “necessarily revocable.”362  
Otherwise, “every harbor in the country [would be] at the mercy of a 
majority of the legislature of the state in which the harbor is 
situated.”363  But this view totally ignores both the core idea of the 
American Revolution and the reality of Parliament’s powers in the 
monarchical republic from which the United States achieved its 
independence.  As a dissenting Justice Shiras stated in Illinois Central: 
 359. HALE, supra note 32, at 336. 
 360. Id. at 457.  Here, Field was quoting from Justice Bradley in Stockton v. Baltimore and 
N.Y. R.R. Co., 32 F. 9, 19 (N.J. 1887).  Bradley’s statement that the king acquired title by right of 
conquest is different from Chief Justice Taney’s insistence in Martin that title was acquired by 
right of discovery.  Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 409 (1842). 
 361. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 319, at 803. 
 362. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 455.  Field’s discussion of the revocability of the grant 
suggests some uneasiness with his earlier conclusion that the legislature was not competent to 
make the grant in the first place.  But the idea that a grant intended to facilitate private 
development of the harbor was revocable without constitutional consequence defied logic.  No 
private enterprise would invest in such project without greater security than that. 
 363. Id. 
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It would seem to be plain that, if the state of Illinois has the power, 
by her legislature, to grant private rights and interests in parcels of 
soil under her navigable waters, the extent of such a grant and its 
effect upon the public interests in the lands and waters remaining 
are matters of legislative discretion.364 
Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the nineteenth, and even 
twentieth, century caselaw and commentary on the public trust 
doctrine is its almost universal failure to distinguish between the 
powers and responsibilities of the crown and those of the state and 
federal governments formed after the Revolution.  It is a failure that 
has infected other areas of American law including, notably, the law 
of sovereign immunity.  Why should we assume that abuses by the 
crown will be abuses by the elected legislature?  Is not the theory of 
popular sovereignty that individuals have both rights and 
responsibilities in a civic community, and that democratic governance 
is the best available means for assuring that actions taken in the name 
of the public will most likely serve the public interest while respecting 
individual rights and fairly distributing the responsibilities of civic 
life?  Yet the theory of the public trust doctrine, as we have come to 
understand it from our reading of Illinois Central, seems to be that we 
must rely upon the courts (including the unelected federal courts) to 
assure that the legislature does not violate the common (not 
individual) rights of the citizenry.  Unless the common rights 
represented by the jus publicum are understood to be individual 
rights held in common by all citizens and enforceable by each citizen 
acting on his personal behalf (like a tenancy in common), the jus 
publicum must be understood to be the rights of the public as an 
entity.365  It is one thing to conclude that the king cannot be trusted to 
respect those rights.  It is quite another thing to suggest that the 
legislature, which has been elected by the public to act on behalf of 
the public, cannot be trusted to respect the public’s rights.  English 
law, on which modern public trust advocates rely, clearly understood 
this fundamental distinction.  “What the king alone might not be able 
to do after 1701 [date of an act by Parliament declaring all 
prospective royal grants invalid] has never been beyond the power of 
the king and Parliament together to do, or beyond the power of 
Parliament alone.”366 
 364. Id. at 467 (Shiras, J., dissenting). 
 365. See infra discussion accompanying note 373. 
 366. Deveney, supra note 30, at 50.  In the case of R v. Montague, (1825) 107 Eng. Rep. 
1183, 1184 (K.B.), Justice Bayley wrote: 
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Yet the legislature can be trusted, without judicial intervention, 
at least in this case, with the rights of its individual citizens.  The 
contract and due process claims asserted by Illinois Central were both 
constitutional.  Neither was given a moment’s notice by the majority.  
The Court thus turned the notion of limited government on its head 
by ignoring claims of right under the contract and due process clauses 
while intervening in the name of the public to invalidate the actions of 
the people’s representatives in the legislature.  Justice Field sought to 
avoid the contract clause claim by concluding that the legislature was 
not competent to make the grant in the first place,367 but then he goes 
on to suggest that, in any event, the grant was revoked.368  But such 
revocation, as Justice Shiras pointed out, “is utterly inconsistent with 
a great and fundamental principle of a republican government, the 
right of the citizens to the free enjoyment of their property legally 
acquired.”369  Shiras did not disagree with Field’s description of the 
public rights in navigable waters and submerged lands, but there was 
no claim that those rights had been violated by Illinois Central, and 
there would “be time enough to invoke the doctrine of the 
inviolability of public rights when and if the railroad company 
[should] attempt to disregard them.”370  And if the Illinois Legislature 
later were to conclude that the public interest no longer was served by 
the grant to Illinois Central, as it apparently did in 1873, it could 
“take the rights and property of the railroad company in these lands 
by a constitutional condemnation of them.”371 
E. From Illinois Central to Phillips Petroleum 
Although Illinois Central is today the lodestar of the public trust 
doctrine, its impact on the law in the decades following the decision 
was limited.  The case was extensively cited in state court opinions for 
the general notion of a public right to navigation, commerce, and 
fishing in navigable waters, but it had little effect on state law with 
[E]ven supposing this to have been at some time a public navigation . . . it ought to be 
presumed that the rights of the public have been lawfully determined. . . . If they arose 
from natural causes, why should not natural causes also put an end to them?  But they 
might also be put an end to by Act of Parliament, or by writ of ad quod damnum, and, 
perhaps, by commissioners of sewers, if there were any appointed for the district, and 
they found that it would be for the benefit of the whole level. 
 367. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 460. 
 368. Id. at 461-62. 
 369. Id. at 475 (Shiras, J., dissenting). 
 370. Id. at 474 (Shiras, J., dissenting). 
 371. Id. 
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respect to the alienation of submerged lands under those waters.  
Most conveyances of submerged lands would have passed muster 
under Illinois Central had they been challenged in federal court, but 
the reality was that disputes over title to submerged lands generally 
were agreed to be matters of state law for resolution by state courts.372  
Indeed, the nature and extent of the public trust in navigable waters 
were understood by everyone, including the United States Supreme 
Court, to be questions of state law. 
That it was a question of state law was made clear in Appleby v. 
City of New York,373 the next case in which the Supreme Court 
addressed the public trust doctrine.  The 1926 case is seldom cited 
today, either in the case law or in the public trust literature, but it 
remains important for two reasons.  First, in deciding for the private 
claimant of submerged land granted by the city pursuant to state 
authorization,374 Appleby underscored that Illinois Central was not a 
prohibition on alienation of such lands.  Second, Chief Justice Taft’s 
opinion is filled with citations to New York law.  Justice Field’s 
opinion in Illinois Central cites only two Illinois cases, neither for the 
purpose of evidencing the law of Illinois on title to submerged land 
under navigable waters or any public trust responsibilities of the state 
with respect to such lands.375  Because Justice Field paid no heed to 
Illinois law in Illinois Central and because that case is the focal point 
of modern public trust analysis, there has been much recent 
discussion of the sources of the public trust doctrine and it has been 
suggested by a few modern commentators that the public trust 
doctrine is rooted in federal law, if not in the federal constitution.376  
If we looked to Appleby rather than Illinois Central, we would 
 372. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 484 (1988). 
 373. 271 U.S. 364 (1926).  A companion case, Appleby v. Delaney, 271 U.S. 403 (1926), was 
decided at the same time.  A unanimous Supreme Court found for the plaintiff in both cases on 
an impairment of contract theory. 
 374. Id. at 399. 
 375. The cases were cited in the context of the City of Chicago’s claims to the soil under 
platted streets, alleys, ways, etc..  Ironically, one of the cited cases did involve submerged lands 
on an apparently navigable river and the Court stated that the riparian landowner owned 
submerged lands to the center of the river, contrary to Justice Field’s assertion that the state had 
title to all submerged lands under navigable waterways.  Trustees v. Havens, 11 Ill. 554, 557 
(1850).  The other case had nothing to do with submerged lands but did state with respect to the 
city’s trust responsibilities in relation to public streets that the legislature had discretion to 
determine how best to meet those responsibilities.  Chicago v. Rumsey, 87 Ill. 348, 354 (1877). 
 376. See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 15, at 460 n.144. Wilkinson notes that “[t]he Appleby 
ruling contains an involved and comprehensive analysis of New York state law and state court 
decisions, in contrast to the very limited treatment of Illinois authority in Illinois Central.” Id. 
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understand that whatever the public trust doctrine is, it is a question 
of state law. 
Appleby is also of interest in any historical analysis of Illinois 
Central because it involved a private claim of title to submerged lands 
in an important public harbor and because the claim, like Illinois 
Central’s, was based on the contract clause of the United States 
Constitution.377  Chief Justice Taft began his opinion in Appleby with 
the statement that “the extent of the power of the state and city to 
part with property under navigable waters to private persons, free 
from subsequent regulatory control of the water over the land and the 
land itself . . . is a state question, and we must determine it from the 
law of the state . . . .”378  Taft’s sincerity on this point might be 
questioned since he went on to reverse the decision of the state’s 
highest court on this question of state law, but he had a sound 
justification for considering New York law anew in the Supreme 
Court.  The Court had long made an exception to its normal rule of 
deferring to state court interpretation of state law in contract disputes 
where the state is a contracting party.379 
In 1852 and 1853, the City of New York conveyed to Appleby fee 
simple title to a significant area of submerged lands for the purpose of 
Appleby’s undertaking to fill those lands for commercial, residential, 
and public purposes.380  It was “an excellent example of nineteenth 
century legislative attempts to achieve desired social goals, in the 
absence of an adequate tax structure, by utilizing private capital.”381  
Out of concern for unobstructed navigation on the Hudson River, the 
state subsequently established a line beyond which fill would not be 
permitted.382  The effect was to reduce by roughly half the land 
available to Appleby for filling.383  The City then undertook a policy 
 377. Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. at 380. 
 378. Id. 
 379. Taft cited several cases is support of this exception including Jefferson Branch Bank v. 
Skelly, 66 U.S. 436, 443 (1861), in which the court stated: 
We answer to this, as this court has repeatedly said, whenever an occasion has been 
presented for its expression, that its rule of interpretation has invariably been, that the 
constructions given by the courts of the states to state legislation and to state 
constitutions have been conclusive upon this court, with a single exception, and that is 
when it has been called upon to interpret the contracts of states, ‘though they have 
been made in the forms of law,’ or by the instrumentality of a state’s authorized 
functionaries, in conformity with state legislation. 
 380. Appleby, 271 U.S. at 381. 
 381. Deveney, supra note 30, at 71-72. 
 382. Appleby, 271 U.S. at 383. 
 383. Id. 
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to condemn and take by eminent domain all of the privately owned 
wharf property and water lots within its boundaries and to construct 
wharves at public expense, including two wharves adjacent to 
Appleby’s lands which had not been condemned.384  When the City 
curtailed its condemnation program in 1914, Appleby sued for 
trespass and sought an injunction to stop the dredging of his 
submerged lands adjacent to the public wharves.385  Appleby 
prevailed in the trial court, but that opinion was reversed in the New 
York Court of Appeals.386  He then filed his contract clause claim in 
the United States Supreme Cou
Although Taft’s opinion for the unanimous court was, for the 
most part, a careful analysis of New York law, he did comment briefly 
on the broader issues addressed in Illinois Central.  He began by 
confirming that “[u]pon the American Revolution, all the proprietary 
rights of the crown and Parliament in, and all their dominion over, 
lands under tidewater vested in the several states, subject to the 
powers surrendered to the national government . . . .”387  On the 
question of the state’s power to alienate those lands, he relied on 
Lansing v. Smith for the applicable principle of New York law: 
[T]here can be no doubt of the right of parliament in England, or 
the legislature of this state, to make such grants, when they do not 
interfere with the vested rights of particular individuals.  The right 
to navigate the public waters of the state and to fish therein, and 
the right to use the public highways, are all public rights belonging 
to the people at large.  They are not the private unalienable rights 
of each individual.388 
The last sentence of the statement from Lansing has particular 
significance to the New York court’s understanding of the nature of 
the jus publicum.  It is a common right, perhaps in the nature of a 
joint tenancy, but certainly not in the nature of a tenancy in common.  
Indeed, the Lansing court went on to state that “the legislature as the 
representatives of the public may restrict and regulate the exercise of 
those rights in such manner as may be deemed most beneficial to the 
public at large; provided they do not interfere with vested rights 
which have been granted to individuals.”389  Chief Justice Taft then 
 384. Id. at 400. 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. 
 387. Appleby, 271 U.S. at 381. 
 388. Id. at 382 (quoting 4 Wend. 9, 21 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829)). 
 389. Id. 
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cited the New York case of People v. New York & Staten Island Ferry 
Co. for what is essentially Hale’s prima facie rule: 
It will not be presumed that the legislature intended to destroy or 
abridge the public right for private benefit, and words of doubtful 
or equivocal import will not work this consequence. . . .  The state, 
in place of the crown, holds the title, as trustee of a public trust, but 
the legislature may, as the representative of the people, grant the 
soil, or confer an exclusive privilege in tide-waters, or authorize a 
use inconsistent with the public right . . . .390 
Under New York law, concluded Taft, the legislature may alienate 
fee simple title to submerged tidal land including “exclud[ing] itself 
from its exercise as sovereign of the jus publicum, (that is[,] the power 
to preserve and regulate navigation),” but such alienation of public 
rights will be found only “upon clear evidence of its intention and of 
the public interest in promotion of which it acted.”391  Relying on 
another New York case, Langdon v. Mayor,392  which held that, 
having granted both the submerged land on which to construct a 
wharf and the easement of wharfage (navigation) adjacent to that 
wharf, the City could restrict that easement of wharfage only by 
condemnation,393 Taft said “it follows necessarily that [the legislature] 
may by an absolute deed of land under water, with the right of the 
grantee to fill it, part with its own power to regulate the navigation of 
water over this land . . . .”394 
Taft finally got to a discussion of Illinois Central, and found it to 
be a case unlike any of those he had discussed under New York law.  
He summarized Field’s holding in these terms: “It was held that it was 
not conceivable that a Legislature could divest the state of [more than 
1,000 acres in the harbor of Chicago and the adjoining submerged 
lands] absolutely in the interest of a private corporation, that it was a 
gross perversion of the trust over the property under which it was 
held, an abdication of sovereign governmental power . . . .”395  He 
noted that it “was necessarily a statement of Illinois law,”396 
notwithstanding that Field had no resort to Illinois law, and 
acknowledged that it had been widely cited with approval including 
 390. People v. N. Y. & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 77-78 (1877). 
 391. Appleby, 271 U.S. at 384. 
 392. 93 N.Y. 129 (1883). 
 393. Id. at 161. 
 394. Id. at 388-89. 
 395. Id. at 393. 
 396. Id. at 395. 
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by the New York courts.397  Taft mentioned two New York cases that 
relied upon Illinois Central in invalidating grants of submerged lands 
to private parties, but he pointed out that both cases involved most of 
the land in a particular region and both confirmed that the legislature 
nevertheless had the power to make such grants if it “can fairly be 
said to be for the public benefit.”398  Ultimately, nothing in this 
discussion altered the Court’s unanimous holding that Appleby’s 
contract with the state of New York had been impaired in 
contravention of the contract clause of the United States 
Constitution.399  There can be little doubt, based on both Appleby and 
Illinois Central, that had the Illinois Legislature’s grant to Illinois 
Central Railroad been for particular parcels in the Chicago harbor for 
the purpose of facilitating the development of the railroad or of 
associated commercial activity it would have been upheld.  Illinois 
Central was an exceptional case yielding an exceptional result. 
Since Appleby, the Supreme Court has cited Illinois Central in 
less than a handful of cases,400 only one of which addresses the 
constraints imposed on states by the public trust doctrine.  That case, 
Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi,401 has been of assistance to those 
seeking to release the doctrine from its “historic shackles,” although 
with concrete results contradictory of the broad environmental 
protection objectives generally thought to benefit from an expansive 
application of the doctrine.  Phillips Petroleum involved a dispute 
over the ownership of land lying under non-navigable waters affected 
by the tides.  Mississippi claimed title to the lands on the basis of the 
equal footing doctrine, pursuant to which “new states admitted into 
the Union since the adoption of the Constitution have the same rights 
as the original States [sic] in the tide waters, and in the lands under 
 397. Id. 
 398. Id. at 395-96 (quoting Coxe v. State, 39 N.E. 400, 402 (1895), in which the state had 
granted to a private company the right “to re-claim and drain . . .  all or any portion of the wet 
or overflowed lands and tidewater marshes on or adjacent to Staten Island and Long Island”). 
The court also referred to Long Sault Development Co. v. Kennedy, 105 N.E. 849, 851 (1914), in 
which case “the Legislature of New York attempted to give complete control of the navigation 
of the St. Lawrence River in the region of Long Sault Rapids, to a private corporation . . . .” 271 
U.S. at 396. 
 399. Id. at 402-03. 
 400. See, e.g., Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 332 n.1 (1973) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting); Summa Corp. v. California, 466 U.S. 198, 206 n.4 (1984); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 474 n.2, 477, 488 (1988); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 
285 (1997). 
 401. 484 U.S. 469 (1988). 
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them, within their respective jurisdictions.”402  Phillips Petroleum 
claimed title to the same lands based upon recorded titles, property 
tax payments over many years and a demonstrated chain of title 
dating back over 150 years to Spanish land grants predating the 
United States’ acquisition of territory that would become the state of 
Mississippi.403  The supreme irony of the case is that the State of 
Mississippi did not assert its claim of ownership on the basis of its 
desire to protect the traditional public uses of navigable waters, nor 
on the basis of a concern for the ecological integrity of those waters as 
the modern advocates of the public trust doctrine would have it.  The 
State’s “belated and opportunistic”404 interest in the lands was based 
on its desire to derive revenue from the lease of those lands for 
petroleum development.405  Like the seventeenth century English 
Crown’s reliance on Thomas Digges’ prima facie rule,406 Mississippi 
relied on a legal doctrine with no basis in English law and contrary to 
the settled expectations of generations of property claimants.  Adding 
to the irony is the fact that the Mississippi Mineral Lease Commission 
identified the lands at issue from a survey conducted pursuant to the 
Mississippi Coastal Wetlands Protection Law.407 
But these facts did not prevent environmental advocates from 
supporting Mississippi’s claim or from celebrating the majority 
holding in the case.408  While some amount of tidal lands would be 
subjected to the impacts of oil and gas development,409 governments 
everywhere now had a new Supreme Court opinion to support 
uncompensated environmental regulations on lands understood for 
generations to be private property.  For advocates of an expanded 
public trust doctrine, the bad news of oil and gas development on 
some tidal lands in Mississippi was well offset by the good news that, 
 402. Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 474 (quoting Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894)).  
For more on Shively, see discussion infra accompanying notes 408-435. 
 403. Golem, Note, The Public Trust Doctrine Unprecedentedly Gains New Ground in 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1319, 1335 (1989). 
 404. Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 492 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 405. Id. at 492 
 406. See MacGrady, supra note 58, at 559-63. 
 407. Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 492 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 408. An exception to the widespread praise of Phillips Petroleum among environmentalists 
is Brent R. Austin, The Public Trust Misapplied: Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi and the Need 
to Rethink an Ancient Doctrine, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 967 (1989), where it is argued that the link of 
the doctrine to state ownership of tidal land will constrain its future use in the protection of non-
tidal environmental values. 
 409. Impacts that have made a cause celebre of opposition to recurrent proposals to drill for 
petroleum in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. 
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in the words of dissenting Justice O’Connor, “[t]he Court’s decision 
today could dispossess thousands of blameless record owners and 
leaseholders of land that they and their predecessors in interest 
reasonably believed was lawfully theirs.”410  While high-minded 
statements of public interest generally undergird public trust claims 
by both government and those advocating constraints on 
development, the prospect of circumventing the constitutional 
requirement of compensation for takings of private property is often 
what motivates the claim.  In a lapse of rare candor in another of the 
Supreme Court’s few public trust cases, the City of Los Angeles 
“indicated that it wanted to dredge the lagoon and make other 
improvements without having to exercise its power of eminent 
domain over petitioner’s property.”411  Therein lies the nub of the 
debate over the public trust doctrine and the reason that it has often 
been framed as a debate over title to land and resources, rather than 
an inquiry into the nature and scope of public rights and the state’s 
responsibilities with respect to those rights, as it was under Roman 
and English law. 
VI.  STATE OWNERSHIP AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 
Two lines of Supreme Court cases have contributed to the 
modern tie between state ownership of submerged lands and the 
public trust doctrine.  It is already evident that legal doctrine defining 
state ownership of submerged lands has played a critical role in the 
American understanding of the public trust doctrine.  This linkage, 
though it has distorted the historic concept of the public trust, is not 
surprising given that one doctrine related to uses of navigable waters 
and the other to ownership and use of their underlying lands.  The 
other line of cases, those relating to the ownership of wildlife, has 
suggested a possibly fruitful direction for expansion of the public trust 
doctrine, although it might better suggest how the doctrine has 
already strayed from its original meaning. 
A. State Ownership of Submerged Lands 
Given the Court’s holding in Phillips Petroleum, it is probably 
not surprising that Justice White embraced the oil company’s 
assertion that “the ‘seminal case in American public trust 
 410. Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 493 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 411. Summa Corp. v. California, 466 U.S. 198, 200 (1984). 
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jurisprudence is Shively v. Bowlby.’”412  Justice White does cite Illinois 
Central, but only for having restated the equal footing doctrine from 
Shively413 and in support of the assertions that tidewater and 
navigability were “synonyms at common law”414 and that “lands under 
navigable freshwater lakes and rivers were within the public trust 
given the new States [sic] upon their entry into the Union . . . .”415  
Shively, indeed, was more relevant to Phillips Petroleum than was 
Illinois Central because, like Phillips Petroleum, Shively was 
concerned with a title dispute as opposed to an inquiry into the limits 
on state power to alienate submerged lands.  In Shively, it was not 
questioned that the state of Oregon had the power to grant exclusive 
title to submerged lands.416  Rather, the issue was whether or not the 
United States government had the authority to grant submerged 
lands in the Oregon Territory prior to the creation of the state of 
Oregon.417 
At issue in Shively was title to submerged lands in the Columbia 
River adjacent to the town of Astoria, Oregon.  Shively claimed title 
on the basis of his predecessors in title having recorded a claim in 
1854 under the Oregon Donation Act of 1850 and that claim having 
been patented by the United States in 1865.418  Bowlby and co-
plaintiff Parker claimed title on the basis of a deed issued by the 
Board of School Land Commissioners of the State of Oregon 
pursuant to an Oregon statute enacted in 1874.419  The Oregon 
Supreme Court concluded that the United States had no authority to 
grant lands below the high water mark and found for Bowlby and 
Parker.420  The United States Supreme Court agreed in a unanimous 
opinion by Justice Gray.421 
Noting “diversity of view as to the scope and effect of the 
[Supreme Court’s] previous decisions . . . upon the subject of public 
and private rights in lands below high water mark of navigable 
waters,” Justice Gray finds it “a fit occasion for a full review of those 
 412. Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 473 (quoting from petitioner’s reply brief). 
 413. Id. at 474. 
 414. Id. at 477. 
 415. Id. at 479. 
 416. Id. at 474 (construing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894)). 
 417. Id. 
 418. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 2 (1894). 
 419. Id. at 3-6. 
 420. Id. at 8. 
 421. Id. at 58. 
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decisions and a consideration of other authorities upon the subject.”422  
He discusses the English common law and, consistent with Hale, 
whom he quotes at length, he concludes: 
In England, from the time of Lord Hale, it has been treated as 
settled that the title in the soil of the sea, or of arms of the sea, 
below ordinary high water mark, is in the king, except so far as an 
individual or a corporation has acquired rights in it by express 
grant, or by prescription or usage[,] . . . and that this title . . . is held 
subject to the public right, jus publicum, of navigation and 
fishing.423 
He then goes on to state, consistent with Hale’s prima facie rule, that 
“[i]t is equally well settled that a grant from the sovereign of land 
bounded by the sea, or by any navigable tide water, does not pass any 
title below high water mark, unless either the language of the grant, 
or long usage under it, clearly indicates that such was the 
intention.”424  Noting that the common law became the law of the 
United States to the extent not modified, he then makes reference to 
Martin v. Waddell as “[t]he leading case in this court, as to the title 
and dominion of tide waters and of the lands under them,”425 and 
confirms that grants of uplands by the crown did not, without express 
language to that effect, convey lands below the high water mark.426  In 
other words, a unanimous Court speaking through Justice Gray was 
of the view that Hale’s prima facie rule applied in colonial America as 
it had in England.427  But when sovereignty passed from the king to 
the state governments after the Revolution, each sovereign state was 
free to modify or maintain the common law rule as it chose.428  Justice 
Gray provides a comprehensive survey of the laws of the thirteen 
original states by way of confirming that state, not federal, law is 
controlling on the question of title and that in every jurisdiction the 
state has authority to alienate whatever submerged land it owns, 
subject to the public right of navigation and fishing 
titutional power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce.429 
Justice Gray then turns to the more immediate question of the 
law in the states admitted since the adoption of the Constitution, of 
 422. Id. at 10-11. 
 423. Id. at 13. 
 424. Id. 
 425. Id. at 15. 
 426. Id. at 16-17. 
 427. Id. at 14. 
 428. Id. 
 429. Id. at 18-26. 
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which Oregon is one.  Based upon the Virginia cession of its western 
land claims in 1783,430 the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,431 and the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Pollard v. Hagan,432 United States v. 
Pacheco433 and Knight v. U
ting from Knight, states: 
It is the settled rule of law in this court that absolute property in, 
and dominion and sovereignty over, the soils under the tide waters 
in the original states were reserved to the several states; and that 
the new states since admitted have the same rights, sovereignty and 
jurisdiction in that be
respective borders.435 
In the language of the Northwest Ordinance, this is the equal footing 
doctrine.436  It is a doctrine that limits the authority of the United 
States government with respect to submerged lands, but in no way 
limits the powers of the states with respect to those lands.  To the 
extent that Justice McKinley’s opinion for the Court in Pollard’s 
Lessee “implied that the title in the land below high-water mark could 
not have been granted away by the United States after the deed of 
cession of the territory [from Georgia], and before the admission of 
the state into the Union,”437 Justice Gray concluded that it was dicta 
and not controlling.438  In fact it was clear, said Gray, that the United 
States could grant submerged lands under navigable waters 
“whenever it becomes necessary to do so in order to perform 
 430. The Virginia cession provided that the ceded lands would be formed into new states 
“having the same rights of sovereignty, freedom, and independence as the other states.”  Id. at 
26. 
 431. The Northwest Ordinance of July 13, 1787, provided that new states would be admitted 
“‘on an equal footing, with the original states in all respects whatever,’ and that ‘all the lands 
within’ the territory so ceded to the United States, and not reserved or appropriated for other 
purposes, should be considered as a common fund for the use and benefit of the United States.”  
Id.  The equal footing language originally appeared in the Northwest Ordinance of 1784: “That 
whensoever any of the said states shall have, of free inhabitants as many as then shall be in any 
one the least numerous of the thirteen original states, such state shall be admitted by its 
delegates into the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the said original 
states . . . .”  26 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789 119 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 
1928). 
 432. 44 U.S. 212 (1845). 
 433. 69 U.S. 587 (1864). 
 434. 142 U.S. 161 (1891). 
 435. Shively, 152 U.S. at 30 (quoting Knight, 142 U.S. at 183). 
 436. See supra note 432. 
 437. Shively, 152 U.S. at 28. 
 438. Id. at 47 (“Notwithstanding the dicta contained in some of the opinions of this court . . . 
to the effect that Congress has no power to grant any land below high-water mark of navigable 
waters in a territory of the United States, it is evident that this is not strictly true.”). 
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international obligations, or to effect the improvement of such lands 
for the promotion and convenience of commerce . . . , or to carry out 
other public purposes appro
s hold the territory.”439 
Justice Gray was correct in describing as dicta the assertion in 
Pollard’s Lessee that the United States could not alienate submerged 
territorial lands under its jurisdiction.  Pollard’s Lessee was one of a 
long line of Supreme Court rulings on title to submerged lands in 
Mobile, Alabama, including two prior rulings on title to the specific 
land in question.440  As in Shively a half century later, Pollard’s Lessee 
and the many other cases involving land claims in Mobile and 
elsewhere on the Gulf Coast had nothing to do with assertions of 
public or common rights.  They were disputes about title between 
private claimants.  In Pollard’s Lessee and the other Mobile cases, 
one private claim was based on Spanish grants that had been 
confirmed by Congress and patented by the United States after 
Alabama was admitted and the competing private claim was based on 
grants from the city or state governments.441  However the disputes 
were resolved, there was no suggestion that the national or state 
governments lacked the power to alienate the lands in question.  At 
the heart of Justice McKinley’s dicta in Pollard’s Lessee (stating that 
the United States had no authority to make or confirm any grants of 
submerged land even prior to the admission of a new state) was his 
assertion “that the United States never held any municipal 
sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right of soil in and to the territory, of 
which Alabama, or any of the new states were formed . . . .”442  
Without municipal sovereignty, argued McKinley, the United States 
had no power to dispose of the land it held in trust for the new states.  
Justice Catron, in one of what must be among the most persistent 
series of dissents in the Court’s history,443 objected: that the majority 
decision was inconsistent with earlier decisions on the same facts;444 
that if the United States lacked the municipal sovereignty necessary 
 439. Id. at 48. 
 440. See, e.g., Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. 353 (1840); Pollard’s Lessee v. Files, 43 U.S. 
591 (1844). 
 441. Pollard’s Lessee, 43 U.S. at 591-92. 
 442. Pollard’s Heirs v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 221 (1845). 
 443. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Eslava, 41 U.S. 234, 247-60 (1842); City of Mobile v. Hallett, 
41 U.S. 261, 263-68 (1842).  Catron had also dissented in Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. 353 
(1840), and wrote the majority opinion in Pollard’s Lessee, 43 U.S. at 591. 
 444. Hagan, 44 U.S. at 230. 
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as well (which was clearly not the case);445 that municipal authority in 
territories of the United States, which must exist in some government, 
could only exist in Congress;446 and that the invalidation of titles based 
on United States and Spanish land grants would disrupt the entire 
established economy of the Gulf Coast states.447  Catron further 
argued that “if the United States cannot grant these lands, neither can 
Alabama; and no individual title to them can ever exist.”448  Of course 
that was a result no one could have contemplated at the time, 
although it has strong appeal with some environmentalists today.  
From the perspective of the parties in Pollard’s Lessee, the case was 
about private claims of right.  But as Justice Catron observed in his 
dissent, “the question before us is made to turn by a majority of my 
brethren exclusively on political jurisdiction; the right of property is a 
mere incident.”449 
By the time of Shively, a half century later, the political 
boundaries had been sorted out and the Court was focused on the 
competing claims of private title.  Although it was not necessary to his 
decision in that case, Gray confirmed, as part of his comprehensive 
review of the law, that the submerged lands in question are not 
necessarily just those affected by the tides as under the English rule 
(as it was understood by American courts).  Citing Carson v. Blazer450 
as the seminal case and The Genesee Chief451 as the leading federal 
case (although it was concerned with admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction rather than title to submerged lands), Gray states that 
navigable waters, for the purpose of establishing title to submerged 
lands, are, in most states, those waters that are navigable in fact.452  
He even takes the liberty of suggesting that states adhering to the 
English rule are “at variance with sound principles of public 
policy.”453  But by way of making clear that “it is for the states 
themselves to determine” title to submerged land, whether under 
tidal or non-tidal but navigable waters, Gray laments that “[i]f they 
[states] choose to resign to the riparian proprietor rights which 
 445. Id. at 234. 
 446. Id. 
 447. Id. at 233-34. 
 448. Id. at 234. 
 449. Id. at 232. 
 450. 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810). 
 451. 53 U.S. 443 (1851). 
 452. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 31-40 (1894). 
 453. Id. at 43. 
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properly belong to them in their sovereign capacity, it is not for 
others to raise objections.”454  This state autonomy on the question of 
title to submerged lands had earlier been recognized in Packer v. Bird 
where the Court stated that “the right of the riparian owner, where 
the waters are above the influence of the tide, will be limited 
according to the law of the state either to low or high water mark, or 
will extend to the middle of the stream.”455  It was clear beyond 
argument, concluded Justice Gray, “that the title and rights of 
riparian or littoral proprietors in the soil below high-water mark of 
navigable waters are governed by the local laws of the several states, 
subject, of course, to the rights granted to the United States by the 
Constitution.”456  This conclusion was consistent with a proper 
understanding of the equal footing doctrine.  “Equal footing was a 
principle considered crucial to the development and expansion of the 
Union.  Each new state would be endowed with equal sovereignty 
and would participate as an equal member of the Union.”457  
Professor Rasband has demonstrated how the doctrine was 
transform
If the Supreme Court majority in Phillips Petroleum had in mind 
to expand the reach of the public trust doctrine in the way advocated 
by environmentalists, Shively is an odd case to have identified as 
seminal.  When Justice Gray states “that the navigable waters and the 
soils under them, . . . shall be and remain public highways; and, being 
chiefly valuable for the public purposes of commerce, navigation, and 
fishery, . . . shall not be granted away [by the United States] during 
the period of territorial government,”459 he is describing the historic 
practices of Congress and not a legal prohibition.  Indeed, as 
indicated above, the Shively Court found no doubt that Congress 
could make grants of submerged lands in territories of the United 
 454. Id. 
 455. 137 U.S. 661, 669-70 (1891). 
 456. Shively, 152 U.S. at 40. 
 457. Rasband, supra note 127, at 34. 
 458. Rasband demonstrates the incoherence of Pollard and Shively which together hold “(1) 
that ownership of land under navigable water is an essential aspect of sovereignty; (2) that each 
state must enter the Union on an equal sovereign footing . . .; but (3) that Congress nevertheless 
has the power . . . to grant land under navigable water.”  Equal footing, says Rasband, must be 
understood to mean “that Congress has the power to convey submerged lands, that each state is 
entitled to equal sovereign footing, but that ownership of submerged lands is not essential to 
state sovereignty.” Id. at 47. 
 459. Shively, 152 U.S. at 49. 
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States.460  There were limitations intended to keep new states on an 
equal footing, but the point was that new states came in on an equal 
footing in the sense that they had title to all submerged lands that 
remained the property of the United States at the time of admission 
to the Union.461  The prohibition critical to the result in Shively was on 
the United States making grants within the boundaries of any existing 
state.  Also critical to the outcome of the case was the Court’s 
conclusion that “unless . . . [tidal and submerged lands] have been . . . 
built upon with its permission, [the states have] the right to sell and 
convey them to any one, free of any right in the proprietor of the 
upland, and subject only to the paramount right of navigation 
inherent in the public.”462  That the Shively Court had no thought of a 
significant constraint on the states’ power to dispose of submerged 
lands is evidenced by the principle that Justice Gray draws from 
Illinois Central: 
[Illinois Central] recognized as the settled law of this country that 
the ownership of, and dominion and sovereignty over, lands 
covered by tide waters, or navigable lakes, within the limits of the 
several states, belong to the respective states within which they are 
found, with the consequent right to use or dispose of any portion 
thereof, when that can be done without substantial impairment of 
the interest of the public in such waters, and subject to the 
paramount right of congress to control their navigation, so far as 
may be necessary for the regulation of commerce.463 
Although Gray had concurred along with Justice Brown in Justice 
Shiras’ dissent in Illinois Central, it does not appear that he 
misrepresented the thinking of that decision’s four person majority 
 460. Id. at 48.  Justice Gray concluded that it could be no other way.  “By the Constitution, 
as is now well settled, the United States, having rightfully acquired the Territories, and being the 
only government which can impose laws upon then, have the entire dominion and sovereignty, 
national and municipal, federal and state, over all the territories, so long as they remain in a 
territorial condition.”  Id. 
 461. In Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 260 (1891), the Court quoted with 
approval Justice Curtis’s statement in Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 71, 74 (1855), that “[w]hatever 
soil below low-water mark is the subject of exclusive propriety and ownership, belongs to the 
state on whose maritime border, and within whose territory it lies, subject to any lawful grants 
of that soil by the state or the sovereign power which governed its territory before the 
declaration of independence.”  In support of that statement, Justice Curtis in turn cited 
Pollard’s Heirs v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845). 
 462. Shively, 152 U.S. at 52. 
 463. Id. at 47. 
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since three of them remained on the Court and agreed to the 
unanimous holding in Shively.464 
Many other nineteenth century cases in the state and federal 
courts dealt with title disputes in submerged lands.  While there were 
still differences of opinion, by the end of the century the law and its 
origins were reasonably clear and settled.  The rule in England was 
that the king held title to lands under navigable waters.465  At least 
since Chief Justice Taney’s decision in Genesee Chief, it was generally 
accepted by American courts and commentators that navigable 
waters were defined in England as those affected by the tides.466  
While exclusive grants of those lands could be made by the king and 
rights could be acquired by prescription, the prima facie assumption 
was that the king retained title, placing the burden on a private 
claimant to prove a grant by the king or prescriptive title.467  The king 
held these lands subject to a common right of use for navigation and 
fishing, although the king could make exclusive grants of both land 
and fisheries for the purpose of promoting navigation and commerce 
or to the extent that such grants did not unnecessarily interfere with 
those public purposes.468  The English rule as stated by Kent applied 
in the American colonies except where modified to meet local needs 
and circumstances.469 
 464. The Illinois Central majority consisted of Justices Field, Harlan, Brewer and Lamar.  
Justices Shiras, Gray and Brown dissented.  Chief Justice Fuller did not participate, having been 
counsel in the court below, nor did Justice Blatchford who held stock in the Illinois Central 
Railroad.  Both Lamar and Blatchford died before Shively was decided.  Justice Jackson 
replaced Lamar and participated in the Shively decision.  Justice White replaced Blatchford, but 
a week after Shively was decided.  Thus the unanimous court in Shively consisted of eight 
justices, three of whom had been in the four member majority in Illinois Central. 
 465. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 413-14 (1842). 
 466. As indicated above, see discussion supra at text accompanying note 124, the accepted 
American understanding of English law on the relationship between navigability and tidal 
waters was incorrect, at least until English law changed in the second half of the nineteenth 
century.  Noting the confusion among English authorities through the eighteenth century, 
MacGrady asks “how could Kent . . . have concluded that navigable rivers and tidal rivers were 
legally coextensive in England, and that the Crown held title to the beds of all tidal rivers . . . .”  
MacGrady, supra note 58, at 584.  MacGrady goes on to observe that Kent “not only settled the 
American understanding of English law, but sixty-three years later, settled the English 
understanding of English law.”  Id. at 585.  What happened sixty-three years later was the 
decision in Murphy v. Ryan, (1868) 2 Ir. R.C.L. 143, in which an English court for the first time 
held that navigable waters were coextensive with tidal waters.  For an illustration of the earlier 
English navigable in fact rule see Miles v. Rose, (1814) 128 Eng. Rep. 868 (C.P.). 
 467. HALE, supra note 32, at 392. 
 468. Shively, 152 U.S. at 13. 
 469. Id. at 14. 
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After the American Revolution, sovereignty over, and title to, 
submerged lands passed to the state governments subject to the 
common rights of navigation and fishing and any powers delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution.470  As independent sovereigns, 
each state was free to enact its own laws with respect to ownership of 
the beds and banks of navigable and non-navigable waters, subject to 
valid existing rights, common rights in navigation and fishing and the 
delegated powers of the United States.471  New states entered the 
union on an equal footing with the original states, meaning they had 
title to submerged lands not previously granted and the same police 
powers with respect to those lands as the original states, but this did 
not mean that state title was the same in every state.472  Among the 
original thirteen states, seven held that presumptive state title 
extended to the high water mark while six held that state title 
extended only to the low water mark.473  Under English law title to 
the beds and banks of fresh waters, even if navigable in fact, was held 
by riparian landowners.  Most of the original states adhered to the 
English rule,474 but most of the new states applied a navigable in fact 
test to determine the scope of presumptive state ownership of 
submerged lands.475  In every state it was accepted that the state could 
alienate its submerged lands for the purpose of promoting navigation 
and commerce or for other purposes so long as the private uses did 
not interfere with navigation, and subject to the delegated powers of 
the United States.476  In disputes over title to submerged lands under 
navigable waters, the burden was on the private claimant to prove 
title, consistent with the English prima facie rule.477  The opposite 
presumption applied with respect to submerged lands under non-
 470. Id.  
 471. Id. at 14-26. 
 472. Id. at 26. 
 473. According to Justice Gray’s survey in Shively, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, 
New Jersey, Delaware, South Carolina and North Carolina fixed the high water mark as the 
boundary of state title while Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia 
and Georgia limited state title to the low water mark. Id. at 18-25. 
 474. The exceptions, again according to Justice Gray in Shively, were Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, North Carolina and New York, the latter only with respect to the Hudson, Mohawk 
and St. Lawrence Rivers.  Id. at 31. 
 475. Id. at 26-48. 
 476. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). 
 477. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 5 (N.J. 1821). 
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navigable waters.478  The prima facie rule was also understood to 
apply to conveyances of submerged land by the United States.479 
The notion of an externally imposed limit on the state’s exercise 
of its proprietary and sovereign rights with respect to submerged land 
was seldom even suggested beyond the boiler-plate reference to the 
common rights of navigation and fishing in navigable waters.480  In the 
vast sea of cases dealing with private claims of title to submerged 
lands – in every one of which the private claim had its origin in a 
grant from the English crown, a foreign government, the United 
States or a state government481 – there was no suggestion that the 
claim might be invalid because it infringed a public right.  Where 
private activities in navigable waters interfered with navigation, the 
standard remedy was an action in nuisance, not a claim that the 
interfering individual lacked title to the submerged land.  Arnold v. 
Mundy, Martin v. Waddell and Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois 
were exceptions to the norm, but even then, exceptions more in 
rhetoric than in their holdings.482  The defendant in Arnold may have 
claimed pursuant to an exclusive community right, and in any event 
could have made application for an exclusive license from the state.  
But if the claim was truly on behalf of what Professor Rose calls the 
“unorganized public,” it was unusual if not unique among nineteenth 
century cases.483  In any event it is clear that under New Jersey law at 
the time Arnold was decided, an individual taking oysters on the basis 
of a claim of common right could well have been violating the private 
rights of another individual with exclusive license from the state.484  
Martin was nothing more than a title dispute, the defendant claiming 
on the basis of an exclusive license from the state.485  So we are left 
with Illinois Central as the only clear case in which a claim of private 
title to submerged lands was rejected on the basis of a claim of 
common right.  But recall that Justice Field was careful to point out 
the exceptional nature of the grant to the Illinois Central Railroad, 
 478. Id. 
 479. Id. at 7-8. 
 480. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R Co., 146 U.S. at 452. 
 481. This was true of prescriptive claims as well, since prescription operated against another 
with legal title. 
 482. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 387; Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842); Arnold, 6 
N.J.L. at 1. 
 483. See Rose, supra note 18, at 721. 
 484. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 33. 
 485. Martin, 41 U.S. at 407-08. 
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while recognizing the state’s general power to alienate submerged 
lands.486 
B. State Ownership of Wildlife 
One other line of cases, those relating to ownership of wildlife, is 
of historical interest in relation to present day ambitions for the 
public trust doctrine.  Of all the theories for extension of the public 
trust doctrine to resources existing beyond navigable waters, those 
relating to wildlife have the most surface plausibility.  In most 
discussions of the subject, the starting point is the same as in 
discussions of navigable waters – Justinian’s Institutes: 
Wild beasts, birds, fish and all animals, which live either in the sea, 
the air, or the earth, so soon as they are taken by anyone, 
immediately become by the law of nations the property of the 
captor; for natural reason gives to the first occupant that which had 
no previous owner.  And it is immaterial whether a man takes wild 
beasts or birds upon his own ground, or on that of another.  Of 
course any one who enters the ground of another for the sake of 
hunting or fowling, may be prohibited by the proprietor, if he 
perceives his intention of entering.487 
As the Romans conceived of the matter, wild animals are, in the 
nature of things and therefore by the law of nations, owned by no one 
in their natural state.488  They are part of the res nullius.  The Roman 
rule of capture set forth by Justinian was said to be itself natural, but 
it was also practical.  Like water, and unlike land, wild animals are 
transient, they move about without regard to fixed boundaries.  One 
could know who owned land and fixtures or things growing on land 
by their location, but one could not know who owned wildlife until it 
was confined.  The complexity of Roman law on this subject 
demonstrates that the rule of capture was more practical than 
philosophical.  There were special rules for bees, pigeons, peacocks, 
geese and other fowl that might leave their owners land but would 
return of their own accord.489  Wild creatures were owned by no one, 
not because they were thought to be owned by everyone, but because 
establishing private ownership required special rules adapted to their 
wild nature.  If there was a right held in common it was the right to 
acquire private ownership of wild animals by capturing them. 
 486. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 450-51. 
 487. JUSTINIAN, supra note 27, at 2.1.12. 
 488. Raymond J. Starr, Silvia’s Deer (Vergil, Aeneid 7.479-502): Game Parks and Roman 
Law, 113 AM. J. PHILOLOGY 435, 438 (1992). 
 489. JUSTINIAN, supra note 27, at 2.1.14-16. 
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Early English law was much the same.  “Things are said to be res 
nullius in several different ways:” wrote Bracton, “by nature or the 
jus naturale, as wild beasts, birds and fish . . . .”490 
By the jus gentium or natural law the dominion of things is acquired 
in many ways.  First by taking possession of things that are owned 
by no one, [and do (not) now belong to the king by the civil law, no 
longer being common as before,] as wild beasts, birds and fish, that 
is, all the creatures born on the earth, in the sea or in the heavens, 
that is, in the air, no matter where they may be taken.  When they 
are captured they begin to be mine, because they are forcibly kept 
in my custody, and by the same token, if they escape from it and 
recover their natural liberty they cease to be mine and are again 
made the property of the taker.491 
Blackstone, writing five centuries later, recorded that under English 
law “a man may be invested with a qualified, but not absolute, 
property in all creatures that are ferae naturae, either per industriam, 
propter impotentiam, or propter privilegium.”492  Acquisition of 
property in a wild animal  per industriam is the rule of capture, 
accomplished “by art, industry, and education; or by so confining 
them within his own immediate power, that they cannot escape and 
use their natural liberty.”493  It is a qualified ownership defeasible “if 
they resume their ancient wildness, and are found at large.”494  
Property in ferae naturae, propter impotentiam, existed in the 
offspring of birds or wild animals that, by their immobility, were 
confined to nests or burrows on one’s property, “till such time as they 
can fly, or run away, and then my property expires.”495  The very 
practical nature of the law is certainly reflected in this rule, which 
would seem to have encouraged landowners to provide habitat for 
breeding and nesting.  Finally, property in ferae naturae, propter 
privilegium, was “the privilege of hunting, taking, and killing them, in 
exclusion of other persons.”496  This qualified ownership existed 
within the boundaries of one’s private land (as under Roman law), 
but also within the boundaries of other “liberties” including those 
 490. BRACTON, supra note 93, at 41. 
 491. Id. at 42. 
 492. BLACKSTONE, supra note 114, at *392. 
 493. Id. 
 494. Id. at *394. 
 495. Id. at *395. 
 496. Id. at *394-95. 
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that may have been granted by the crown for the sole purpose of 
taking game.497 
The crown was in a position to grant exclusive rights to hunt and 
fish for the same reason it was able to grant exclusive rights in 
tidelands and navigable waters – it was the proprietor of all of those 
things.  Blackstone observed that “notwithstanding the general 
introduction and continuance of property, [there are some things 
that] must still unavoidably remain in common,” and therefore only 
be subject to usufructuary ownership, including light, air, water and 
“those animals which are said to be ferae naturae, or of a wild and 
untamable disposition.”498  But “that species of wild animals, which 
the arbitrary constitutions of positive law have distinguished from the 
rest by the well-known appellation of game,” were vested in the 
crown as a means of preempting the “disturbances and quarrels [that] 
would frequently arise among individuals, contending about the 
acquisition of this species of property by first occupancy . . . .”499  Thus 
Blackstone made the case for the king having title to all wild game, as 
well as to the navigable waters, of the kingdom.  It was all part of the 
“legislature of England[’s] . . . wise and orderly maxim, of assigning to 
everything capable of ownership a legal and determinate owner.”500  
As with navigable waters and submerged lands, the rules also served 
well the interests of the king and his favorites. 
Of course the English laws with respect to wildlife were applied 
in the American colonies, and after the Revolution the states 
succeeded to the sovereign powers and rights relating to wildlife just 
as they had with respect to navigable waters and tidelands.  Indeed, 
many of the early wildlife cases were one and the same with 
submerged lands cases.  Arnold v. Mundy and Martin v. Waddell were 
both wildlife cases in the sense that what was really at issue was the 
right to harvest oysters.501  The common property that Justice 
Kirkpatrick says cannot be alienated in Arnold includes not just the 
submerged lands from which oysters are harvested but the oysters 
themselves.502  “The people of New Jersey,” said Chief Justice Taney 
in Martin, “have exercised and enjoyed the rights of fishery for shell-
 497. Id. at *414-20. 
 498. Id. at *14. 
 499. Id. at *725. 
 500. Id. at *15. 
 501. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842). 
 502. Arnold, 6 N.J.L at 49.  Common property, says Justice Kirkpatrick, includes “the air, 
the running water, the sea, the fish, and the wild beasts.” 
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fish and floating fish, as a common and undoubted right, without 
opposition or remonstrance from the proprietors.”503  The New Jersey 
laws regulating the taking of oysters, in effect at the time of Arnold 
and directly at issue in Martin, were challenged by non-citizens of the 
state in the federal case of Corfield v. Coryell on the grounds that 
they violated Article I, Section 8 (the commerce clause) and Article 
IV, Section 2 (the privileges and immunities clause) of the United 
States Constitution.504  The challenged laws prohibited non-citizens 
from taking oysters within the state of New Jersey as well as 
authorized the granting of exclusive license to New Jersey citizens to 
plant and harvest oysters.505  Counsel for the plaintiffs in Corfield 
cited Arnold in support of their claim that the common right to take 
oysters cannot be restrained, even as against non-citizens.506  In 
pressing their claim, plaintiffs insisted that there could be no exclusive 
right in fish or game until it was captured, but Justice Washington, 
sitting as a circuit justice, disagreed.507  Washington stated that the 
citizens of New Jersey “may be considered as tenants in common of 
this property; and they are so exclusively entitled to the use of it, that 
it cannot be enjoyed by others without the tacit consent, or the 
express permission of the sovereign who has the power to regulate its 
use.”508  To agree with plaintiffs that the harvesting of New Jersey’s 
oysters was among the privileges and immunities of all citizens of the 
United States, said Washington, would “amount . . . to a grant of a 
cotenancy in the common property of the state, to the citizens of all 
the other states.”509 
 503. Martin, 41 U.S. at 417. 
 504. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823). 
 505. Id. at 549-50. 
 506. Id. at 548. 
 507. Id. at 552. 
 508. Id. 
 509. Id. Justice Washington’s rejection of the privileges and immunities claim with respect to 
the taking of wildlife is particularly important because his opinion in Corfield is often cited as 
one of the earliest articulations of the natural rights basis for understanding the privileges and 
immunities clause.  See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, I AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1251 (3d ed. 
2000).  Not only was there no natural rights basis for limiting the state’s power to regulate and 
permit the taking of oysters, but the natural rights Washington identified implied that the state 
would be precluded from forbidding all private acquisition of exclusive rights in game, if only 
the exclusive right to acquire title by capture.  Among the fundamental rights protected by the 
privileges and immunities clause, said Washington, was “the right of a citizen . . . to take, hold 
and dispose of property.”  Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552.  But if that is so, one might ask how the 
state of New Jersey could prohibit non-citizens from taking oysters in New Jersey.  As we have 
seen, Washington’s answer was that the wildlife of New Jersey had already been appropriated 
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Justice Washington also found in Corfield, relying on Gibbons v. 
Ogden,510 that the New Jersey exclusion of non-citizens from taking 
oysters within the state was not an unconstitutional regulation of 
interstate commerce.511  Well over a century later it would be found 
that Justice Washington was probably wrong in this conclusion,512 but 
his statements on the nature of New Jersey citizens’ common right in 
oysters remain relevant to our modern understanding of the concept 
of public or common rights.  Washington’s description of New Jersey 
citizens as “tenants in common,” with respect to the fisheries of the 
state made clear that individual New Jersey citizens had a right of 
access to the fishery so long as it remained common, but no right to 
object to a total prohibition on the taking of oysters or to the granting 
of exclusive licenses to take oysters: 
A several fishery, either as the right to it respects running fish, or 
such as are stationary, such as oysters, clams, and the like, is as 
much the property of the individual to whom it belongs, as dry land, 
or land covered by water; and is equally protected by the laws of 
the state against the aggressions of others, whether citizens or 
strangers.  Where those private rights do not exist to the exclusion 
of the common right, that of fishing belongs to all the citizens or 
subjects of the state.  It is the property of all; to be enjoyed by them 
in subordination to the laws which regulate its use.513 
Just as granting exclusive rights to submerged lands, including those 
from which the oysters might be harvested, did not violate the rights 
of the individual or collective citizens of New Jersey, the granting of 
such exclusive right to harvest oysters was within the power of the 
state legislature. 
Most of the caselaw that followed after Corfield, like the case law 
relating to ownership of submerged lands, turned on the relative 
powers of the state and federal governments or constitutional limits 
on those powers.514  In the submerged lands cases, the dispute was 
most often between one party claiming under a grant from the United 
by the citizens of New Jersey as tenants in common.  The fundamental right to take property did 
not include the property of others. 
 510. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).  In Gibbons Chief Justice John Marshall drew a 
distinction between regulations of commerce, clearly within federal power, and “[t]he 
acknowledged power of a State to regulate its police, its domestic trade, and to govern its own 
citizens.” Id. at 208. 
 511. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552. 
 512. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 338 (1879). 
 513. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552. 
 514. See, e.g., McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 395-97 (1876). 
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States and the other party claiming title from the state.515  In the 
wildlife cases the controversy generally related to the nature and 
extent of the regulatory powers of the state and federal governments.  
The United States Supreme Court’s first serious consideration of the 
issue in the context of wildlife came in McCready v. Virginia, yet 
another oyster case raising the question of whether a state could 
prohibit citizens of another state from planting oysters in its waters.516  
Relying on Martin v. Waddell, Chief Justice Waite, writing for a 
unanimous court, stated “the States own the tide-waters themselves, 
and the fish in them, so far as they are capable of ownership while 
running.  For this purpose the State represents its people, and the 
ownership is that of the people in their united sovereignty.”  This 
common interest is “held . . . subject to the paramount right of 
navigation, the regulation of which . . . has been granted to the United 
States, . . . [but] [t]here has been . . . no such grant of power over the 
fisheries.”517  Waite followed Corfield in rejecting a privileges and 
immunities challenge to Virginia’s law.  “Such an appropriation,” said 
Waite, “is in effect nothing more than a regulation of the use by the 
people of their common property.  The right which the people of the 
State thus acquire comes not from their citizenship alone, but from 
their citizenship and property combined.  It is, in fact, a property 
right, and not a mere privilege or immunity of citizenship.”518  But the 
fact that the citizens of Virginia had a shared property right in the 
submerged lands and fisheries within the state did not mean that the 
state could not regulate access by those citizens or grant exclusive 
rights to particular citizens.  “[A]ll concede that a State may grant to 
one of its citizens the exclusive use of a part of the common property, 
[so] the conclusion would seem to follow, that it might by appropriate 
legislation confine the use of the whole to its own people alone.”519 
The concept of state ownership of wildlife became firmly rooted 
in American law with the Supreme Court’s decision in Geer v. 
Connecticut.520  Although that case has since been overruled,521 it is 
important to understand what was said in that and several subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions on the subject of a common right to wildlife 
 515. Id. at 394. 
 516. Id. 
 517. Id. at 395. 
 518. Id. 
 519. Id. at 396. 
 520. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896). 
 521. See infra discussion at note 564. 
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that might form the basis for an expanded application of the public 
trust doctrine.  The defendant in Geer was convicted of violating a 
Connecticut statute prohibiting the possession of game birds for the 
purpose of transporting them beyond the state, the birds having been 
legally killed within the state.522  Among other defenses, the 
defendant argued that the Connecticut statute was invalid under the 
commerce clause of Article I, Section 8, of the United States 
Constitution.523  In the course of his opinion for the five justice 
majority, Justice White discussed the history of wildlife law from 
Athens to nineteenth century America.  From the beginning, he 
reported, “the right to reduce animals ferae naturae to possession has 
been subject to the control of the law-giving power.”524  Of course this 
statement presumed the validity of the rule of capture that was well 
settled in American law.  At issue in the case was the nature and 
extent of the state’s power to regulate the taking of wildlife, not the 
right of individuals to acquire a property interest in wildlife by killing 
it or otherwise reducing it to possessio
The history Justice White recounts in Geer is pretty much the 
history summarized above.  Because wildlife are generally transient 
and not easily confined, through the centuries and across societies 
they have been held to belong to no one and therefore to belong to 
everyone in common.  But it is also true that the sovereign has always 
asserted particular interests in wildlife and has acted to limit and even 
prohibit the taking of wildlife by ordinary people.  In Athens, “‘Solon, 
seeing that the Athenians gave up to the chase, to the neglect of the 
mechanical arts, forbade the killing of game.’”526  In Rome, according 
to Justice White, “[n]o restriction . . . was placed by the Roman law 
upon the power of the individual to reduce game, of which he was the 
owner in common with other citizens, to possession,” although it 
appears that access to wildlife and other coastal resources was in fact 
greatly limited.527  White notes that in Europe, despite some claims 
that the natural law prohibits the sovereign from limiting public 
access to game, “[t]he sovereigns have reserved to themselves, and to 
those to whom they judge proper to transmit it, the right to hunt all 
 522. Geer, 161 U.S. at 521-22. 
 523. Id. at 522. 
 524. Id. 
 525. See id. at 527-29. 
 526. Id. (quoting from PHILLIPE ANTOINE MERLIN, 4 REPERTOIRE DE JURISPRUDENCE 
128 (1807)). 
 527. See supra discussion at note 91. 
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game, and have forbidden hunting to other persons.”528  The 
Napoleonic Code, says White, provides “‘[t]here are things which 
belong to no one, and the use of which is common to all.  Police 
regulations direct the manner in which they may be enjoyed.’”529  And 
“[t]he common of England also based property in game upon the 
principle of common ownership, and therefore treated it as subject to 
governmental authority.”530 
It is notable in Justice White’s explanation of the roots of the 
common or state ownership doctrine in American law that the 
consequence of these asserted public rights is not any limit on state 
power with respect to wildlife.  To the contrary, it is the source of 
unlimited power in the states to protect, regulate and dispose of 
wildlife.  In the state courts at the time, this was precisely the 
understanding of state power with respect to wildlife.  In Royal 
Phelps v. Racey, the Court of Appeals of New York held that “[t]he 
protection and preservation of game has been secured by law in all 
civilized countries, and may be justified on many grounds, one of 
which is for purposes of food.  The measures best adapted to this end 
are for the legislature to determine, and courts cannot review its 
discretion.”531  In Magner v. People of the State of Illinois, the Illinois 
Supreme Court stated: “The ownership [of wildlife] being in the 
people of the State – the repository of the sovereign authority – . . . it 
necessarily results, that the legislature, as the representative of the 
people of the State, may withhold or grant to individuals the right to 
hunt and kill game, or qualify and restrict it, as, in the opinion of its 
members, will best subserve the public welfare.”532  The California 
Supreme Court stated in Ex parte Maier “[t]he wild game within a 
state belongs to the people in their collective, sovereign capacity.  It is 
not the subject of private ownership, except in so far as the people 
may elect to make it so; and they may, if they see fit, absolutely 
prohibit the taking of it, or any traffic or commerce in it, if deemed 
 528. Geer, 161 U.S. at 524 (quoting from POTHIER, TRAITE DU CROIT DE PROPRIETE, Nos. 
27-28). 
 529. Id. at 526 (quoting from C. CIV. arts. 714 & 715 (Fr.)). 
 530. Id. 
 531. Royal Phelps v. Racey, 60 N.Y. 10, 14 (1875) (upholding conviction of an individual 
found in possession in New York of game birds killed and transported from another state in 
violation of a New York law prohibiting such possession on the particular date in question). 
 532. Magner v. Illinois, 97 Ill. 320, 333-34 (1881) (upholding conviction of an individual for 
selling quail killed in and imported from Kansas in violation of Illinois prohibition on sale of 
such game). 
01__HUFFMAN.DOC 10/8/2008  10:26 AM 
88 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 18:1 
 
necessary for its protection or preservation, or the public good.”533  
All of these cases and many others spoke the language of state and 
common ownership while recognizing full discretion in the legislature 
to regulate the use and disposal of wild game. 
Justice White did use language in Geer that invited the 
conclusion that limits on legislative discretion may nonetheless exist: 
Whilst the fundamental principles upon which the common 
property in game rests have undergone no change, the development 
of free institutions has led to the recognition of the fact that the 
power or control lodged in the state, resulting from this common 
ownership, is to be exercised, like all other powers of government, 
as a trust for the benefit of the people, and not as a prerogative for 
the advantage of the government, as distinct from the people, or for 
the benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the public 
good.534 
Later in the opinion White writes: 
It is, perhaps, accurate to say that the ownership of the sovereign 
authority is in trust for all the people of the State, and hence by 
implication it is the duty of the legislature to enact such laws as will 
best preserve the subject of the trust, and secure its beneficial use in 
the future to the people of the state.  But in any view, the question 
of individual enjoyment is one of ‘public policy, and not of private 
right.’535 
But a careful reading of both statements reveals that what White is 
really talking about is the police power of the state, not a public trust 
based limit on the police power.  In the first quotation he says the 
states’ authority with respect to game is “like all other powers of 
government.”536  In the second quotation he says that legislative 
enactments on game are a matter of “public policy.”537  And near the 
conclusion of his opinion, Justice White states that “[t]he right to 
preserve game flows from the undoubted existence in the State of a 
police power to that end . . . .”538 
 533. Ex parte Maier, 37 P. 402, 404 (1894) (upholding the conviction of an individual for the 
sale in California of wild meat killed in and transported from Texas in violation of a prohibition 
on the sale of wild meat in the state). 
 534. Geer, 161 U.S. at 529. 
 535. Id. at 534. 
 536. Id. at 529. 
 537. Id. at 534. 
 538. Id. 
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 purpose” of the 
statu
 
Following on Geer, the Supreme Court made frequent reference 
to the state ownership theory in wildlife cases.539  In Missouri v. 
Holland, where federal regulations of migratory waterfowl pursuant 
to a treaty with Great Britain were challenged as a violation of state 
authority over wildlife, Justice Holmes acknowledged that earlier 
federal regulation of migratory birds, not undertaken pursuant to 
treaty obligations, had been invalidated in the face of state claims of 
ownership in the wildlife.540  Absent the treaty, said Holmes, the state 
of Missouri “would be free to regulate this subject,” but he also 
suggested that “[t]o put the claim of the State upon title is to lean 
upon a slender reed.  Wild birds are not in the possession of anyone; 
and possession is the beginning of ownership.”541  In Lacoste v. State 
of Louisiana the Court upheld a severance tax on the hides, skins and 
furs of wild animals against a takings claims under the 14th 
Amendment due process clause, noting that “[t]he wild animals 
within its borders are, so far as capable of ownership, owned by the 
state in its sovereign capacity for the common benefit of all of its 
people.  Because of such ownership, and in the exercise of its police 
power the state may regulate and control the taking, subsequent use 
and property rights that may be acquired therein.”542  In Foster-
Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel the Court invalidated a Louisiana law 
requiring the removal of heads and hulls of all shrimp prior to 
export.543  The Court acknowledged that “the state owns, or has 
power to control, the game and fish within its borders not absolutely 
or as proprietor or for its own use or benefit but in its sovereign 
capacity as representative of the people,”544 but found that 
conservation was “a feigned and not the real
te.545 
In Toomer v. Witsell Chief Justice Vinson, writing for a 
unanimous court, picked up on Justice Holmes’ clear skepticism in his 
Holland opinion about the state ownership theory.546  The court found 
that a South Carolina law imposing a tax on non-resident shrimpers 
 539. See, e.g., Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 3 (1928); Lacoste v. 
Louisiana, 263 U.S. 545, 547 (1924); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920). 
 540. Holland, 252 U.S. at 432. 
 541. Id. at 434. 
 542. Lacoste, 263 U.S. at 549. 
 543. Foster-Fountain Packing Co., 278 U.S. at 12-14. 
 544. Id. at 11. 
 545. Id. at 10. 
 546. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 401 (1948). 
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its citizens as against both 
alien
 
that was 100 times as much as the tax on resident shrimpers violated 
the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2547 and a 
law requiring shrimping boats to dock at a South Carolina port and 
unload, pack and stamp their catch with a tax stamp before 
transporting it to another state violated the commerce clause of 
Article I, Section 8.548  In its defense the State of South Carolina had 
urged that state ownership of the shrimp justified its discrimination 
against non-residents because they did not share in ownership of the 
fish.549  Vinson pointed out that only in McCready had the Court ever 
upheld such blatant discrimination against non-resident fishing and 
hunting.550  Based on two factual distinctions,551 he concluded that 
McCready was an exception to the general rule that such 
discrimination was unconstitutional.  “The whole ownership 
theory, . . .” said Vinson, “is now generally regarded as but a fiction 
expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a 
State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an 
important resource.”552  In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter 
objected that McCready should not “be looked at askance.”553  Not 
only had the doctrine of that case been widely relied upon in state 
courts, said Frankfurter, but in Truax v. Raich the Supreme Court 
itself “formulated the amplitude of the . . . doctrine by referring to 
‘the regulation or the distribution of the public domain, or of the 
common property or resources of the people of the state, the 
enjoyment of which may be limited to 
s and the citizens of other states.’”554 
Thirty years later the Supreme Court returned to consideration 
of the state ownership theory in three successive terms with seemingly 
contradictory results.  In 1977, the Court invalidated a Virginia law 
prohibiting federally licensed vessels owned by non-residents of 
Virginia from fishing in Chesapeake Bay and prohibiting ships owned 
 547. Id. at 402-03. 
 548. Id. at 406. 
 549. Id. at 399-400. 
 550. Id. at 400-01. 
 551. Id. at 401.  McCready involved stationary oysters rather than transient fish and 
regulations of inland rather than coastal waters. 
 552. Id. at 402. 
 553. Id. at 408. 
 554. Id. at 408-09, quoting from Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915).  In Truax the Court 
invalidated an Arizona law, enacted by initiative, requiring that eighty percent of the employees 
of employers with five or more workers be qualified electors or native-born citizens.  The Court 
mentions McCready by way of distinguishing it from the issue in Truax. 
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a law was preempted by federal legislation, 
Just
e have demonstrated above, Virginia has failed to do so 
Holmes’ blade in Missouri v. Holland . . . finally became reality in 
 
by non-citizens to catch fish anywhere in the state.  Pursuant to 
holding that the Virgini
ice Marshall stated: 
The “ownership” language . . . must be understood as no more than 
a 19th-century legal fiction expressing “the importance to its people 
that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of 
an important resource.” [citations omitted]  Under modern 
analysis, the question is simply whether the State has exercised its 
police power in conformity with the federal laws and Constitution.  
As w  
here.555 
The next year the Court upheld, in Baldwin v. Fish and Game 
Commission of Montana, a state hunting license scheme that required 
non-residents to pay seven and one-half times as much as residents 
for a license to hunt elk in the state.556  The law was challenged as 
violating the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2, 
and the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.557  Citing 
Corfield, McCready and Geer, Justice Blackmun stated that “[i]t 
appears to have been generally accepted that although the States 
were obligated to treat all those within their territory equally in most 
respects, they were not obliged to share those things they held in trust 
for their own people.”558  Blackmun acknowledged that “the States’ 
interest in regulating and controlling those things they claim to ‘own,’ 
including wildlife, is by no means absolute,”559 but insisted “that that 
language nevertheless expressed ‘the importance to its people that a 
State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an 
important resource.’”560  In concurrence, Chief Justice Burger 
admitted that the state ownership doctrine “is . . . a legal anachronism 
of sorts,” but insisted that it nonetheless “manifests the State’s special 
interest in regulating and preserving wildlife for the benefit of its 
citizens.”561  Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, 
said in dissent that “[t]he lingering death of the McCready doctrine as 
applied to a State’s wildlife, begun with the thrust of Mr. Justice 
 555. Douglas v. Seacoast Prod’s, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284-85 (1977) (quoting from Toomer v. 
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948)). 
 556. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 392 (1978). 
 557. Id. at 372. 
 558. Id. at 384. 
 559. Id. at 385. 
 560. Id. at 386 (quoting Douglas, 431 U.S. at 284, and Toomer, 334 U.S. at 402). 
 561. Id. at 392. 
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Douglas v. Seacoast.”562  As it turned out, Justice Brennan was right 
about the demise of the state ownership theory, but just a year 
premature.  Although the state ownership theory got a little CPR in 
Baldwin, it was finished off the next term in Hughes v. Oklahoma.563  
In Hughes the Court held “that time has revealed the error of the 
early resolution reached in [Geer] . . . and accordingly . . . [it] is today 
overruled.”564  Justice Brennan noted that efforts to extend the state 
ownership justification for favoring residents in the use of other 
resources had been repeatedly rejected565 and concluded that there 
was no justification for treating wildlife any differently.  “Under 
modern analysis,” wrote Brennan, “the question is simply whether 
the State has exercised its police power in conformity with the federal 
laws and Constitution.”566 
Because most objections to state wildlife laws rooted in the 
ownership theory have taken the form of claimed violations of the 
United States Constitution, the Supreme Court jurisprudence on the 
subject is important.  But there is nothing in the Supreme Court’s 
rejection of the state ownership theory that precludes a state 
legislature from continuing to assert ownership of wildlife and 
holding that such ownership constrains the state’s discretion with 
respect to wildlife use, disposal and management.567  A state 
legislature could ban, as some have, the taking of certain animals on 
the ground of state or public ownership, but the state can do that 
pursuant to its police power without the ownership claim.  In other 
words, or in the repetitious words of the Supreme Court, a state 
legislature can choose to place a higher priority on wildlife 
conservation than on competing policy objectives, whether or not it 
claims to own the wildlife.  What states cannot do is enact wildlife 
protection laws that conflict with either the individual rights 
protections or the governmental power assignments of the United 
States Constitution.  The only way in which the state ownership 
argument can make a difference in such federal cases is in the event 
the Supreme Court relies upon a balancing test and takes it upon 
 562. Id. at 405. 
 563. 441 U.S. 322 (1879). 
 564. Id. at 326. 
 565. See, e.g., West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (natural gas); Pennsylvania v. 
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (natural gas) and Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 
525 (1949) (milk). 
 566. Douglas v. Seacoast Prod’s, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977). 
 567. Id. 
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itself to decide in favor of a state law on the basis that the claim of 
state ownership evidences that the state’s interest in a challenged law 
is sufficiently weighty to overcome a burden on a protected right or a 
delegated federal power.568 
It is not coincidental that the interstate commerce and the 
privileges and immunities clauses have been the context for the 
wildlife cases in the Supreme Court.  The cases have reflected the 
efforts of states to gain advantage for their own residents in relation 
to non-residents, much more than they have reflected sincere concern 
for wildlife conservation.  To the extent that state laws do not have 
differential impacts on non-residents, do not conflict with legitimate 
federal laws and do not violate the federal constitutional rights of the 
state’s own citizens, state legislatures can do what they like, subject 
only to any limits imposed by their own state constitution and courts.  
It is such limits that advocates for extension of the public trust 
doctrine to wildlife seek to establish.  Although they have relied on 
the state ownership rhetoric of Supreme Court cases and on the 
Roman and English references to common property in wildlife, their 
objective is to justify court imposed limits on the legislative power or 
to justify legislative actions that might limit the property rights claims 
of state citizens.  Rather than accept that wildlife conservation and 
management is one among a multitude of competing interests in the 
give and take of the state legislatures, they seek a trump in the 
political game.  State ownership theory has been the hoped for trump 
card. 
VII.  THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
As the foregoing demonstrates, the generally accepted history of 
the public trust doctrine is more myth than reality.  The real story, to 
summarize very briefly, goes like this.  Roman law distinguished three 
interests in tidal waters and submerged lands.569  The jus publicum 
 568. For example, a state law that burdens interstate commerce might be upheld under the 
Pike v. Bruce Church test (cited in Hughes, 441 U.S. at 331) on the ground that “the burden 
imposed on such commerce is clearly [not] excessive in relation to the putative local benefits,” 
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970), with the Court relying on its repeated 
statements that the ownership theory should be understood to indicate a “special” interest in 
wildlife on the part of state governments.  But even then, it seems unlikely that the Supreme 
Court would find wildlife protection more special than schools or police or any number of other 
things the state does pursuant to the police power.  The wildlife cases seem to recognize that 
these public policy priority questions are for state legislatures to resolve. 
 569. Carl Shadi Paganelli, Creative Judicial Misunderstanding: Misapplication of the Public 
Trust Doctrine in Michigan, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1096-1103 (2007). 
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was the common right of unobstructed navigation, commerce and 
fishing (and perhaps bathing) in navigable waters.570  The emperor 
was assumed to own all navigable waters, submerged lands and other 
unappropriated resources and had the power to grant exclusive 
interests in them.571  The jus privatum encompassed all private 
interests in these waters and lands including the proprietary interests 
of the emperor.572  Such private interests were acquired either by 
grant or prescription.  The jus regium encompassed the emperor’s 
powers to regulate these waters and lands on behalf of the public.  
Early English law made similar distinctions.  After Magna Carta, the 
crown was precluded from granting exclusive title to navigable waters 
and tidal lands, in law if not in fact, but there was no such limit on 
grants made by the king and Parliament or by Parliament alone.573  
From the nineteenth century, title to all submerged and tidal lands 
was presumed to be in the Crown, putting the burden of proof on any 
private claimants to demonstrate the legitimacy of their claims.574  
Grants were made subject to the public right of navigation, commerce 
and fishing 575 and any obstructions to or interference with those uses 
were subject to abatement or removal pursuant to an action in 
nuisance.576  These principles of English law, with various distortions, 
applied in the American colonies, and after the Revolution the 
individual states succeeded to the crown’s and Parliament’s rights and 
responsibilities.577  The prima facie rule of presumptive state title was 
converted to a rule of sovereign title and was applied to navigable 
waters and submerged lands.  Grants of those state interests to 
private parties could be made subject to the public rights of 
navigation, commerce and fishing.  These public uses could be 
regulated and licensed or granted by the state legislatures as 
successors to the powers of Parliament and without the limitations 
imposed by Magna Carta on the king.  The only important change 
from the English doctrine, at least according to Chancellor Kent and 
 570. Id. at 1098. 
 571. See id. at 1097-98. 
 572. Id. at 1098. 
 573. See supra text accompanying note 308; see also Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 
U.S. 387 (1892). 
 574. Deveney, supra note 30, at 53. 
 575. Id. at 54. 
 576. See generally text accompanying supra notes 137-39. 
 577. Deveney, supra note 30, at 55-66. 
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all subsequent American law, was its application in most American 
states to all waters navigable in fact.578 
Courts and commentators have consistently referenced the 
history of the public trust doctrine because they embrace the common 
law’s precedential method of assuring that judges and other 
governmental officials respect the rule of law.  The persistent 
citations to Justinian, Bracton, Hale, Blackstone, Kent, Arnold, 
Martin and Illinois Central are not mere expressions of antiquarian 
interest.  They reflect a deeply rooted belief among Anglo-American 
lawyers that the judge and the legal advocate must demonstrate that 
the law they propound was indeed the law before the passions and 
self-interest of the particular case intervened.  It would not do in 
Arnold for Chief Justice Kirkpatrick to reject a private claim of right 
on the basis of his conclusion that the public interest would be better 
served by leaving oyster beds open to all.  Rather he had to 
demonstrate, based on pre-existing law, that the private claim derived 
from an illegal grant.  The Supreme Court in Illinois Central could not 
invalidate the grant to the railroad on the ground that it was bad 
public policy.  Rather, the Court required reliance on a pre-existing 
legal rule that either forbade the legislature from making the grant or 
authorized its repeal without compensation to the railroad.  Without 
reference to pre-existing law and an indication that such law is 
somehow binding on the decision at hand, the judge becomes the law 
maker and the rule of law is abandoned to the rule of men and 
women. 
Of course the law cannot be frozen in time.  It must adapt to 
changing circumstances and the evolving values of our society.  One 
of the great strengths of the common law has been its adaptability 
over many centuries in the hands of judges with the wisdom to 
preserve the rule of law by adapting the law, not to the interests in the 
case at hand, but to the realities of a changing society.  This has been 
accomplished, for the most part, through adherence to basic concepts 
and adaptation through evolving conceptions.579  This difference, 
between concept and conception, is well illustrated by the American 
adaptation of the English definition of navigable waters.  At least 
according to Chancellor Kent, in eighteenth century English law 
navigable waters were those affected by the tides, not because all such 
 578. See id. at 66. 
 579. Charles P. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 407 (1949-
50). 
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waters are in fact navigable, but because most navigable waters in 
Britain are tidal and the extent of the tides is a relatively easy 
boundary to identify.580  The concept was of waters on which 
navigation should be protected against obstruction.  The conception, 
good enough in light of the need to readily identify affected waters, 
was those affected by the tides.  In North America, many navigable 
waters are not tidal, so the conception of tidal waters as navigable was 
seen by the courts as too limiting.  In fact, reliance on the English 
conception of tidal waters in North America would do harm to the 
concept of unobstructed navigation since the law that protected 
navigation would not apply on the vast inland river and lake system 
(given the linking of the common right to state ownership).  The 
topography and hydrology of North America required a different 
conception.  The courts settled on navigable in fact even though it 
was less clear as a definition of boundaries.  Increased enforcement 
costs would be offset many times by the benefits of free navigation on 
America’s inland waterways. 
The revolution in public trust law urged by Professor Sax and so 
many others might be said to call for nothing more than new 
conceptions of public trust uses and resources in light of changed 
circumstances.581  But implicit in this argument is a whole different 
foundational concept.  The concept to which the rule of law is 
tethered would no longer be the public right in navigation, commerce 
and fishing in navigable waters.  It would be the public interest as 
broadly conceived as anyone might imagine which is indistinguishable 
from the scope of the police power.  The concept of a public right to 
navigation, commerce and fishing in navigable waters is bounded 
sufficiently to limit the discretion of a judge or other public official.  
To be sure there are gray areas where judgment must be exercised – 
does fishing include oystering or do navigable waters include those 
navigable in fact?  But if a public right to fish implies a public right to 
camp and a navigable waterway implies a prairie pothole, or if the 
concept of a public right in navigation, commerce and fishing implies 
a public right in all things the public might be thought to value at any 
point in time, then there can be no rule of law because there is no 
bounded concept to constrain the judge. 
The foregoing history of the public trust doctrine in the United 
States confirms that the vast majority of American judges have been 
 580. Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. 307, 318 (N.Y. 1805). 
 581. See Sax, supra note 1. 
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good stewards of the rule of law.  The broad and sweeping language 
of Justinian that has echoed through two millennia of case law and 
commentary has been narrowly applied, as it was in England, to 
navigable waters for the purposes of navigation, commerce, fishing 
and sometimes bathing.  With the exception of the revised definition 
of navigability in North America, an exception made to avoid an 
exceptional departure from the concept of navigability in the 
common law, American case law remained reasonably true to its 
common law roots, at least through the middle of the twentieth 
century.  The glaring exception was Arnold v. Mundy, but there the 
departure was more rhetorical than actual and it had only to do with 
alienability of state lands, not the extent and nature of the public 
trust.582  On the question of alienability, the case was overruled to 
conform with historic and continuing practices in New Jersey and to 
return the state to the common law norm prevalent in the other 
states.  Even the “lodestar” case of Illinois Central was not a 
departure from the common law focus on navigation, commerce and 
fishing in navigable waters.583  While ruling against the railroad, the 
Supreme Court confirmed that the state could alienate submerged 
lands, but not if doing so was likely to result in total obstruction of the 
public’s right of navigation and commerce.  The decision really turned 
on the factual conclusion that the grant to the railroad would have 
that consequence.  From a rule of law perspective, this understanding 
of Illinois Central is far better than the Court’s alternative suggestion 
that the legislature may have had the power to make the grant, but 
they also had the power to revoke it without compensation to the 
railroad.584 
Over the course of the nineteenth century, American public trust 
law did depart from its English roots in establishing a firm linkage of 
the public trust to state ownership.  The original concept was that the 
jus publicum operated as an easement in relation to the jus privatum, 
whether the state or individuals were the proprietors of submerged 
and tidal lands.  The linkage to state ownership arose in part because 
of the expansion of the definition of the navigable waters to include 
navigable in fact, non-tidal waters.  This expansion was important to 
commerce and navigation on America’s inland waterways, the 
traditional concern of the public trust, but not because the state 
 582. See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 45 (N.J. 1821). 
 583. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
 584. Id. at 456. 
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owned the beds of those waterways.  The traditional doctrine applied 
to navigable waters whether or not the beds were owned by the 
sovereign.  The expansion of the navigability definition was also 
important to the extent of riparian land ownership in the rapidly 
developing continent.  Under the English prima facie rule, the 
presumption was that the state owned the beds and banks of 
navigable waterways.  Submerged lands could be privately held, but 
the burden was on the private claimant to prove title either by grant 
from the state or prescription.  There was, however, no necessary 
connection between reliance on navigability to define the geographic 
scope of the common rights of navigation and commerce and 
navigability as establishing the prima facie case for state ownership of 
submerged lands.  This merging of two distinct doctrines did not 
result in unrestrained private obstructions to navigation, because the 
traditional remedy of an action in nuisance remained in cases of 
private obstruction. 
The American cases also have tended to confuse the jus 
publicum and the jus regium.  As explained by Bracton, the jus 
publicum is the common right of navigation, commerce and fishing in 
navigable waters.  The jus regium is the power of the sovereign to act 
in the public interest including the power to enforce the jus publicum.  
This power to enforce the jus publicum, an aspect of what we would 
today call the police power, is the same as the power to enforce the 
jus privatum.  The confusion in some American cases results from 
thinking of the jus publicum as the public interest rather than as 
common rights in the nature of an easement.  The common right in 
navigation, commerce and fishing in navigable waters is enforced in 
the state courts in a nuisance case or some analogous action against 
the offending individual.585  It is in the public interest for the state to 
provide for such remedies, but that is only a very small part of what 
the state might do via its police powers to promote and protect the 
public interest.  An order by the state enforcing the jus publicum 
requires no compensation to the offending party because that party 
had no right to obstruct navigation in the first place, or to state it in 
the affirmative, the common right was a preexisting easement.  But it 
does not follow that everything the state does pursuant to its police 
power can be done without compensation to affected property 
owners.  By confusing the jus publicum and the jus regium – the 
 585. Under English law the obstruction was referred to as a purpresture.  Injunctive relief 
would be granted in an action in nuisance. 
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common right to navigation and fishing with the general public 
interest – American case law has opened a potentially giant loophole 
in the constitutional protections of property rights.  A property owner 
whose dam on his own property obstructs navigation and thus violates 
the jus publicum has no complaint when he is required to remove the 
dam without compensation.586  His property right did not permit such 
a dam to be built.  But if the jus publicum is just a Latin term for the 
public interest,587 the scope of the public trust is limitless and the 
constitutional protections of property rights are a nullity. 
The prospect of such a free pass to the exercise of the police 
power has animated the modern interest in an expanded public trust 
doctrine.  It is implicit in Professor Sax’s 1970 article and explicit in 
many articles written in the intervening years.588  Many of the 
advocates of an expanded doctrine are of the view that the interests 
they seek to protect are of special importance and not interests that 
should be negatively impacted by the actions of private property 
owners on the one hand, or of state and local government on the 
other hand.  By expanding the scope of the jus publicum, they can 
claim there is no infringement of property rights because those rights 
have always been subject to the public rights of the jus publicum.  
And to the extent the jus publicum is viewed as a limit on the 
legislature, at least with respect to management and use of state 
owned resources, they can exercise a trump in the political process.  
The effort to extend the doctrine to wildlife is illustrative of its 
potential power and of the importance to that potential of the 
American conflation of the jus publicum, jus privatum and jus regium.  
By linking the public trust to state ownership of submerged lands, it is 
a seemingly small step to expand its application to all state owned 
resources.  The overruling of Geer has not been helpful to that 
possibility.589  But by equating the jus publicum to the public interest, 
 586. In such a case, the jus publicum is part of what Justice Scalia called “background 
principles” in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
 587. This confusion has not been limited to the courts.  Noting that the Florida Constitution 
(Article X, Section 11) provides that unalienated tidelands are held in trust for the people and 
may only be sold or leased when in the public interest, Donna Christie argues that the use of the 
term “the public interest” rather than “public trust uses” “is an indication that Florida intends 
the doctrine to be dynamic and reflect the public’s contemporary interests . . . .”  Marine 
Reserves, the Public Trust Doctrine and Intergenerational Equity, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 
427, 433 (2004).  But there is nothing on the face of the provision suggesting it means anything 
other than state lands may be sold when the legislature determines it to be in the public interest.  
It is the legislature, not the public trust doctrine, that is meant to be dynamic. 
 588. See Sax, supra note 1. 
 589. See generally Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1879). 
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or at least to special public interests, the American interpretation has 
encouraged reliance on the view that state ownership of wildlife was 
meant to convey a special public interest in that particular resource.  
In modern public trust law a special interest can be converted to a 
public right by the stroke of a sympathetic judge’s pen.  That right will 
then serve to preempt the claims of private property owners and to 
trump the political process.590 
The wildlife cases can be helpful to a clear understanding of the 
historic public trust doctrine.  As we have come to understand in the 
last several decades, the concept of public ownership of wildlife was a 
useful legal fiction expressing that wildlife are thought to be 
important to the general public interest.  But the concept of public 
ownership also had much deeper roots in Roman and English law in 
the sense that all things not owned, either because they have not been 
appropriated or because they are not conducive to ownership, are 
owned by the emperor or king, or by their American successors to 
sovereignty, the states.  And so it was with navigable waters and 
submerged lands as well as with unclaimed or “waste” uplands.  The 
idea of a common or public right to navigation, commerce and fishing 
in these navigable waters, with resulting limitations on the use of 
those waters and their submerged lands, did not mean that the waters 
and lands could not be granted to private individuals.  Nor did it 
mean that the jus publicum could not be granted in the form of 
several fisheries, exclusive wharfing rights or licenses to engage in 
commerce.  So long as the jus publicum had not been granted, the 
remedy for its violation was an action in nuisance.  But there is little 
doubt that the state could eliminate the action in nuisance and 
replace it with a regulatory regime, or replace it with nothing, which 
would be the equivalent of granting the right to whomever 
appropriated it first.  In other words, the legislature speaks for the 
public.  It is the only legitimate voice for the public interest.  If its 
decisions, whether with respect to navigable waters or any other 
matter or means not precluded from its jurisdiction and powers by the 
state or federal constitutions, are invalidated by the courts, the courts 
are acting beyond their legitimate powers. 
 590. A parallel to this development in public trust law exists in other areas of public interest 
regulation.  The term “stakeholder” has become common parlance to describe individuals or 
groups with a personal interest in just about any private or public project.  But the term 
“stakeholder” carries meaning different from old fashioned terms like “voter” or “special 
interest group.”  The term speaks of rights more than interests, casting a very different shadow 
over both the judicial and legislative processes. 
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Yet that is precisely what proponents of an expanded public trust 
doctrine advocate.  In Professor Sax’s words, they seek judicial 
intervention to limit the legislative and executive branches of 
government or to force those branches of government to impose 
limits on private individuals in the name of the public trust doctrine.591  
To encourage and bolster such judicial intervention they have created 
a mythological history of the doctrine.  Perhaps this is an 
acknowledgment of the rule of law and our precedential legal system, 
or at least a sense that our courts, for the most part, remain 
committed to the rule of law tradition, but it shows little respect for 
the rule of law or for history. 
It may be argued that the foregoing review of the history of the 
public trust doctrine has taken too narrow a view of the relevant 
history.  Customs and practices beyond the formal institutions of the 
law may be found to confirm a much broader understanding of the 
public’s rights.  Although a broader perspective may evidence long 
standing public uses not reflected in the statutory or common law, as 
the Oregon Supreme Court concluded in Thornton v. Hay, in which it 
found a public right of access to the entire coast of the state,592 such a 
sociological approach is almost certain to confirm a generally narrow 
understanding of the public trust doctrine.593  As we have seen from 
Magna Carta through Arnold v. Mundy, sociological realities have 
generally reflected extensive grants of exclusive private rights, even in 
those rare cases where statements of the formal law asserted a broad 
public right.  The king continued to grant lands and fisheries to 
private individuals, often with the approval of Parliament, 
 591. See Sax, supra note 1, at 473. 
 592. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584 (1969).  Relying on a history of extensive 
public use of Oregon’s beaches, Blackstone and an 1834 New Hampshire case Perley v. Langley, 
7 N.H. 233 (1834), the court found a public right of access to the dry sand beaches of the state 
pursuant to the doctrine of custom. 
 593. Even in Thornton the court provided no evidence, sociological or otherwise, that the 
dry sand beaches of Oregon had been customarily used by the public.  The claim of customary 
use had not been raised in the trial court so there was no evidence on the record to support the 
Supreme Court’s conclusion.  The court’s opinion suggested that the customary common right 
had existed on the entire Oregon coast, notwithstanding that only a single property owner was 
party to the litigation.  The Oregon Supreme Court later held that the doctrine did not apply to 
every dry sand beach in the state, absent a showing of actual public use sufficient to satisfy the 
doctrine of custom, in McDonald v. Halvorson, 308 Or. 340 (1989).  But four years later the 
Court seemed to affirm its original statement in Thornton recognizing general public rights, at 
least to a particular section of the coast.  Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 317 Or. 131 (1993).  
The United States Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari over a vigorous dissent by Justice 
Scalia in which he wrote: “To say that this case raises a serious Fifth Amendment takings issue is 
an understatement.” Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994). 
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notwithstanding the prohibitions of Magna Carta.  At the very 
moment Chief Justice Kirkpatrick was writing his opinion in Arnold 
v. Mundy, the New Jersey Legislature was passing laws providing for 
the granting of exclusive rights to plant and harvest oysters in New 
Jersey waters.594  The sociological history of resource use is largely a 
history of economic forces at work.  Professor Cohen suggests that 
history will demonstrate that the common rights generally said to be 
the core of the public trust doctrine originally existed to promote 
commercial interests through the efficiencies of private rights, 
including a private right of access to the channels of commerce.595  
Professor Rose recognizes that nineteenth century American courts 
rarely ventured beyond commerce as the foundation of public trust 
and public prescription, and that custom as a basis for noncommercial 
public rights was more often rejected than accepted.596  She suggests, 
nonetheless, a theory of a commons managed by the unorganized 
public that might extend these common law doctrines beyond 
commerce to speech and recreation, though probably not 
environmental protection.597  But the evidence for such a theory in the 
case law is thin and the evidence that such informal management of 
scarce resources works on a scale relevant to the twenty-first century 
is even thinner.  Nearly forty years ago, Patrick Deveney observed 
that the history of the doctrine being told by some modern courts was 
“very much ad hoc” and “often substituted for or obscured an 
analysis of the real interests competing for the coastal area.”598  Five 
years after Deveney, Glenn MacGrady concluded that “the public 
trust doctrine was . . . [n]onexistent at English common law, . . . was 
created by an obscure and unprepared state court judge, adopted by 
the inventive Roger Taney, and repeated forever after in hundreds of 
American decisions, . . . .”599  And, he might have added, it was 
repeated by scores of legal commentators.  The ad hoc and ill-
informed telling of that history has continued unabated since 
 594. See James Kent, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 417 (Oliver Wendell Holmes 
ed., 12th ed. 1873). 
 595. Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL. W. L. 
REV. 239, 254 (1992). 
 596. Rose, supra note 18, at 722-23. 
 597. In a contribution to a symposium on Professor Sax’s public trust writings, Rose 
concludes that “the public trust doctrine only indirectly relates to environmental resources . . . .”  
The better theory for environmentalists, she suggests, is one drawn from the law of riparianism.  
Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L. Q. 351, 360-61 (1998). 
 598. Deveney, supra note 30, at 37. 
 599. MacGrady, supra note 58, at 591. 
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Deveney and MacGrady wrote, but it does not provide justification to 
secure for the public, in the name of newly conceived notions of 
common rights and without compensation, resources heretofore 
privately owned. 
Of course in the adversary system of the common law, the lawyer 
is expected to make the most of the facts and law at hand.  But a 
careful review of the history – the precedent – does not make the case 
for expanded application of the public trust doctrine.  That leaves its 
advocates to search for constitutional sources for the doctrine, or to 
make the case for judicial law making beyond the traditional judicial 
role of legal interpretation.  At the end of the day, courts will 
embrace whatever theories they choose and extend or limit the public 
trust doctrine as they see fit.  But if they are committed to the rule of 
law, democratic government, and the traditional interpretive role of 
the judiciary, they will not loosen the public trust doctrine’s historic 
shackles. 
